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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) implemented a maritime interdiction network using search and
rescue which interdicted at least 462,813 “illegal migrants” in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea between 2006 and 2015. This involved 15 discrete, militarised and semi-secret 
maritime interdiction operations (MIOs) at a minimum cost of 126.9 million 2014 Euros. 
In this dissertation, I will explore and map these operations and their geographies 
between 2006 and 2015.
First, and based on the given existence of the European Patrols Network, I 
examine how this network came into being in the first place. This serves to show that the 
EU purposely created regular maritime interdiction operations using search and rescue to 
interdict migrants by 2006. This approach also justifies and underpins my subsequent 
analyses of their histories, functions and outcomes, all of which depend on the network 
having two specific properties. First: that the EPN was a system intentionally designed to 
internalise migrants and boats as external objects of security via legal inclusion in order to
exclude them. Second: that the main mechanism for this process of what I call 
internalisation was search and rescue.
Second, and based on the establishment of these two properties of the EPN, I 
examine and explore these operations in order to describe them for the first time. I 
demonstrate the existence of these operations, their inner workings and their basic 
empirical outcomes. I then proceed to statistically show that search and rescue was 
empirically vital to their interdiction practises over time. I subsequently display that 
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search and rescue was also critical to spatial externalisation, or the outward movement of 
border enforcement to manage international migration. These analyses demonstrate that 
search and rescue was indeed the primary spatial and legal tool of interdiction in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015.
Last, and based on the empirical demonstration of the relevance of search and 
rescue, I put these maritime interdiction operations to unprecedented statistical testing to 
determine whether they were effective at stopping current or future migration. This 
enables analysis of whether social theories assuming or arguing for the (lack of) 
effectiveness of such operations have empirical support, something yet to be performed in 
past research.
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1 Introduction
1 How to Search and Rescue Weapons of Mass Destruction
If cooperation between Member States [in border enforcement at sea] is to be 
uniform and more effective, there is a special need to reaffirm the principle of solidarity 
in intercepting vessels carrying illegal immigrants, by means of meticulous application of 
the law of the sea for the immediate rescue of ships whose seaworthiness is in doubt.
Council of the European Union (2003, 10)
On 21 May 2015, CNN reporter Christian Amanpour received a rare chance to shipride 
with a maritime interdiction operation in the Central Mediterranean Sea (CNN 2015). 
Such shipridding likely required permission from both the Government of Italy and 
Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders (Frontex 2014, 52). As she walked towards a Italian helicopter, Christian
appeared confident that she was joining on a mission to ‘free’ those journeying from all 
over Africa and the Middle East to Italy.
Christian, however, appeared unaware of the obsfucation happening right before 
her eyes. She confused interdiction, or the practise of blockading the sea to halt and 
control the movement of contraband, with search and rescue. Amanpour had no 
knowledge of the fact that the very human beings making journeys by boat to the 
European Union, or migrants, were the contraband. So when Italian Admiral Pierpaolo 
Ribuffo called such migrants and their boats “weapons of mass destruction”, her only 
response was to note how that affected the military forces on their mission of interdiction 
in the region. But the Government of Italy and Frontex considered them a threat which 
they had to contain.
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Amanpour watched a military helicopter track and stalk a migrant boat near the 
coast of Libya. She never seemed to question either the legality or justification for 
interdiction despite how far it happened from EU shores. Rather, Christian was moved by 
the intricate military equipment and personnel used to interdict the migrant boat on its 
journey northward towards the Italian island of Lampedusa. She reverently observed EU 
frigates approaching to isolate this vessel, while its ‘human cargo’ was offloaded by 
border enforcement personnel wearing masks and white hazard suits. Once aboard, she 
smiled while explaining that the deckload of huddled, African migrants left in the burning
sun were “free at least”. Not once did Amanpour question what would happen to these 
people or where they might end up. Though, for many, that would either be in detention 
and eventual deportation, or, for others, ‘return’ to Libya. Amanpour said such an 
outcome was necessary to stop the “merchants of death”, that is, those who help facilitate 
these migrants in moving to the EU.
Most critically, Christian never connected the relationship between search and 
rescue and interdiction, despite the fact that it laid before her eyes. The boat she followed 
was moving, not sinking, when Italian and EU forces interdicted it. In spite of this, 
Frontex’s records reported that border enforcement authorities stopped the boat by virtue 
of search and rescue, which implied it was in distress and thereby needed intervention 
(Frontex 2015a-b). It was on this basis that they went far beyond EU territorial limits to 
stop the boat and detain those on board. What Amanpour in fact witnessed were military 
forces actively seeking out migrant boats to claim as in distress and therefore interdict.
2
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Rescue had become interdiction before Christian’s very eyes: a tool to contain the 
presumed threat of migration itself. This was the European Commission’s “meticulous 
application of the law of the sea for the immediate rescue of ships whose seaworthiness 
was in doubt.” That result, as this dissertation will demonstrate, was the culmination of a 
larger policy to intentionally use search and rescue as an instrument of interdiction for 
political ends. I will specifically examine and explore the history, implementation and 
outcomes of these semi-secret maritime interdiction operations in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea between 1985 and 2015. I will now expose these operations and their 
consequences for the first time. I will show what these operations looked like, how 
Frontex designed and operated them, and their basic empirical effects. I will additionally 
demonstrate that search and rescue was spatially and legally critical to the operations. 
Finally, I will substantiate that they ultimately were ineffective at deterring migration.
Hundreds of thousands of people journeyed from North Africa by boat to reach 
the EU through the Central Mediterranean Sea. Some of this movement was part of longer
processes of migration and exclusion, such as restrictive visa controls, carrier sanctions 
and generally tighter borders. But also important was the existence of substantial violence
and conflict in the EU’s periphery, most noteably the Syrian Civil War (2011-present). 
While only a minority of such migrants attempted to enter the EU by boat, Chapter 2 
shows how its policymakers nevertheless constructed them into a major threat.
3
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2 About Maritime Interdiction Operations and the Central Mediterranean Sea
This dissertation’s analytical object is the Maritime Interdiction Operation, or MIO. The 
MIOs which I explore happened in a specific region between the EU and North Africa, 
which Frontex calls the “Central Mediterranean Sea”, between 2006 and 2015. In this 
section, I briefly introduce and justify my selection of MIOs, the Central Mediterranean 
Sea and time period from 2006 to 2015, elaborations of which occur in subsequent 
chapters.
2.1 Maritime Interdiction Operations
Maritime interdiction describes the practise of implementing military control over space 
at sea in order to achieve political ends. Western European states developed organised 
maritime interdiction as a strategy to achieve their military objectives by blockading 
enemy states between the 17th and 19th centuries. They later formalised and implemented 
international law concerning how interdiction should occur. To avoid war while 
maintaining their enforcement powers, imperial powers created new interdiction 
instruments, one of which later evolved into the maritime interception operation. 
United States authorities, such as the Coast Guard, would later reapply these terms
and spatial tactics to non-military “contraband” like the drug trade and human migration 
in the Caribbean by the 1970s. Multinational forces also deployed these types of 
interdiction in cases like the First Gulf and Yugoslavian Civil Wars. Morabito (1992, 10) 
described this rebranding of interdiction as a "creative disguise to well tested and proven 
wartime strategy." US Navy Lieutenant Commander Ziegler (1995, 29) supported this 
4
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lack of distinction: "It could well be argued that MIOs are merely the late-20th century 
version of pacific blockade."
Combined with search and rescue, the Government of Italy experimented with its 
first MIO to manage migration from Albania in the late 1990s based on the United States 
experience and policy in Haiti during the early 1990s. As I discuss below, the EU later 
built on these experiments in creating the European Patrols Network (EPN), or a regular, 
near continuous system of maritime interdiction across its border spaces at sea.
I chose to study maritime interdiction operations because they were the object by 
and through which Frontex and the EU created and implemented interdiction at sea 
between 2006 and 2015. MIOs were the concept around which Frontex planned its spatial
and legal tactics. The use of operations in this way has a longer history, part of which I 
will explore over time in Chapter 3 and in the EU context specifically in Chapter 2. We 
can best describe and explain interdiction at sea through the genealogy and practise of the 
concept of the MIO. This is therefore how I approach studying interdiction at sea in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015.
Maritime interdiction operations matter because state border enforcement 
authorities frequently used them to interdict and detain migrants for processing and 
subject them to an expedited immigration process. During detention, state officials 
interviewed migrants to collect information on their characteristics and routes of travel. 
This additional surveillance mechanism helped state bureaucrats plan future border 
enforcement tactics. 
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MIOs have a governance character, in that the EU intends them to influence 
migrant behaviour on a regional scale. This placed them into an international mobility 
regime, which functioned to manage and reproduce population groups through 
influencing movement (Aas 2011; Agamben 1998; Cresswell 2006). Influencing mobility 
partially achieves this by changing the biological and political characteristics of the 
population itself. The result, then, has been a ‘policy of containment’, or global 
governance mechanisms designed to control movement as far away from the sovereign as 
possible (Castles 2003; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Samers 2004). MIOs exemplify this 
result.
State coordination in surveillance and interdiction operations (e.g., through 
Frontex) in the EU reveal their quest for an international geography. The EU, for example,
has signed many bilateral treaties with North African states, funds International 
Organization for Migration projects in known sending regions, and developed its policy 
from the actions and experiences of states like Australia and the United States (European 
Commission 2011; Loyd and Mountz 2018; Mountz 2010, 121; Ronzitti 2009, 125). It 
also shares surveillance data with third-party states (Aas 2011, 333; Mathiesen 2004).  So
while MIOs, as a whole, intended to manage migrant movement, their constituent 
activities are also part of larger governance mechanisms like surveillance intended to 
manage migration as a whole. This made understanding MIOs necessary in order to 
understand migration governance on larger scales.
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Maritime interdictions further matter because states used them to compete in their 
political population management goals. While these objectives vary, a number of scholars 
agreed that enforcing border policy via MIOs is critical in maintaining sovereignty via 
social exclusion (Aas 2011, 333; Basch, Glick-Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1997, 183-4). 
Insofar as such operations exist and expand, then, they reinforce the nation as a sovereign 
within a given space, even if that space, as I will argue in Chapter 2, is not that state’s 
territory. Ultimately, however, and as shown in Chapter 4, MIOs have limits on their 
ability to control migration through containment. Chapter 4 instead highlights the limits 
of sovereignty and how states constructed political performances to produce sovereignty 
in the first place.
2.2 The Central Mediterranean Sea and Selection of 2006 to 2015 as Study Time Period
The European Union created and implemented regular maritime interdiction operations 
using search and rescue in the “Central Mediterranean Sea”, or the physical sea space 
roughly bounded between North Africa, Greece, Italy and Malta, between 2006 and 2015.
The region became a part of the wider European Patrols Network in 2006, which aimed to
organise large-scale naval patrols across the Mediterranean Sea and parts of the Atlantic 
Ocean in preventing illegalised movement at sea. The European Union created and 
formalised the region as early as 1994 due to its political commitment to the "external 
border", problematisation of "illegal immigration" from North Africa, and desire to 
reduce displacement effects of migration enforcement elsewhere.
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Between 2006 and 2015, Frontex, intended long before 2006 to become the EU’s border 
guard, administered the European Patrols Network through at least 66 semi-secret operations at a 
minimum cost of 315.6 million 2014 Euros. To do this, it arranged the sea into four regions: 
Central Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean and Canary Islands and 
Atlantic. This was the immediate origin of the term “Central Mediterranean”, as used in this 
study. Frontex coordinated with local member states and cooperative third countries to organise 
large-scale naval patrols and surveillance through regional infrastructures, including command 
centres, search and rescue coordination centres and satellite systems. These activities worked with
local operations to produce continuous migration deterrence over extended distances.
To study maritime interdiction operations using search and rescue in the EU, I had to 
examine the European Patrols Network. The EPN, however, was too large, legally, spatially and 
politically, to appropriately analyse in a single dissertation. I therefore selected one region based 
on its availability of data: the Central Mediterranean Sea. I set 2006 as the start of my full 
analysis because it was also when the EPN began its MIOs; I selected 2015 as the end since this 
was the last available data when I finished data collection in early 2016. My study therefore 
represents a complete analysis of the MIOs in one of the four regions of the EPN during its first 
ten years of existence.
3 Methodological Approach
My dissertation’s methodological approach evolved during the course of the research. As I
began to systematically study MIOs and migration, I reviewed a vast body of literature on 
migration by boat, maritime interdiction and methodology in studying international 
migration. The lived experience of my research combined with previous scholarship 
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fermented into a more formal, defined mixed methodology to study MIOs more generally 
(Williams 2018). I specifically designed my study to integrate critical, grounded, 
historical and correlational methodologies and thereby overcome previous limitations in 
studying MIOs. Despite my approach’s ultimate limitations, my dissertation shows how it 
has enabled the first comprehensive, detailed account of the empirics of MIOs.
Current scholarly literature in border and migration studies had yet to examine the 
origin, development, implementation and wider consequences of maritime interdiction 
operations. This was despite the fact that they had become a critical part of understanding 
both the context and outcomes of international migration at sea. MIOs more specifically 
were integral components of policies of containment at sea, which first emerged after the 
growing concern over the movement of ‘boat people’ in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean
in the 1970s (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008; Loyd & Mountz 2018; Lutterbeck 2006). As I 
will explore in Chapter 2, state actors reinforced these concerns by the publicity of boat 
migrant boat incidents worldwide and the alleged security threats they posed (Pugh 2004; 
van Selm forthcoming). Since that time, and as previously mentioned, a host of wealthier 
states have practised regular MIOs ostensibly to manage migration at sea. This evolved in 
parallel with state and media discourses of crisis which served to exacerbate their threat 
(Mountz 2010). This dissertation thus serves to fill this important research gap.
A core scientific problem of the importance of maritime interdiction was how to 
approach studying it. Identifying which approaches were most appropriate required an 
appraisal of their relative benefits and consequences. Selecting the most appropriate 
9
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method required specification of what was being studied, identification of key study 
issues, and a list of appropriate methodologies. Six major challenges in understanding 
MIOs were data availability, different definitions, divergences in recording, power 
relations, reluctance to report, and data destruction by the state (Williams 2018). My 
dissertation functions partly to overcome these challenges and alleviate them in the future 
by forming a baseline for future research.
The philosophy of science employed multiple concepts of understanding, such as 
truth, falsifiability, and verifiability (Lauden 1981, 144; Salmon 1984). From a pragmatic 
perspective, the analytical use of objects in migration studies was to assist in constructing 
a logical framework of known social relations in determining migration outcomes using 
these concepts (Little 1991, 4-5). Relations which connected a series of characteristics, 
through events, to a given outcome in the world are called “causal mechanisms” (ibid, 15).
Statistical approaches could not solely establish these mechanisms because they were 
limited in isolating the micro-level ways in which social relations affected behaviour 
(Achen 2002, 443). Models of MIOs, boats and migrants in this dissertation are not 
instrumental but rather meant to make inductive generalisations about causal mechanisms 
operating in the real world (Hausman 1992; Sugden 2010, 1). My models then are not 
MIOs, but instead serve as heuristics by which to understand, explain and act upon MIOs 
(Ruhs and Anderson 2010, 10; 30).
The ability of various available research designs to describe and explain maritime 
interdiction operations had substantial limitations (Williams 2018). On the qualitative 
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side, pragmatic and grounded theory approaches suffer from insufficient specification to 
guide the researcher in studying the analytical object (Pratt 2012, 2). Ethnographic and 
historical accounts often miss key informants, locations, documents, and even time can 
often only be selected in ways which significantly skew sampling (Freeman 1983; Thies 
2002, 355). Critical theory widely neglects empiricism in favour of theory (Bohman 
2013). Finally, content analysis’ issues with document availability constrain its use, which
applies in the case of my study (Sommer and Sommer 1991, 362).
Quantitative methodologies generally experience feasibility and validity issues. 
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs required selecting among undocumented 
migrants or state actors who lack incentive to self-report.  Studies along these lines would 
likely be conducted in laboratory settings, where controlled conditions would remove the 
causal mechanisms most relevant in behaviour and render results invalid (Little 1991, 18).
While a natural experiment could have solved the issue of subject selection, it necessitates
an in-depth study of a MIO from start to finish which is simply infeasible at this time. 
This is possible because states design operations to be covert, making direct observation 
of all of their activities difficult. Correlational studies were limited by data availability 
and explanatory power of causal relationships (Shaughnessy, Zechmeister and 
Zechmeister 2014). If data were available, however, then a correlational study could 
explore interdictions at sea in an empirical way mostly previously absent in the literature 
(Mountz 2018; Williams and Mountz 2018). Simulation, via agent-based modelling is 
problematic to deploy due to the deductive limits of theory (Crooks, Castle and Batty 
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2008, 422). Scholars have also yet to sufficiently formalise traditional theories of 
international migration to be used in simulation (Bijak 2010, 47-50). 
My view was that limitations in researching maritime interdiction operations made
a mixed methods method approach most appropriate for studying them. I proposed that 
the most appropriate overall approach was to integrate critical, grounded, historical and 
correlational methodologies (Williams forthcoming). The design of this approach used a 
critical, theoretical underpinning to study interdiction at sea using available 
documentation and data on MIOs, boats, and migrants. In turn, the collected data allowed 
me to update my research as it progressed with the ultimate goal of identification of 
causal mechanisms and verification of theory (Table 1.1). The primary advantage of my 
methodological approach was to identify and describe causal mechanisms in a valid, 
empirical way which overcame the limitations of each method on its own.
The reliability, validity, and representativeness of a correlational study are 
desirable, but were limited in practise (Burawoy 1998, 11-3). A theoretical, qualitative 
approach permitted an identification and exploration of the actors relevant to causing 
MIOs. Critical theory was useful for understanding how social meaning was integral to 
this process. I moreover complemented social theories by a concurrent empirical 
description and analysis of its characteristics and verification of their outcomes. Important
sources of historical data included state policy documents and legislation, bilateral 
agreements and memoranda of understanding between states, and archival information on 
operations from relevant actors.
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Examples of correlational data included MIO, boat and migrant characteristics. 
Multiple sources for these data existed, such as media reports, international organisation 
budgets, scholarly literature, police records, court documents, and border agency 
statistical publications. I also made use of unconventional data sources, one example was 
freedom of information requests from Frontex. I then conducted statistical analysis to 
search for relationships in the data to support or fail to support causal mechanisms in 
theory, as well as search for new relationships. Statistical tools included, but were not 
limited to, descriptive statistics, linear modelling, analysis of variance, time series analysis
and spatial analysis. I actively incorporated historical data into these models. My ongoing 
analysis updated the existence, types, and workings of causal mechanisms from these 
findings, which informed additional research and thereby began the cycle anew.
There were ultimately limitations in my mixed methodology to study maritime 
interdiction operations using search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 
2009 and 2015. Three outstanding problems were differences in definition, divergence in 
recording and data destruction. A small amount of literature emerged in the last twenty 
years to deal with the first two issues. Methodologists in migration indirectly outline five 
tools for definition and recording issues: residual estimation, multiplier estimation, survey
methods, capture-recapture methods, and regularisation estimation (Jandl 2004, 143-6; 
Raymer 2007, 986; de Beer et al. 2010). The applicability of these tools was highly 
contextual and not applicable to the MIOs I studied. 
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International migration literature has yet to study data destruction. Rarely, a 
secondary source such as a state, may republish destroyed data. Even when it was not 
possible to retrieve data which has been destroyed, it was possible to keep multiple, secure
records of data used in my study. There were data management standards in social science
describing how nearly any type of data can be stored electronically for later use (ICPSR 
2011; DDIA 2014). Beyond preservation, storing all data used in studying migrant 
interdiction at sea had two further benefits. Publication of data added to public knowledge
and awareness of MIOs, which they often poorly understood, as with CNN’s Christian 
Amanpour. My stored data are also reproducible for future researchers or policymakers to 
verify or expand upon my findings.
Table 1.1. Summary of Dissertation’s Mixed Methodology and its Components
Stage Methodologies Purpose Expected Outcomes
1. Theoretical
formulation
Critical Theory Identify and explore causal
mechanisms and actors
* Selection of theory
* List of relevant
actors and processes
2. Empirical
collection and
verification
Correlational
Historical
Describe and analyse
actions and outcomes of
mechanisms
* Data collection
* Data analysis
3. Inference and
updating
Grounded
Theory
Compare outcomes to
expectations; update
research
* Verification of
theory
* New actors and
processes
My mixed methodology substantially compensated for methodological issues in 
studying maritime interdictions operations. As I will show, it allowed the most 
methodologically advanced and detailed study yet to be done on MIOs. My methodology, 
14
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
however, did not ultimately solve all potential challenges, and therefore some limitations 
remained. Despite that, I employed this approach in my dissertation, which I argue has 
enabled the first comprehensive, detailed account of the empirics of MIOs.
4 Exploring and Mapping the Relationship between Border Enforcement and 
Migration by Boat in the Central Mediterranean Sea, 2006 to 2015
4.1 Research Questions and Functions
The European Union (EU) implemented a maritime interdiction network using search and
rescue which interdicted at least 462,813 “illegal migrants” in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea between 2006 and 2015. This involved 15 discrete, militarised and semi-secret 
maritime interdiction operations (MIOs) at a minimum cost of 126.9 million 2014 Euros. 
In this dissertation, I will explore and map these operations and their geographies 
between 2006 and 2015 based on these three research questions:
1 How was it possible that a maritime interdiction network using search and rescue 
arose in the European Union? What were the historical, political and spatial 
factors that shaped this social structure?
2 What were the maritime interdiction operations involved with this network? What 
happened during them? How and why did they use search and rescue to conduct 
interdiction of migrants making journeys to the EU on boats? and
3 Were these maritime interdiction operations ultimately effective at stopping 
current or future migration?
The function of each question is as follows. First, and based on the given existence of the 
European Patrols Network, I examine how this network came into being in the first place. 
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This serves to show that the EU purposely created regular maritime interdiction 
operations using search and rescue to interdict migrants by 2006. This approach also 
justifies and underpins my subsequent analyses of their histories, functions and outcomes,
all of which depend on the network having two specific properties. First: that the EPN was
a system intentionally designed to internalise migrants and boats as external objects of 
security via legal inclusion in order to exclude them. Second: that the main mechanism for
this process of what I call internalisation was search and rescue.
Second, and based on the establishment of these two properties of the EPN, I 
examine and explore these operations in order to describe them for the first time. I 
demonstrate the existence of these operations, their inner workings and their basic 
empirical outcomes. I then proceed to statistically show that search and rescue was 
empirically vital to their interdiction practises over time. I subsequently display that 
search and rescue was also critical to spatial externalisation, or the outward movement of 
border enforcement to manage international migration. These analyses demonstrate that 
search and rescue was indeed the primary spatial and legal tool of interdiction in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015.
Last, and based on the empirical demonstration of the relevance of search and 
rescue, I put these maritime interdiction operations to unprecedented statistical testing to 
determine whether they were effective at stopping current or future migration. This 
enables analysis of whether social theories assuming or arguing for the (lack of) 
effectiveness of such operations have empirical support, something yet to be performed in 
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past research. If such operations are effective, then that would support theories claiming 
that MIOs have clear deterrent effects which justify their implementation in migration 
management. If such operations are ineffective, and they are a functionalist structure (i.e., 
one which the EU implemented for its functions), then it follows that there must be other 
explanations for their continual use and enhancement.
So, by the end of this dissertation, the following three answers to the questions 
above will be known:
• How it was possible that the European Patrols Network came into existence in the 
European Union by 2006. How and why the EU and later Frontex intentionally 
designed this system of interdiction to try and stop human migration for political 
ends. How and why search and rescue was an integral part of such interdiction;
• What these maritime interdiction operations involved with the EPN looked like, 
how Frontex designed and implemented them, and their basic empirical 
consequences. That search and rescue was the main mechanism by which MIOs 
achieved interdiction, both spatially and legally; and
• Whether or not search and rescue as interdiction was effective at stopping current 
or future migration, as well as what that says about current theories of border 
enforcement at sea in migration studies and border studies literatures.
4.2 Summary by Chapter
My dissertation consists of five chapters. Chapters 1 and 5 are its Introduction and 
Conclusion, respectively, and Chapters 2 through 4 are its substantive chapters, or those 
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which contribute new research. I begin here by expanding upon these three chapters and 
the end with a brief discussion of the Conclusion.
Chapter 2 identifies and explains the creation of a maritime interdiction network 
using search and rescue in the European Union (EU) between 1985 and 2006. The 
purpose of this "European Patrols Network" was to interdict migrants prior to arrival in 
the EU. To explain its rise, I first give a structural narrative of the evolution of interdiction
at sea through the concept of the "external border"; I then supplement this narrative with a
structural theory of internalisation. My central argument is that EU authorities, led by 
Frontex, used search and rescue as a means to internalise the external objects of security 
via legal inclusion in order to exclude them. The Network's creation was a deliberate 
policy developed by EU policymakers at key moments over time. It fit into a wider system
of border security whose goal was to manage illegalised movement in "all stages and 
places". Thanks to search and rescue, it was therefore possible for "illegal migrants" to 
"arrive" in the EU while simultaneously not being there. 
Search and rescue regions, or those where maritime interdiction operations 
nominally occurred, had special characteristics which allowed denationalisation to occur, 
thereby transferring jurisdiction to the rescuing state and creating new territory in that 
process. Search and rescue was thus a mechanism of internalisation, which not only 
captured bodies, boats and spaces, but subjected them to security via police. This was 
parallel to but different than Agamben's camp, and had distinct and formidable 
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consequences for those trapped inside this space of potentiality (i.e., space which was 
internal/external).
Chapter 3 theoretically and empirically demonstrates that search and rescue was 
instrumental in Frontex’s maritime interdiction operations in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea between 2006 and 2015. I do this via four analyses. I conduct a theoretical and 
literature review of the key links between search and rescue and modern maritime 
interdiction. I then describe the evolution of both in the Central Mediterranean Sea from 
2006 and 2015. I proceed to provide the first detailed account of these operations to show 
how they worked, including via search and rescue, to interdict migrants. Last, I 
statistically demonstrate that search and rescue was empirically instrumental in maritime 
interdiction via three subhypotheses: increases in (1) the use of search and rescue over 
time, (2) outward spread of interdiction geographies via use of search and rescue and (3) 
more migrants interdicted as a consequence of these shifts. I find all three relationships to 
be statistically significant and postive, therefore supporting an undeniable connexion 
between search and rescue and maritime interdiction.
Chapter 4 demonstrates that there was no statistical relationship between maritime
interdiction operational intensity and current or future migration in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. I find this result using a time series analysis 
of complete interdiction data from two data sets acquired through freedom of information 
requests with Frontex. My statistical analysis achieves a fine-grained, literally day-by-day 
analysis of 3,256 boat interdiction incidents involving 462,813 interdicted migrants over 
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3,241 operational days in 12 MIOs. My results give important evidence against previous 
theories which argued that MIOs had a clear deterrent effect that made them valuable 
tools of migration management. Contrastingly, they support scholars who argued that this 
general ineffectiveness reflected the political functions of MIOs. Though my data and 
analysis experience important limitations, my findings are compelling and show that an 
independent, quantitative analysis of the relationship between MIOs and migration is 
possible.
Finally, in Chapter 5 I bring together and review the conclusions of Chapters 2 to 
4. I make further, speculative inferences on the nature of maritime interdiction via search 
and rescue as a means of border enforcement at sea. Given that my study ends in 2015, I 
proceed to update my findings to the end of 2017. This involves updating my historical, 
policy and statistical analyses using new data. I observe the continual deployment of 
MIOs using search and rescue to the present, despite their general ineffectiveness at 
deterring migration.
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2 Internalisation and the Origin of Maritime Interdiction via Search and Rescue 
in the European Union, 1985 to 2006
Abstract: This chapter identifies and explains the creation of a maritime interdiction 
network using search and rescue in the European Union (EU) between 1985 and 2006. 
The purpose of this "European Patrols Network" was to interdict migrants prior to arrival 
in the EU. To explain its rise, I first give a structural narrative of the evolution of 
interdiction at sea through the concept of the "external border"; I then supplement this 
narrative with a structural theory of internalisation. My central argument is that EU 
authorities, led by Frontex, used search and rescue as a means to internalise the external 
objects of security via legal inclusion in order to exclude them. The Network's creation 
was a deliberate policy developed by EU policymakers at key moments over time. It fit 
into a wider system of border security whose goal was to manage illegalised movement in
"all stages and places". Thanks to search and rescue, it was therefore possible for "illegal 
migrants" to "arrive" in the EU while simultaneously not being there.
1 Introduction
A maritime interdiction network using search and rescue interdicted at least 462,813 
"illegal migrants" in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. In this 
chapter, I critically examine the historical conditions which made such a system possible.
Pursuing Agamben's (1998) suggestion, I consider how a system was set up to deprive 
international migrants of their humanity in a legally acceptable manner. I do this by 
heeding Mountz & Hiemstra (2012) in an analytical focus on how and where interdiction 
operations were created in the European Union from 1985 to 2006. I argue that 
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construction of a Mediterranean-wide interdiction network run by a proto-EU border 
guard was a new institutional framework of border security at sea. Its ultimate design, 
and thus the purpose of search and rescue, was to interdict people moving by boat as far 
away from the Union as possible.
I deploy two different modes of explanation to understand the origin of these 
operations. First, I give a structural narrative of the evolution of interdiction at sea 
through the concept of the "external border". My historical evidence comes from a policy 
analysis of 7,738 pages of material in 204 EU documents. This represents a census of 
every Union-level policy document including the terms "external border" or "external 
frontier" and "boat", as collected from EUR-Lex, the EU's database for EU law and 
publications (EUR-Lex 2016). I also analyse a number of unpublished documents which 
were later released via freedom of information requests or other, anonymous leaks. The 
policy analysis, in sum, explains how a system of maritime interdiction was set up from 
the birth of the Schengen Acquis in 1985 to the implementation of the European Patrols 
Network in 2006.
Second, I supplement this narrative with a structural theory of internalisation 
based on a review of previous literature and critique of Michel Foucault (2004), Stuart 
Elden (2013) and Giorgio Agamben (1998) in particular. My central argument is that EU 
authorities, led by Frontex, used search and rescue as a means to internalise the external 
objects of security (i.e., illegalised bodies, boats and spaces around them) via legal 
inclusion in order to subject them to police. I will show that this is parallel to, but distinct 
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from, Agamben's focus on the legal exclusion of internal persons to remove most of their 
political personhood. The process of internalisation thereby explains how the institutional
framework of border security simultaneously dehumanised illegalised bodies while 
including them in the legal order.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I review previous literature on the border, the 
sea and border enforcement in the Central Mediterranean Sea. While the sea was a 
socially-constructed site of conflict over sovereignty of territory (Steinberg 2001), 
existing literature has yet to describe or map how borders were changed to exclude 
unauthorised boat journeys. I propose to fill this gap by examining the conditions under 
which these border changes were possible through maritime interdiction using search and
rescue. These changes, as it turned out, reflected a process of internalisation, by which 
search and rescue could denationalise those within its space and thereby transfer them to 
the jurisdiction of another state. The consequences of this were to allow the subjection of 
these objects to security and create new territory in that process. Internalisation 
highlighted the limits of and extended Agamben's conceptualisation of the camp, which 
proved a poor empirical model for the operation of search and rescue regions.  
I explain the emergence of maritime interdiction using search and rescue at sea in 
the European Union. The creation of a coordinated maritime interdiction network using 
search and rescue was a deliberate policy developed by policymakers within the EU at 
key moments over time. Through the evolution of the "external border", particularly its 
policies and spatial tactics, I show that the construction of a Mediterranean-wide 
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interdiction network run by a proto-EU border guard was a new institutional framework 
of border security at sea. This fit into a wider system of border security whose goal was to
manage illegalised movement in "all stages" and "all places". Thanks to search and 
rescue, it was possible for “illegal migrants” to “arrive” in the EU while simultaneously 
not being there. I discuss the relationship of this result in the context of internalisation, 
and then briefly conclude the chapter.
2 The Sea and its Relationship to the Internal/External through Internalisation
Existing literature in political geography identified how sovereignty and territory were 
dynamic and constructed by social forces. The demarcation and enforcement of the 
border around sovereignty/territory was a strategic location where states contested power.
The sea was one such exceptional zone. While governed by different legal regimes from 
land, the sea also became a space of exclusion to migrant entry in a policy of containment
operated by the states of the European Union. In shifting the border using spaces such as 
search and rescue regions, these spatial tactics reflected a desire to (re)constitute territory 
as a means of (re)constructing sovereignty, which affected the lives of hundreds of 
thousands of people. Despite this, existing literature has yet to describe or map how 
borders were changed and their consequences in the Central Mediterranean Sea.
While noteable scholars, such as Foucault, Elden, Sasken and Agamben, 
attempted to conceptualise the internal and the external relative to the state and security, 
they neither described which objects were external nor explained how they became 
internal and therefore subject to security. I therefore define the concept of internalisation 
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to fill this analytical gap, and identify search and rescue as a particular mechanism by 
which internalisation occurs. A focus on internalisation importantly highlights the limits 
of and extends Agamben's concept of the camp. Although the search and rescue region fit
the state of exception, the camp was a poor model for its conditions. The root of this 
result was Agamben's focus on the externalisation of internal objects via exclusion, 
thereby neglecting the important but opposite process by which the external object was 
internalised to the state. This parallel process generated different conditions for those 
subjected to interdiction via search and rescue – to which the camp does not properly 
apply.
2.1 The Border, the Sea and the Central Mediterranean
Political geographers assume that the exercise of power does not end with the state and 
its bureaucracy but, rather, conjoins with the everyday. The construction of place through
the everyday delineates our imagination of politics, particularly the limits of sovereignty 
and territory (O’Tuathail 1996). A primary mechanism for this construction was the 
demarcation and policing of boundaries or, as they are called between states, borders. As 
part of territoriality, borders are dynamic; they are conditioned by particular theories of 
the social, and these influenced the topologies of power (Agnew 1994). This is possible 
because borders regulated and reproduced movement/mobility (Steinberg 2009). Shifting 
borders, then,  often associate with changes in sovereignty (Nevins 2002; Walters 2008). 
States, however, are not fully contained by borders, and therefore conflicts emerge at or 
beyond the margins of territory to construct sovereignty (Mountz 2013). These 
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“exceptional” zones became strategic locations where power is realised through spatial 
tactics (Gregory 2006). Search and rescue regions are such a zone.
The sea was a space of conflict over territory and sovereignty (Mountz 2013). 
Steinberg (2009) argued that the sea was defined as a space of movement by social 
forces, and that this conceptualisation changed with society. Accordingly, territory at sea 
was governed by multiple regimes unique from those on land, and its current existence 
operates by guarantee of a patchwork of state enforcement (Carling and Hernandez-
Carretero 2011; Coppens 2013; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008). Despite the difficulty of 
enforcing sovereignty over the sea, however, new spatial tactics have been developed to 
manage movement within it, especially to exclude migrant entry – what I call “illegalised
movement”. In the Central Mediterranean Sea, this included the creation and expansion 
of search and rescue regions, which allowed authorities to patrol and interdict boats far 
beyond previous territorial limits (Pugh 2004). Other authors have claimed that, in 
extreme cases, territory may even be explicitly (re)moved to divert migrants from 
entering at all, as in Italy's joint naval patrols with Libya in the Gulf of Sirte or Australia's
multiple territorial excisions for the purposes of claiming asylum (Bialasiewicz 2012; 
Crock and Saul 2002; Cuttitta 2008). In shifting the border, these spatial tactics reflected 
a desire by state authorities to (re)constitute territory as a means of (re)constructing 
sovereignty – and vice-versa.
Existing literature on illegalised movement by boat across the Central 
Mediterranean Sea has yet to empirically describe or map how borders were changed to 
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exclude unauthorised journeys and their consequences for migrants on a macro scale. The
issue of containment in the Mediterranean emerged as early as the mid-1980s with 
growing concern about movement at sea, as will be shown in the next section (Lutterbeck
2006).  These concerns were reinforced by increasing publicity of migrant boat incidents 
worldwide and the security threats states constructed them to pose (Pugh 2001). 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (2008) and Carling & Hernandez-Carretero (2011) identified ways 
policymakers in European Union member states used international law and 
humanitarianism to justify boat interdiction, but their studies were limited to the Canary 
Islands. At the same time, Bialasiewicz (2012) documented micro-level complexities on 
the ground for border enforcement between Libya and Italy. These studies, nevertheless, 
failed to reveal the larger relationship between migration by boat and border enforcement
in the Central Mediterranean Sea. The only recent, large-scale empirical study focusing 
on this region did not discuss interdiction operations or search and rescue at all (di 
Pascale 2011). The immediate question at hand in this chapter is to thus examine the 
conditions that made it possible to interdict 462,813 bodies in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea between 2006 and 2017. I particularly follow Mountz & Hiemstra’s (2012) 
suggestions to study how and where interdiction operations were created.
2.2 The Internal, the External and a Theory of Internalisation
An important but unexplored result of governmentality in management of international 
movement is what I call internalisation, or the process by which state authorities, like 
border guards and immigration agencies, rendered objects internal as security threats. 
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Those who did not follow the normation of the border could not be managed by its 
discipline, and therefore were subject to security via governmentality. Foucault, however,
did not describe which objects were external nor explain how they became internal and 
therefore subject to security. This section explores the latter.  One characteristic 
authorities used to manage their movement was space, specifically by rendering moving 
bodies as “internal” through loss of their previous state identifications. Search and rescue 
was one way of doing this. Internalisation subjected bodies to the police state 
(polizeistaat), or a fused juridical-executive authority which only internal, administrative 
mechanisms checked. This ultimately followed a strategy of containment, which 
attempted to halt, integrate and pre-empt illegalised movement.  Internalisation thus 
paralleled externalisation through Elden’s “imperio”: a boundless, administrative power 
which was only limited in application through the extent of enforcement.  
Foucault used internal/external as an analytical distinction with respect to the 
operation of the state’s power through “raison d’État”, or the idea that “the state is 
organised only by reference to itself.” (Foucault 2004, 378) The state’s reconfiguration as
an object with final sovereignty over fixed territory shifted security to its internal power 
in early modern Europe (Elden 2013). The mechanism of this security, called police, was 
the “maintenance of the relations of forces and development of the internal forces” to 
“ensure maximum growth of the state’s forces while maintaining good internal order” 
(Foucault 2004, 384; Agamben 1998). This contrasted with external power, where states 
checked each other (e.g., the international system).  
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One important aspect of the border was its function as a disciplinary mechanism. 
State authorities prescribed norms from which acceptable practises of international 
movement followed, thereby attempting to control who may “cross the threshold” and 
under what conditions (Balibar 2003; Foucault 2004, 85). Authorities determined 
abnormal (i.e., “illegal”; “unauthorised”; “undocumented”) entry by building, surveilling 
and breaking down subjects (Franko-Aas 2011). So while the border was hugely 
dispersed, it was also fluid and became concentrated at particular times and places as 
state practises changed (Carrera 2007). State authorities imagined and justified these 
border regimens for a variety of reasons, empirically, as shown later in this chapter, but a 
key purpose of this power was to enforce a desired spatial order over movement 
(Cresswell 2006; Mountz 2010). Outside of this order, the body (and vessels) of the 
“other” became associated with ideas construed to be a threat (Appadurai 2006).
Those who did not follow the normation of the border thus violated its raison 
d’État, and therefore were subject to security via police. People who engaged in 
illegalised movement, nevertheless, were especially difficult for authorities to manage 
due to their location. They were external in the Foucauldian sense, out of sovereignty’s 
reach (i.e., territory), yet constructed as internal to its forces with potentially harmful 
effects (Ceriani et al. 2009). Governmentality, in this context, presented a strategy by 
which illegalised movement could be managed on aggregate using indirect characteristics
(Foucault 2004). Geography was foremost of the manageable characteristics identified in 
this case study, due to its relative ease of manipulation at sea and the fixation of state 
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authorities with territorial integrity and preservation (Elden 2009). By removing previous 
state identification (i.e., denationalising) under international law, EU authorities tactically
rendered bodies (and boats) internal to their power – that is, internalised them. Space 
then became an object of internalisation, insofar as the border extended into these sites of 
interdiction and further around the bodies of those interdicted as they moved elsewhere. 
Search and rescue, as this study demonstrates, became the key tactic in achieving these 
outcomes between North Africa and Italy between 2006 and 2015.
One major consequence of the process of internalisation was the subjection of 
interdicted persons to the police state. In the Foucauldian perspective, liberalism 
normally provides external checks on the operation of administrative power within the 
state, thereby limiting security in the interest of freedom (Foucault 2008).1 But in the 
police state, juridical and executive authority became blurred in the hands of bureaucrats 
with unlimited authority in achieving the state’s objectives, akin to Butler’s (2004) 
depiction of detainees in Guantanamo Bay or Agamben’s (2005) “state of exception”. 
State authorities subjected people engaging in illegalised movement to the police state 
due to their illegalised identity, which they structured as unmanageable by normal 
processes (Foucault 2004).2 They were thus simultaneously made internal and external 
(internal/external) to the state’s geography and power. This was not a contradiction but a 
1 Foucault argued that the state’s interest in freedom was to construct and ensure conditions allowing proliferation of 
desireable natural phenomena. Freedom was therefore a means to developing the states internal forces (e.g., 
population; production). Liberalism was a strategy to reduce government intervention in order to produce freedom 
– one that simultaneously checked the police state.
2 According to Foucault, authorities would determine these “normal processes” through empirical observation. The 
normative commitments made in creating and measuring the normal, however, indicate the continuing presence of 
disciplinary regimens, at least insofar as they structure what is normal and delimit how “unfavourable normals” 
may be moved to a more desireable normality.
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new variation of the relationship between territory and sovereignty, one which political 
scientists oversimplified through the binary of territorialisation-deterritorialisation, and 
Agamben misunderstood through his lens of the “camp” (Agamben 1998; Sassen 1996, 
19).
Internalisation followed the European Union’s enactment of a “policy of 
containment” designed to keep most people engaged in international movement out 
(Castles 2003). Border enforcement at sea was premised on this idea of containment. To 
this end, state authorities built systems to force migrants back before, during, or after 
arrival at the physical border (Hyndman and Mountz 2008). These new border sites, like 
search and rescue regions, became spaces demarcating political and legal status 
(Agamben 1998; Franko-Aas 2011).
Containment was consequently a logic of security, which entailed a series of 
mechanisms through which offending bodies could be kept as far away as possible from 
sovereign territory. Elden (2009) further postulated that containment implied spatial 
tactics of integration and pre-emption. This was because threats, now internally 
contained, would need to be integrated to be restored to circulation, and future attempts to
circulate between contained places would need to be pre-empted to maintain 
containment. All this represented an expansion of territory, or space as a bounded 
container subject to state power (Elden 2013). Search and rescue, then, in attempting to 
contain illegalised movement to defined spaces, integrating bodies to the state’s political 
and legal processes, and pre-empting arrival to the state produced new territory.
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The territory produced through search and rescue was also internalised, since state
authorities coded it as a space of internal threat and so subjected it to the police state. 
Internalisation, in this case, thus paralleled what migration scholars called externalisation,
or the outward spatial enforcement of the border. Enforcement pushed the border’s outer 
limit and simultaneously produced search and rescue regions. While Elden (2009; 2013) 
implied that the boundedness of territory itself precluded empire, he later described 
imperio (i.e., imperial power) as fundamentally boundless, limitless and administrative. I 
propose that the logic of containment worked through imperio, in that its objects had no 
fixed spatial boundary, and that its constant expansion was only limited in application 
through the extent of enforcement. Search and rescue was subsequently just one means 
by which illegalised movement could be managed in “all stages” (and places), and empire
emerged from attempts to produce containment (European Union 2000a-b; Loyd and 
Mountz 2018).
2.3 Internalisation highlights the Limits of and extends Agamben’s Camp
Internalisation can be understood through the work of Giorgio Agamben, especially his 
framing of the internal/external in the state of exception and the camp. Subsequent work 
in the border studies related how the high seas, interdiction and detention produced 
illegalised bodies in this state; however, they did not fully unpack the applicability of 
Agamben’s camp. His definition of the camp, in particular, did not empirically fit search 
and rescue regions at all.  The origin of this gap was Agamben's focus on internal 
externalisation, or the process of rendering internal objects internal/external through 
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exclusion. Internalisation instead explored how the external object could be rendered 
internal/external through inclusion. This process proved distinct in that the fundamental 
problem was not the suspension of legal order, but inclusion of that which was never 
formally part of the order in the first place. The resulting differences of internalisation 
produced a site of exception with different characteristics than the camp: the search and 
rescue region.
Agamben’s (1998; 2005) work had an important impact on border studies 
literature. Previous scholars demonstrated how state authorities placed illegalised bodies 
in institutionalised sites of crisis through the introduction and conceptualisation of the 
state of exception (Kernerman 2008; Mountz 2011). Noteable studies of migration by 
boat pursued this idea by proposing how the high seas, vehicles of interdiction and 
resulting detention centres were all in the state of exception, and therefore implicitly part 
of the camp (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008; Hyndman and Mountz 2008; Loyd and Mountz 
2014). The location and expansion of these spaces was a central element of the 
externalisation literature, which explored how shifting borders captured bodies, coded 
their movement as illegal and thereby altered their legal status (Bigo 2000; Samers 2004).
These scholars directly succeeded Agamben in understanding these sites as both internal 
and external to the state’s juridical order. Bigo’s (2001) “Mobius ribbon” of security, for 
instance, directly paralleled Agamben’s (1998) “Mobius strip” of law and violence in the 
state of exception. One major gap of this work, however, was that it did not fully unpack 
the applicability of the camp, and thereby the internal and external in Agamben, as a 
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model by which to understand the production of illegalised movement of actual people in 
existing locations. Internalisation addresses this issue.
Und`erstanding the camp reveals its limits. The internal/external relation is deeply
tied to the state of exception and what Agamben calls inclusion/exclusion (Agamben 
1998). The “law is outside of itself” in this state, yet remains as “force-of-law”: the 
normal division of violence and law produced by the state breaks down, and the 
sovereign dictates and enforces whatever actions are necessary to maintain the juridical 
order (Agamben 2005). The state creates this condition by suspending the law, 
continually violating its norms ostensibly so that they may be otherwise enforced. Those 
placed into this state are trapped in spaces of potentiality (e.g., inclusion/exclusion; 
violence/law; internal/external), decidable only by the sovereign; realised only by the 
sovereign’s removal of impediments to either part of the relation. The state activates this 
position on bodies through the “ban”, in which it abandons the political person (bios), 
thereby turning its very life (zoe) into a political object. This is not a reduction to bare 
life3 (i.e., nature), but an indeterminate condition, relation and non-relation producing 
each other, where life and law cannot be easily separated. The camp is the site which 
forms and illuminates the normally potential, obscured spaces of exception and bodies 
therein.
3 Internal externalisation (i.e., movement from the internal to internal/external) cannot reduce the political person to 
bare life. Bare life, for Agamben, exists as pure nature. Reduction to nature is impossible so long as political 
society exists, since the relation that strips political personhood of the body maintains a relation to that body. This 
is the fundamental difference between the state of nature in Hobbes and the state of exception in Schmitt and 
Agamben.
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Agamben describes the camp as the modern spatial formalisation of the state of 
exception. He defines the camp, in three conditions, as a space:
1. Of temporary suspension of law;
2. Which becomes a permanent arrangement; and
3. Which remains outside of the “normal order”.
The problem with this definition is that none of the three conditions held in the case of 
search and rescue regions, despite empirically fitting into the state of exception. Search 
and rescue regions were not:
1. A suspension of law or temporary, since they had no previous status in the 
juridical order and so became included in it through a long-standing interdiction 
network;
2. Spatially fixed, since they continually moved closer to “places of origin”; and
3. Outside of the “normal order”, but, in fact, came to constitute regular practises 
and rules managing illegalised movement.
A careful analysis of this gap revealed its origin in the construction of the 
exception as “inclusive exclusion”. This occurred due to Agamben’s analytical focus on 
what I call internal externalisation, or the process in which the state rendered the internal 
object internal/external through exclusion.  “Homo Sacer” was its model: a normal, 
political person (i.e., internal) whom the state banned (i.e., externalised) and whose life 
thus became an object of politics. While correctly identifying that the internal can be 
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made internal/external through exclusion, Agamben failed to consider the opposite case: 
an external object becoming internal/external through inclusion. This process of inclusion
was (external) internalisation, and it operated in parallel but distinctly from Agamben’s 
examples, leading to a different site of exception.
Internalisation extends the camp by exploring the movement of the external into 
the state of exception. The fundamental problem of this position is not the suspension of 
order from a previously normal state, but the inclusion of that which was never formally 
part of the order in the first instance. The bearer of illegalised movement must be 
internalised in order to be managed by the state and its authorities. Bare life is made 
political, in this case, and thereby becomes an internal/external potential. Like Homo 
Sacer, only the sovereign can remove the impediments to decide and realise and outcome
of this body (e.g., through deportation or visa) (Geiger and Pecoud 2010). But to produce 
this potential, or to realise its particular outcome, the state must activate the juridical 
order. This inclusion can be understood as the creation of a second, legal body – the 
biotic person. That is, in order to legally manage and exclude migrants, it is necessary to 
turn them into persons to whom the some law applies. This application subjects them to a
legal body. It is this subject which allows application of the juridical order while 
superficially covering the violence inflicted upon the natural body. The space in which 
this occurs is in the state of exception, but is not a camp; in this case study, it is known as
the search and rescue region.
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3 Search and Rescue and Evolution of Interdiction at Sea in the European Union, 
1985 to 2006
In this section, I demonstrate that the creation of a coordinated maritime interdiction 
network using search and rescue to interdict illegalised bodies neither emerged suddenly 
nor spontaneously. It was, instead, a deliberate policy developed by policymakers within 
the European Union at key moments over time. At the forefront of this policy and its 
associated spatial tactics were the European Commission and the European Council. 
They imagined and created the "external border", a concept which became central in the 
problematisation of "illegal migration". This problematisation of illegalised movement at 
sea evolved and was increasingly securitised, its changes coinciding with alterations in 
locations and functions of spaces of control. Expanded and heightened border 
enforcement produced crisis, justifying internalisation and externalisation. Despite the 
policy failure of the external border, policymakers remained convinced that escalation of 
their previous efforts would solve illegalised movement, thereby repeating the vicious 
cycle.
European Union authorities made the creation of what became the European 
Patrols Network run by Frontex possible through the creation of a new institutional 
framework of border security, as evidenced through policy and practise. Elements of this 
framework explored here included new policy priorities, research agendas, programs and 
institutions to enhance security and surveillance. Its ultimate design, and thus the purpose
of search and rescue, was to interdict people moving by boat as far away from the Union 
as possible. But the Network fit into a wider deployment of spatial tactics by EU 
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authorities within and far beyond its territory to manage illegalised movement in "all 
stages" and "all places".
3.1 The Creation of the Schengen Area forces an Imagination of the External Border
While previous scholars noted the importance of 1986 Single European Act in 
establishing a unified market in Western Europe by 1992 (Lodge 1986; Moravcsik 1991),
the origin of the European Union Treaty (TEU) was also critical in forwarding a unified 
security policy.  This policy was solidified at the 1988 Rhodes European Council, where 
European leaders agreed on the organisation of controls at the “external border” 
(European Commission 1991a, 36). One goal of these controls was to coordinate and 
harmonise national policies to combat illegalised immigration: “In view of the risks in the
fields of security and illegal immigration, the Ministers and State Secretaries underline 
the need for effective external border controls” (European Commission 1999, 95). 
Illegalised immigration, however, was considered less important than customs, drug 
trafficking and environmental issues (European Commission 1991b, 3).
The need for external border controls arose from the structure and framing of the 
TEU. As noted, the states that would go on to form the Union had committed themselves 
to what Elden (2009) called a “policy of containment”. The push for containment was 
enhanced by the end of the Cold War and the increasing politicisation of migration (Betts
2011, 78-80; Castles and Miller 1998, 9-10; Samers 2010, 18-20). This policy conflicted 
with the abolishment of internal border controls created by the Schengen Area in January 
1993, since member state authorities would lack legal instruments to control movement 
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into their territory. It was therefore concluded as early as 1992 that all controls would be 
moved to the external border (European Commission 1992). To do this, a geographical 
imagination of the external border was necessary. The signatories of the 1985 Schengen 
Acquis and, later, European Commission (COM) accordingly conceptualised it as the first
border between a member state, including all of its ports, and a third country, and 
delegated the task of enforcing it to the member state whose territory it delimits. In the 
case of the Central Mediterranean Sea, this meant that primary responsibility for future 
management of movement by boat would fall upon Italian and, later, Maltese authorities.
3.2 EU Policymakers Problematised Illegalised Movement across the External Border
The geographical imagination of the external border subjected European Union 
policymakers to the problem of its security. Illegalised movement was made to be a core 
threat to this security through a cycle of problematisation, increased enforcement and 
crisis. EU policy documents defined “illegal immigration” as a problem immediately after
the creation of the Schengen Area (European Commission 1993a; 1995a). COM 
emphasised “the urgent problems arising from illegal immigration” as early as 1994, 
tying it to transnational criminal networks, drug trafficking, human trafficking and 
terrorism (European Commission 1994a; 1995b; 1996a). Policymakers spatially 
connected these initial concerns to the evolving concept of the external border and 
described them using verbs like fight and combat. They saw halting illegalised movement
as necessary to achieve unspecified socio-economic outcomes. Policymakers also 
intended the external border to restrain the perceived “inherent cultural differences” of 
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those attempting to enter the EU from North Africa (Committee of the Regions 1996a, 
16). 
The problematisation of illegalised movement at sea conceptually evolved and 
solidified over time. EU policymakers constructed protecting the external border as 
essential to border security. They particularly framed this space to establish a “common 
security identity” of the Union (European Commission 2002a, 5). Failure to prevent 
illegalised movement, then, was a threat to European solidarity and entailed significant 
“political and strategic risk” (European Commission 2003a, 7; 2004a, 10). One political 
risk requiring “fighting illegal immigration” was the legitimacy of the asylum regime, 
which policymakers stated was compromised (European Commission 2000c; 2001a, 8; 
2002b, 8). Another was the public’s awareness of the ineffectiveness of border control 
and surveillance, especially around the Union’s external maritime borders (Council of the
European Union 2002, 62-63; European Commission 2003a, 7; 2006a, 33). Some 
documents even included illegalised movement by boat in a category of risks covering 
natural disasters, presenting it as an abnormal and dehumanised threat (European 
Commission 2006b, 25).
Changes with the problematisation of illegalised movement at sea coincided with 
alterations in the locations and functions of spaces of control. The external border had 
already shifted towards third countries via the “external dimension” of the Union’s 
policies. This meant harmonisation of migration management and border controls, and 
signing expulsion agreements as a condition to future political or economic treaties 
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(European Commission 1995b, 204; 1995c). By 1998, however, COM documents 
proposed the management of illegalised movement in “all stages”, especially via 
interdiction at sea (European Commission 2000a-b). This geographical fiction of the 
external border corresponded with a call to move asylum and visa processing to or near 
countries of origin (European Commission 2000d). Policymakers framed interdiction as 
the ideal spatial tactic to enforce the external border, and they wanted to push it as close 
as possible to the point of origin of boats (European Commission 2001, 3). This led to the
conceptual extension of the external border at sea into the territorial seas of “origin” and 
“transit” countries, which were to be patrolled using maritime interdiction operations 
(European Commission 2006, 33). 
3.3 The Problematisation of Illegalised Movement led to Crisis
The problem of illegalised movement led to repeated “crises” requiring tighter controls 
and additional resources, which pushed externalisation through spatial tactics. 
Policymakers noted “Urgent problems arising from illegal immigration” as a basis for the
creation of the EU’s initial policy instruments on the external border (European 
Commission 1994a). They also framed increasing illegalised movement into the Union as
dire in 1998, necessitating stronger enforcement and additional resources and powers 
(European Commission 2000a-b).
For policymakers, these “substantial waves” of people could only be addressed by
reinforced member state cooperation and technical assistance at the external border, 
especially at sea. Despite continually receiving these, they repeated the call for an 
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intensified fight against illegal immigration each year. In 1999, EC stressed illegalised 
movement as requiring enhanced border controls (Council of the European Union 1999). 
In 2000, COM claimed Europe was failing to maintain the external border, and called for 
a tougher fight (European Commission 2000d). In 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs 
Council (JHA) stated that combatting illegalised movement was so urgent and necessary 
that it received its top funding priority (European Commission 2001, 5). 
This narrative continued through 2006, calling for new efforts to stop migration, 
especially at politicised sites of arrival like Gibraltar, the Canary Islands, the Greek 
islands, Lampedusa and Malta (European Commission 2002c, 27; 2003; 2005a). The 
term “migration crisis” was regularly applied to illegalised movement into these spaces 
by 2006 (European Commission 2006a, 2; 2006c, 90; 2006d, 3). At the same time, the 
external border that vaguely delimited their location continued to push outward, thereby 
expanding the crisis. It became apparent that the continual creation and enforcement of 
the border was not solving the problem of illegalised movement. Policymakers explained 
policy failure by a lack of enforcement, lack of homogenous levels of security, and lack 
of political will among the Union and its member states (European Commission 2001, 
20). These explanations prompted further escalation of previous efforts, and fed into a 
cycle of problem, internalisation, externalisation and crisis.
3.4 EU Authorities created new Policy Instruments for Coordinated Management of the 
External Border
As the perceived threat of illegalised movement grew, the European Council and 
European Commission created new priorities, research agendas, policy programs and 
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institutions to promote enhanced border security and surveillance. The culmination of this
process at sea was the creation of Frontex and the European Patrols Network (EPN) by 
2006. These policies built a coordinated maritime interdiction network using search and 
rescue under the auspices of a proto-EU border guard. The design of this institutional 
framework was to interdict people moving by boat as far away from the Union as 
possible.
Table 3.1. Key Policies Created by the EU to Manage the External Maritime
Border, 1985-2006
Year Policy Created
1985 Schengen Acquis
1993 Establishment of the Schengen Area
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam
1997-2001 Odysseus Programme
1999-2003 Tampere Programme
2001 Inception of Frontex
2002-2006 ARGO Programme
2003 Programme of Measures to Combat Illegal Immigration Across the Maritime 
Borders of the European Union
2004-2008 Hague Programme
2005 Inception of the External Borders Fund, 2007-2013
2005 Inception of the European Patrols Network
The early days 
The formal establishment of the Schengen Area included few policy instruments to create
and manage the spaces of the external border. EC and COM officials actively created 
these policies at key moments in time. These actors were initially constrained by their 
reduced legal authority, institutions and material resources in achieving their policy 
objective of controlling movement at the external border. Over time, however, member 
47
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
state governments and Union policymakers used the construction and reproduction of the 
threat of illegalised movement to expand their power.
Union authorities attempted to manage movement at sea by information gathering,
risk analysis and monitoring member state policy convergence were the initial means by 
which nascent (European Commission 1993b; 1994a). These softer instruments reflected 
the lower political importance of preventing illegalised immigration. They also stemmed 
from the scarcity of funds allocated to maintenance of the external border, and the 
absence of Union-level institutions through which to use them. The TEU embedded these
processes within a federal politics between the European Union and its member states – 
one that, with few exceptions, denied the Union the authority to legislate on immigration 
issues via Article K (Council of the European Union and European Commission 1992).
The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere, Hague, Odysseus and ARGO 
Programmes 
The Treaty of Amsterdam fundamentally changed this power dynamic by giving the 
European Union the authority to handle migration control (Council of the European 
Union 1997). The Treaty additionally prioritised the operation of the Justice and Home 
Affairs Council to create policy instruments to this end. EC mandated the creation of a 
JHA Task Force to produce reports on the situation of illegalised movement and how best
to manage it (European Commission 2000b). These reports fed into the call for member 
state cooperation and technical assistance in control of maritime borders at the Cardiff, 
Vienna and Tampere European Councils and consolidation of the expanded Schengen 
Acquis (Council of the European Union 1999; European Commission 2000a-b). The 
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Councils became the basis of the five-year Tampere Programme which outlined an action
plan and timetable to control the external border and illegalised movement through it. EC
and COM used TEU article 66 projects, third country agreements, Odysseus and ARGO 
Programmes, and Frontex as instruments to fund these goals (European Commission 
2000e, 25; 2002c, 5; 2003b, 7). EC expanded them and their funding with a renewed five-
year Hague Programme in 2004 and the External Borders Fund in 2007 (Council of the 
European Union 2005; European Commission 2005b).
The funds generated by the European Council and European Commission flowed 
into a growing number of policy experiments. The first three pilot projects of coordinated
management of the external border were created by the Council in 1995, given €600,000, 
and implemented by COM (Council of the European Union 1997, 146; European 
Commission 1997, 2). Policymakers in COM wrote in their evaluation of these projects 
that they “not only constitute a valuable adjunct to the Council's legislative activity but 
can even serve as a starting point for such activity” (ibid, 3). EC accordingly created the 
five-year Odysseus Programme in 1997 as the first regularised policy project in 
coordinated management of the external border. Odysseus made use of €14 million to 
finance projects which aimed to “combat illegal entry, residence and employment” (ibid, 
13). Member state border guards, non-governmental organisations and university 
researchers participated in these projects, which included the Union’s first joint 
surveillance operations (European Commission 1998).
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The Odysseus and Tampere/Hague Programmes had different policy instruments, 
despite their common policy objectives. Tampere/Hague had a broader political mandate 
and more funding as part of the JHA, whereas Odysseus was a targeted call for projects 
with far fewer resources. While border security was a secondary aim of Odysseus, 
Tampere/Hague actively prioritised funds to identify factors causing illegalised 
movement across the external border and the means to control them (European 
Commission 2001b, 14). As stopping illegalised movement across the external border 
grew in political importance, the EU bestowed the Programmes with new authority, 
institutions and material resources.
The European Council renewed the Odysseus Programme as the five-year ARGO 
Programme in 2002. ARGO directly succeeded Odysseus in its institutional framework, 
but its mandate was the administration of a secure external border (European 
Commission 2001a, 18-19). COM made the fund primarily available for member state 
agencies, and nearly all of its resources were spent on external border projects (European 
Commission 2004b, 9). Its policymakers justified this by claiming that Odysseus showed 
the need for enhanced coordinated management of the external border, and 
simultaneously adopted a plan to this end (European Commission 2002b, 18). EC gave 
COM €48 million for the task, disregarding reports of the Programme’s 
underperformance (European Commission 2004b, 3; 10). One cause of this 
underperformance was the immense cost of the Union’s first joint maritime interdiction 
operations, which the Council used ARGO to finance (Council of the European Union 
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2003; European Commission 2004c). Ulysses, RIO IV, Pegasus, Triton, Orca and 
Neptune were initial experiments in joint patrols of the external border at sea between 
2002 and 2003 – and forerunners of Frontex’s European Patrol Network.
The External Borders Fund 
Large, stable financing was a core problem in coordinated management of the external 
border. COM’s funding instruments were ad hoc and often depended on voluntary 
contributions of member states. EC leaders stated in 2005 that voluntary funding 
threatened to undermine Union-level border enforcement, and directed the creation of the
External Borders Fund to compel annual funding (European Commission 2005c). COM 
added the creation of the Fund as a core goal of the Hague Programme, to be 
implemented by 2007 (European Commission 2005b, 8). The EU budgetary authority 
formally allocated the Fund an impressive €1.82 billion from 2007-2013 – enough money
to finance the entire ARGO Programme 38 times over (European Commission 2006e, 
11).4 EC implemented the External Border Fund in 2007 (Council of the European Union 
2007). It would become the primary financial instrument for Frontex and the European 
Patrols Network. 
The European Council and European Commission used the Treaty of Amsterdam 
as the legal basis for Union-level controls at the external border (European Commission 
2001a, 5). They also established a plan for its integrated management, especially at sea, 
in 2002, and used previous or created new institutions and material resources to this end. 
4 The External Borders Fund itself was part of a larger “Solidarity in Management of Migration Flows” Fund, to 
which the budgetary gave €4.02 billion. The External Borders Fund constituted the plurality, or 45%, of the Fund’s 
total value.
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What unified all of these elements, moreover, was Frontex, soon to be the Union’s 
coordinated border agency. 
Frontex
The European Commission explored and received strong political support for an EU 
border guard as early as November 2001 (ibid, 17; Neal 2009). Its policymakers reported 
that the EC would be effectively going ahead with the agency’s formation, referring to 
the future Frontex as the “nucleus of an overall approach” to its plan for integrated 
management of the external border (ibid). EC leaders discussed this plan at Laeken in 
December 2001, and requested a feasibility study. COM policymakers approved the 
agency in principle on 7 May 2002 – weeks before the feasibility study’s completion on 
30 May 2002 (European Commission 2002a; Rome Study Group 2002). Composed of 
participants from border enforcement agencies around Western Europe, the Rome Study 
Group concluded that a “European border guard” was necessary and feasible. Frontex 
was to become that border guard. 
The European Council made Frontex politically palatable by framing it as an 
organisation which would only coordinate and, eventually, integrate member state border 
guards (European Commission 2002a, 12). COM designed it, however, to progressively 
expand its activities beyond this bureaucratic mandate as the need arose and as an 
implicit precursor to an EU border guard (ibid, 12; 14).  Frontex would inevitably handle 
all checks at all crossings of the external border (ibid, 21). COM established Frontex’s 
operation as a key priority for the Union’s 2004 legislative work program, and formally 
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named the agency on 20 November 2003 (European Commission 2003b-c). These set the 
stage for Frontex’s legal creation on 26 October 2004 (Council of the European Union 
2004). Frontex would become the chief enforcer of the Schengen Borders Code, and take 
over joint maritime interdiction operations from the ARGO Programme in 2006 (Council 
of the European Union 2006; European Commission 2004b, 3; 2006e, 9).5 Its expanding 
activities would be financed by the new External Borders Fund. EC and COM 
policymakers thus ultimately enabled Frontex by a “fast policy” (Peck and Theodore 
2015) which set up its necessary authority, institutions and funds long before its 
existence, reflecting coordinated management as their preferred policy alternative to 
control the external border.
The Schengen Borders Code 
The Schengen Borders Code, formerly the Common Manual on Border Checks and 
Surveillance, documented best practises to harmonise member state border guard 
activities. Although EC agreed to its drafting during the creation of the Schengen Acquis 
in 1985, and implemented it by 1993, the Code was to “be made available only to 
authorities designated by Member States and persons duly authorised” until its 
declassification in 2000 (European Commission 1999, 62; 128). With the expansion of 
Union-level enforcement of the external border, EC leaders secured political agreement 
to extend the Code to become the working basis for border control and surveillance 
operations in 2002 (European Commission 2003a; 2004c). Versions of the Code released 
5 The European Commission discussed Frontex taking over these operations as early as 2004; however, the agency 
lacked sufficient funding to do so until 2006 as the ARGO Programme was phased out. 
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after this time became the guidelines for maritime interdiction used in the Union’s first 
joint interdiction operations and the European Patrols Network. They established the 
conditions under which the external border could be crossed, outlined enforcement 
protocols and tactics, designated the spaces where enforcement would occur, and 
assigned authority for carrying it out (European Commission 2002d; 2004c).
Programme of Measures to Combat Illegal Immigration Across the Maritime 
Borders 
The European Council’s action plan for coordinated management of the external border 
and the updates to the Schengen Borders Code paid special attention to illegalised 
movement at sea, but failed to identify the means to achieve them at an operational scale. 
JHA therefore instructed COM to provide a program of measures to “combat illegal 
immigration across the maritime borders” (Council of the European Union 2003).  The 
EU Presidency directed these measures in a secret communication to EC in 2003. It 
called for the creation and expansion of joint maritime interdiction operations as the basis
for control of the external border at sea. It was also the first document to propose the use 
of search and rescue to interdict boats and achieve this control:  
If cooperation between Member States is to be uniform and more effective, there 
is a special need to reaffirm the principle of solidarity in intercepting vessels 
carrying illegal immigrants, by means of meticulous application of the law of the 
sea for the immediate rescue of ships whose seaworthiness is in doubt (Council of
the European Union 2003, 10). 
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The Presidency additionally directed COM to extend the geography of these operations 
into the high seas and territorial waters of third countries.6 This made the Programme the 
direct ancestor of the MEDSEA and BORTEC studies, which used these spatial tactics as
the basis of the EPN.
The European Patrols Network 
The European Council assigned COM the task of creating the European Patrols Network 
after the Hampton Court Council in October 2005 (European Commission 2005a, 4-5). 
The purpose of the Network was to reinforce monitoring, surveillance and interdict in the
Mediterranean Sea through the creation of permanent, Union-level maritime interdiction 
operations (Council of the European Union 2006). Frontex would run these operations in 
cooperation with member states and third countries, using search and rescue as the 
foundation for joint patrols on the high seas and third country territorial waters (Council 
of the European Union 2006, 12-13; European Commission 2005a, 8-9). EPN was 
significant as the immediate origin of every operation in this study.
The MEDSEA Study provided the EPN’s substance. COM policymakers began 
the Study in 2003, following JHA’s instruction for enhanced maritime border controls 
(European Commission 2003d). COM handed MEDSEA over to Frontex, which 
presented its final report on 13 July 2006 (European Commission 2006a, 7; 2006e, 18).  
Frontex officials called for a “permanent Coastal Patrol Network for the southern 
maritime external border” within and beyond EU territorial waters “to prevent and divert 
6 The communication interestingly cited the relationship of US patrols in the Caribbean with Haiti and Cuba as a 
historical precedent for this type of operation.
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illegal immigration” (ibid, 7; 10). Operations began on 15 July 2006 around Spain and on
5 October 2006 around Italy, during Joint Operation Nautilus (Frontex 2017). Like the 
inception of Frontex, the rapid implementation of the EPN was fast policy. EC and COM 
made it possible by the construction and allocation of new authority via the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, institutions including the Tampere/Hague and Odysseus/ARGO Programmes
and Frontex, and new resources such as the External Borders Fund. These policies 
together built a coordinated maritime interdiction network designed to interdict people 
moving by boat using search and rescue as far away from the Union as possible.
3.5 EU Authorities attempted to create and Control the External Border via New Spatial 
Tactics
The European Council and European Commission implemented enhanced border security
and surveillance by deploying new spatial tactics, as briefly surveyed here. Although 
member states previously used some of these tactics, such as expulsion and detention, EU
authorities created and standardised them on a wider scale. Other tactics, such as joint 
patrols, were new. These tactics helped to build the sovereign power of the Union 
through the construction of new jurisdiction and thereby new territory. Authorities 
closely mapped enforcement to the movement of migrant bodies. In this way they 
attempted to keep these bodies as close to their point of origin as possible, and so prevent 
journeys by boat to the Union before they ever occurred. Illegalised movement by boat 
continued, however, and the expansion of new spaces of enforcement of the external 
border paralleled the creation of new policy instruments to manage it.
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Table 3.2 Key Spatial Tactics Deployed by the EU to Manage the External Maritime
Border, 1985-2006
Year Spatial Tactic Deployed
1990 Inception of the Dublin Convention
1992 Expulsion
1995 Third Country Cooperation
1997 Inception of the EURODAC System
1997 Detention
1997 Joint Interdiction Operations
1998 Liaison Officers
2000 Third Country Processing and Tracking
2002 Search and Rescue
2005 Permanent Joint Interdiction Operations
Like policy instruments, the creation of the Schengen Area included few spatial 
tactics to make the new spaces of the external border. EC and COM officials actively 
implemented these tactics at key moments in time. The EU’s limited sovereign power 
circumscribed these tactics geographically and legally as previously noted. Over time, 
however, they expanded to internalise migrant bodies in particular places with-in and -out
of the Union. Authorities tried to contain legally “arrived” but undesireable bodies by 
restricting their mobility from their place of arrival. Illegalised bodies in the Union were 
subject to detention and expedited expulsion procedures. Authorities strived to contain 
people en route to the Union via illegalised movement by refusing to recognise their 
arrival or halting their progress. This was where EC and COM placed joint patrols using 
search rescue: to prevent arrival. Finally, authorities ultimately sought to stop 
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undesireable people from leaving their place of origin to go to the EU, though this goal 
was largely unrealised by the end of 2006. These strategies reflected the perceived need 
to end illegalised movement from the earliest days of the Schengen Acquis.
Hold and remove illegalised bodies in the Union 
The European Commission reported that operation of the Schengen Area meant that 
“arrangements for the admission of asylum-seekers and refugees can no longer be made 
nationally” based on the mobility of asylum-seekers amongst member states (European 
Commission 1994b). EC created the Dublin Convention in 1990, as ratified in 1997, to 
prevent that movement (European Commission 1994c). The EURODAC System 
supported the Convention, and its later iterations, by establishing a Union-level 
fingerprint database of all undocumented migrants (Council of the European Union 
1997a; European Commission 2002c, 36; 2005a). Authorities used fingerprints to 
determine which member state first registered presence of the asylum-seeker, attempting 
to keep them within their space.
The European Commission created common standards for expulsion (i.e., 
deportation) in 1992 and detention in 1995 (European Commission 1994a). COM 
established common standard travel documents, common forms and simplified 
readmission procedures, programs for “repatriation”, and initiated the systematic 
expulsion of third country national following an EU-wide policy in 1999 (European 
Commission 1994a, 18; 1995c; 2000a). These policies forced recognition of detention 
and expulsion by other member states (Council of the European Union 2001). The 
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“Community return policy” would eventually evolve into a “voluntary return” program, 
with joint expulsion flights directly operated through Frontex by 2006 (European 
Commission 2002b, 8; 2006b, 10). These tactics attempted to hold and remove illegalised
bodies on a Union-wide scale.
Keep illegalised bodies contained to prevent departure 
Whereas the Dublin Convention, EURODAC, expulsion and detention focused on 
managing the spaces of illegalised bodies already within the Union, third country 
cooperation, liaison officers and third country processing and tracking tried to prevent 
bodies from leaving to the Union in the first place. The first third country cooperation 
with the EU occurred in 1994, and there were agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Algeria and most of Africa by 2000 (European Commission 1994a, 20; 1995c; 1996c).7 
These agreements covered joint surveillance and patrols as well as the provision of 
technical assistance and assets (e.g., naval vessels) for border enforcement (European 
Commission 2000a, 16; d, 3.2). The agreements were worth approximately €3.4 billion 
from 1995 to 2000, and came with other economic benefits, such as free trade agreements
(Council of the European Union 1996; European Commission 2001c). It was through 
these agreements that EU authorities deployed liaison officers (1998), sent projects to 
control migrant flows in the Sahara (2000), created third country tracking and processing,
and authorised joint maritime interdiction operations (2005) (European Commission 
7 Most African countries were covered via the Cotonou Agreement.
59
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
2000a,c; 2001d, 9; 2002c, 18). These tactics attempted to keep bodies within contained 
territory beyond the EU through development, security and border enforcement.
Interdict, halt and move illegalised bodies before arrival 
The last series of spatial tactics were joint interdiction operations, search and rescue and 
permanent joint interdiction operations. These tactics aimed to halt illegalised bodies as 
they approach the EU’s external border and interdict them so they could be held in a 
different political and physical space. As noted, they originated in the 1997 Odysseus 
Programme, which initiated the first joint operations at the external border (Council of the
European Union 1997b). Based on these experiences, COM committed to the “fullest 
possible surveillance of land and sea borders outside authorised border crossing points” 
(European Union 2000b). This commitment culminated in the first, experimental joint 
maritime interdiction operations in the Mediterranean Sea. Although largely confined to 
the territorial seas of Spain, France and Italy, they soon expanded into the EPN, which 
included third countries (European Commission 2005a, 8). COM identified the space 
between North Africa and Italy as key in this network, and so created the “Central 
Mediterranean” region there with its own command centre and assets for interdiction 
(European Commission 2006a). Member states, Frontex and third countries, such as 
Libya, Algeria and Tunisia, jointly ran operations using search and rescue on naval 
vessels featuring bureaucrats from multiple countries (European Commission (2005a, 2; 
2006a, 33)). COM charged them with carrying out continuous interdiction at sea in the 
territorial waters of third countries to prevent and divert the movement of illegalised 
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bodies. By search and rescue were illegalised bodies interdicted, halted and moved en 
route to the EU, thereby preventing arrival.
4 Discussion: How to Arrive Somewhere, Not Here
This chapter had two components: a literature review and theory of internalisation, and a 
policy analysis of the history of interdiction at sea in the European Union. The latter 
demonstrated that the advent of search and rescue as a means to interdict over 747,000 
illegalised bodies in the Central Mediterranean from 2006 and 2017 was neither 
spontaneous nor sudden. This outcome, instead, was part of a longer-standing series of 
policies and spatial tactics deployed by EU policymakers, which culminated in the 
creation of the European Patrols Network run by Frontex in 2006. This is where the story 
of permanent maritime interdiction operations begins in this study, and so is a useful 
point to critically reflect on how this condition arose and its consequences.
Previous work in political geography and migration studies showed that the 
tactical use of space and security were important parts of the policy of containment; 
however, few scholars put them together, and those who did have yet to fully explain 
how it was possible for one to produce the other. Even Agamben, whose analysis of the 
state exception lay at the core of internal and external power, focused exclusively on 
those within the state’s politics who were pushed out, not those brought in from the 
outside. The problem of this empirical reality was to bring illegalised bodies into the 
legal order, not suspend them. Following Agamben’s (1998) line of thought, the central 
question for discussion is: How do we set up a system to deprive international migrants 
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of their humanity such that what happened to them was accepted? The policy analysis 
explained how such a system was set up. I therefore focus on how this system internalises
the “illegal migrant” as a means to simultaneously dehumanise them while including 
them in the legal order. The system’s exact empirical functioning and outcomes through 
maritime interdiction will be explored in Chapters 3 and 4.
A primary problem in management of illegalised international movement was to 
render the external internal so that it could be subjected to security via police. The 
external, in this case, became not simply the bodies of migrants, but the vessels that 
moved them as well as the space they occupied. This process of internalisation had to be 
conducted in such a way that, once included, these objects would remain removed from 
the regular internal checks of the state, yet nonetheless subject to the administrative 
apparatus. Because the discipline of the border failed, governmentality presented an 
alternative way to achieve this end; however, the bodies of illegalised movement were 
difficult to manage by virtue of their location. Geography, in this context, provided a 
powerful means by which to relocate them under the state’s jurisdiction. As explored in 
Chapter 3 search and rescue regions had a number of special characteristics which 
allowed denationalisation of those inside of them to occur. Special jurisdiction over these 
bodies extended to states involved in their rescue; in particular, they had the power to 
hold them and determine where they would be moved. This, in addition to policy 
diffusion, was the reason COM selected search and rescue in its secret maritime 
interdiction plans of 2002.
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Maritime interdiction operations worked with other policies and spatial tactics 
employed within the European Union; they were only one part of a larger system. They 
occupied a special position, however, in that they handled those who were neither fully 
inside nor outside of the Union’s territory. Unlike Agamben’s camp, the search and 
rescue region was not a suspension of law or even temporary, since it followed 
international rules defined in the Search and Rescue (SAR) and Safety of Life at Sea 
Conventions as early as the late 1970s.  Although these regions had no legal recognition 
in the Union itself, they became included in it through interdiction operations and, 
ultimately, the EPN. 
Despite having assigned geographies, the SAR Convention accepted that rescue 
itself was not spatially bounded but based on necessity and first response. Member states 
of the Union exploited this potential to continually violate or, in the case of Malta, 
outright reject their assigned region in the name of emergency. These operations 
expanded with the external border and so were not fixed, like the camp, but continually 
moved closer to the origin of the boats. 
And last, but not least, the “rescue” of bodies itself was their entry point into legal
system of the EU and its member states. Their status was legally defined by virtue of their
mode of arrival, and they therefore remained mostly outside of the “normal order”. This 
practise, nevertheless, came to constitute the regular rules for managing their status in 
this order. As Agamben pointed out, then, yet in a different sense, maritime interdiction 
via search and rescue was not the exception but the rule. It was the status of those inside 
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this space relative to the normal order, rather than regularity of this process, which was 
exceptional. Put another way, the EU and its member states included these bodies in their
legal order, but the order’s execution did not operate according to legal norms. It was this
separation of application from execution that provided a mechanism for systemic 
dehumanisation. Thanks to search and rescue, it was possible for these people to “arrive” 
in the EU while simultaneously not being there.
I established in this chapter two specific properties of the EPN: (1) it was 
intentionally designed to internalise migrants and boats in order to exclude them, and (2) 
its main mechanism for this process of internalisation was search and rescue. I use these 
findings in Chapter 3, where I examine and explore these operations in order to describe 
them for the first time. I demonstrate the working of these properties in the existence of 
these operations. I then proceed to statistically show that search and rescue was critical to
their interdiction practises over time. Search and rescue was therefore the primary spatial 
and legal tool of interdiction in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. 
Finally, I use these properties in Chapter 4 to examine where such operations were 
effective in this region and time.
5 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated the emergence of search and rescue in maritime interdiction 
operations as part of a wider EU system of border security. The European Patrols 
Network was the culmination of this process, as implemented through Frontex in 2006. 
The EPN was one part of a broader institutional framework of security for the external 
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border which was designed to manage illegalised movement in all stages and places. As 
policymakers intended maritime interdiction via search and rescue to permit the 
simultaneous legal inclusion and dehumanisation of illegalised bodies by virtue of their 
geography. Search and rescue regions had special characteristics which allowed 
denationalisation to occur, thereby transferring jurisdiction to the rescuing state and 
creating new territory in that process. Search and rescue was thus a mechanism of 
internalisation, which not only captured bodies, boats and spaces, but subjected them to 
security via police. This was parallel to but different than Agamben's camp, and had 
distinct and formidable consequences for those trapped inside this space of potentiality 
(i.e., space which was internal/external).
While this chapter outlined the broad, legal consequences of the position of bodies
interdicted in search and rescue, I also noted that the violence done to the natural body 
was different than that done to its legal counterpart. This detachment was intentional, and 
it purposely obscured that violence as a means to prevent political repercussions to mass 
violations of human rights, as enacted by member states of the EU. To expose these 
abuses, and to fill a key gap in the existing literature, I document the fuller empirical 
consequences of search and rescue through the fate of the lives of over half-a-million 
people from 2006 and 2015 in Chapters 3 and 4. A truly disturbing result of this systemic 
dehumanisation was that the vast majority of these people disappeared. This 
disappearance took many forms and held many names: the systematic erasure of lives lost
on boats which sank and all were lost; the removal of missing bodies who were not found
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following interdicted; the massive gap between interdictions and detention and asylum, 
which implied mass losses of people in the statistical record; and the failure to record 
who was sent back to North Africa or ended up in detention camps in Libya, where no 
recognition of asylum existed at all. The European Union and its member states were able
to cover up this twisted racism through the depoliticisation of search and rescue and its 
obstinate humanitarianism.
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3 Search and Rescue as an Instrument of Maritime Interdiction in 
Frontex’s Operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea, 2006 to 2015
Abstract: In this Chapter, I theoretically and empirically demonstrate that search and 
rescue was instrumental to Frontex’s maritime interdiction operations in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. I do this via four analyses. I conduct a 
theoretical and literature review of the key links between search and rescue and modern 
maritime interdiction. I then describe the evolution of both in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea from 2006 and 2015. I proceed to provide the first detailed account of these 
operations to show how they worked, including via search and rescue, to interdict 
migrants. Last, I statistically demonstrate that search and rescue was empirically 
instrumental in maritime interdiction via three subhypotheses: (1) the use of search and 
rescue over time, (2) outward spread of interdiction geographies via use of search and 
rescue and (3) more migrants interdicted as a consequence of these shifts. I find all three 
relationships to be statistically significant and postive, therefore supporting an undeniable
connexion between search and rescue and maritime interdiction.
1 Introduction
The European Union vis-a-vis Frontex operated a maritime interdiction operations in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. This involved 15 discrete operations 
interdicting 462,813 migrants at a cost of 126.9 million 2014 Euros. The purpose of these
operations was to prevent migrants from reaching EU territory via interdiction. In 
Chapter 2, I explored the creation of an EU-wide maritime interdiction operations: the 
European Patrols Newtork (EPN). I demonstrated that these operations had two key 
77
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
properties: (1) intentionality and (2) the use of search and rescue as a means of 
interdiction. In this chapter, I demonstrate that deployment of search and rescue was 
instrumental in these maritime interdiction operations. I do this via four analyses, 
explained further below. I conduct a theoretical and literature review of the key links 
between search and rescue and modern maritime interdiction. I then describe the 
evolution of both in the Central Mediterranean Sea from 2006 and 2015. I proceed to 
provide the first detailed account of these operations to show how they worked, including
via search and rescue, to interdict migrants. Last, I statistically demonstrate that search 
and rescue and maritime interdiction in this case were intimately tied with one-another.
First, I conduct a necessary conceptualising of "maritime interdiction" in order to 
understand how it worked in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. This
is needed due to the lack of theoretical or conceptual work modelling "maritime 
interdiction" as a concept in migration and border studies literature. I then proceed to 
review, critique and extend existing accounts. According to a number of scholars, the use 
of search and rescue has become an instrumental part of maritime interdiction of migrants
(e.g., Guilfoyle 2009; Morabito 1997; Ziegler 1995).
Second, I provide an overview of the background of the creation and 
implementation of maritime interdiction operations using search and rescue in the 
Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. After its creation as part of the European 
Patrols Network in 2006, the region received increasing amounts of resources to run more
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operations to interdict migration by boat. The European Union justified these operations 
using international agreements, especially search and rescue.
Third, I identify and describe the European Union's 15 maritime interdiction 
operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. I use novel 
empirical evidence from operational and policy documents combined with statistical data 
to form the first comprehensive picture of these operations' personnel, infrastructure, 
physical assets, member state and third country operations and policy.
Fourth, I use statistical analysis to test past literature's claim that search and 
rescue was instrumental to maritime interdiction. If search and rescue was instrumental in
allowing or even enhancing maritime interdiction, then I argue we would expect to 
observe three trends: increases in (1) increases in the use of search and rescue over time, 
(2) outward spread of interdiction geographies via use of search and rescue and (3) more 
migrants interdicted as a consequence of these shifts. I formalised these trends using three
relationships which served to proxy them. I then tested these relationships to estimate 
their direction, strength and significance between 2006 and 2015. I found all three 
relationships to be statistically significant and positive.
2 The Origin and Structure of Maritime Interdiction
There is currently little theoretical or conceptual work modelling "maritime interdiction" 
as a concept in migration and border studies literature; however, conceptualising it is 
necessary to understanding how it worked in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006
and 2015. This section therefore reviews, critiques and extends the term's existing 
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accounts from military and legal scholars. Western European states developed organised 
maritime interdiction as a strategy to achieve their military objectives by blockading 
enemy states. They later formalised and implemented international law concerning how 
interdiction should occur. To avoid war while maintaining their enforcement powers, 
imperial powers created new interdiction instruments, one of which later evolved into the 
maritime interception operation (MIO). Combined with search and rescue, the 
Government of Italy experimented with its first MIO to manage migration from Albania 
in the late-1990s based on the United States experience and policy in Haiti during the 
early-1990s. 
Early modern philosophers enshrined sea space as res communes omnium - the 
common property of all. Grotius (via Jones 1983; Ziegler 1995, 19) particularly affirmed 
that no one either owned or could seize the sea. This principle followed from Western 
European states' custom of supporting free movement at sea. Jones (1983, 760) defined 
"interdiction" as any restriction to this freedom of movement in order to achieve a state's 
military objectives. States designed interdiction in this context as a strategy to cause the 
enemy's surrender through economic or diplomatic coercion (ibid, 762; Olson 1993, 1).
Western European states used modern blockades, or prevention of ships from 
leaving or entering a state's seas, as the earliest form of organised interdiction as early 
1584 (Jones 1983, 765; Morabito 1997, 3). Blockades were a siege tactic which intended 
to deny an enemy economic resources, thereby reducing their will and ability to fight 
(Jones 1983, 769). Contemporary scholars, like Grotius, correspondingly legitimised 
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blockades by tying them to customary laws of siege warfare on land (Morabito 1997, 3). 
While initial attempts at interdiction focused on shorelines near ports, they later moved 
outwards to the high seas to more efficiently manage the blockade's distance and success 
(Jones 1983, 765). This change confronted free movement with potential restrictions via 
interdiction:  "interdiction operations are designed to, and, in fact do, impose the concept 
of mare clausum [closed sea] on otherwise free seas" (Ziegler 1995, 11).
Continued use, experimentation and acceptance of blockades led Western 
European states to formalise rules of maritime interdiction into naval warfare law by the 
end of the 18th century (Jones 1983, 762). International law such as the London 
Convention of 1909 legalised interdiction while attempting to minimise its adverse effects
on free movement. These rules effectively meant that states should interdict ships at sea if 
and only if they (1) targeted another state and its space, (2) gave notice to all affected 
ships prior to interception at sea, (3) completely, (4) impartially intercepted all ships, but 
(5) allowed neutral ships to continue any otherwise legal activity without substantial delay
(ibid; London Naval Conference 1909). Naval warfare laws also defined acceptable 
enforcement measures for ships in violation of interdiction: sanction and destruction. 
States could particularly subject such ships to visit and search,  diversion, capture or 
destruction (Hazen et al. 2003, 4; Ziegler 1995, 35).
Closely tied with interdiction was construction of the notion of "contraband", or 
goods destined for the enemy to carry out war, which was subject to capture (Jones 1983, 
765-6; Paris Declaration 1856). Naval warfare laws specifically tasked enforcement to 
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identify and control the movement of contraband, which, being ambiguous, could range 
from military weapons to food, money or even people. Olson (1993, 4) specifically 
defined interdiction as the "use of naval force to prevent import by sea of specified 
contraband items." Blockades and thereby interdiction legally centred on contraband 
movements and spaces.
During the 19th and 20th centuries, state practise was generally to more closely 
and directly interdict contraband by intensifying enforcement and moving it as close to the
port of departure as possible (Jones 1983, 767). One example of this was Allied 
deployment of the "Navicert" system during the Second World War, which moved 
interdiction enforcement to the port of departure even prior to heading to sea (ibid). 
Navicert served to provide interdiction at port by forcing neutral ships to be inspected for 
contraband prior to departure from Allied ports to Europe; only then could they be 
certified for travel.
While interdiction via blockade was a powerful strategy of control, its legality 
depended upon the existence of war between states. Empires such as the United Kingdom,
Germany and the United States experimented with non-belligerent "pacific blockade" to 
coerce states like the Ottoman Empire (1827) and Venezuela (1902-1903) to yield to their
policy demands (Morabito 1997, 6; Olson 1993, 6; Ziegler 1995, 28). Pacific blockade 
simply consisted of implementing blockade without a declaration of war. This violated 
existing maritime law on blockade such as the London Declaration. Practises of pacific 
blockade allowed imperialist states to deploy interdiction without the costs of war, 
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including following its corresponding rules; however, other states challenged its use and 
so its legality remained disputed (Morabito 1997, 6; Olson 1993, 2).
Given their inclination to evade formally declaring war and the legal stigma of 
"pacific blockade",  powerful, imperialist states like the United States and the United 
Kingdom invented new types of interdiction to justify their military strategies of control 
(Olson 1993, 14). These included, but were not limited to, instruments such as embargo, 
naval quarantine and what we now call maritime interception (or interdiction) operations 
(ibid, 3; Ziegler 1995, 1). The United States, for example, thus deployed de facto 
blockades during the end of the Chinese Civil War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Vietnam War 
and anti-terrorist operations while insisting that these were not  blockades by using 
different terms (Dawley 2003, 2; Jones 1983, 770-2; Morabito 1991, 9). United States 
authorities, such as the Coast Guard, would later reapply these terms and spatial tactics to 
non-military “contraband” like the drug trade and human migration in the Caribbean by 
the 1970s (Dawley 2003, 5). Multinational forces also deployed these types of interdiction
in cases like the First Gulf and Yugoslavian Civil Wars (Olson 1993, 9). Morabito (1992, 
10) described this rebranding of interdiction as a "creative disguise to well tested and 
proven wartime strategy." US Navy Lieutenant Commander Ziegler (1995, 29) supported 
this lack of distinction: "It could well be argued that MIOs are merely the late-20th 
century version of pacific blockade."
Given the lack of directly applicable maritime law, states created or borrowed 
practises for maritime interdiction operations (Morabito 1991, 20). These operations often
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reused parts of if not the entirety of blockade enforcement rules and instruments (Hazen 
et al. 2003, 4-5; Olson 1993, 4). They made use of military assets, including but not 
limited to warships, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, land-based surveillance and satellite 
systems to identify, track and intercept ships at sea. Once intercepted, operational 
personnel would detain and interrogate those on-board to gain further intelligence (Ziegler
1995, 27). MIOs also made active use of military scientific methods, especially risk 
modelling and statistics, to optimise their decision making (Dawley 2003, 2; Hazen et al. 
2003, 5).
The United States conducted the first combination of these practises in 
combination with search and rescue during an MIO to interdict Haitian migrants between 
the 1991 Haitian Coup and d'etat and 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy (Guilfoyle 
2009, 90; 189-90; Ziegler 1995, 68). It facilitated the legality of these and subsequent 
actions through the signing of agreements with Caribbean and Latin American states, 
which handled jurisdictional issues by allowing United States authorities to act on these 
states' behalf and having their enforcement officers ride on United States ships (Dawley 
2003, 13-14; Guilfoyle 2009, 91-2).8
Guilfoyle (2009, 188-194) detailed how this forerunner of modern migration 
interdiction at sea worked. The Government of the United States signed a bilateral 
agreement with the Government of Haiti to allow its patrols effective jurisdiction over 
Haitian persons and vessels on the high seas and vessels in Haitian waters. The US Coast 
8  Scholars have also called this practise “shipriding”.
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Guard and Navy patrolled as closely as possible to Haiti, using search and rescue to 
intercept boats "in distress" as they left. Initially, they processed migrants' asylum claims 
on board vessels and then deported all other migrants, as well as most of the claimants, 
back to Haiti; however, as their numbers grew, the Government of the United States began
detaining and processing migrants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When even these facilities 
became inadequate, the Clinton Administration issued a policy to cease all migration 
processing and simply deport all interdicted migrants to Haiti.
Other states, like Australia, Malta, Spain and Italy, transferred this constellation of
enforcement practises for their own MIOs, despite its questionable legalities (Guilfoyle 
2009, 182; 197; 207-9). Italy particularly experimented with it to manage migration from 
Albania during the Kosovo War in the late 1990s, the experience of which became a basis
for further experimental, EU-level operations (see Chapter 2) (Cuttitta 2018; Guilfoyle 
2009, 210).
3 Background: Origin of the Central Mediterranean and Deployment of Search and
Rescue
This section reviews the background of the creation and implementation of maritime 
interdiction operations using search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean Sea between
2006 and 2015. The region became a part of the wider European Patrols Network (EPN) 
in 2006, which aimed to organise large-scale naval patrols across the Mediterranean Sea 
and parts of the Atlantic Ocean in preventing illegalised movement at sea. The European 
Union created and formalised the region as early as 1994 due to its political commitment 
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to the "external border", problematisation of "illegal immigration" from North Africa, and
desire to reduce displacement effects of migration enforcement elsewhere. The area 
bounded between North Africa, Greece, Italy and Malta roughly encompassed its space at
sea.
Search and rescue became an instrument of migration management in the 
European Union by 2006, as shown in Chapter 2. By then the EU had created a 
European-wide system of maritime interdiction in the EPN. In Chapter 2, I demonstrated 
that this system had two key properties: (1) it was intentionally-designed, and (2) it used 
search and rescue as its primary mechanism for interdiction at sea. International 
agreements and state-based enforcement institutionalised and implemented a search and 
rescue regime to which EU member states conformed. Through the work of politics at 
various scales, these states held great power over legal geographies of asylum and 
migration with little oversight in their search and rescue regions. The structure of the 
Search and Rescue Convention, in particular, allowed them to extend this power well 
beyond sovereign territory. This situation promoted the deployment of search and rescue 
to achieve these states' political objectives. Previous literature identified its use to manage
migration, but did not empirically explore or map its deployment or consequences. I 
address these gaps in this Chapter 4.
3.1 The European Patrols Network and the Creation of the “Central Mediterranean” 
By 2006, the European Union had created a maritime interdiction network using search 
and rescue over parts of the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean. Frontex, intended to 
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become the EU’s border guard, administered the European Patrols Network through at 
least 66 secret operations at a minimum cost of 315.6 million 2014 Euros between 2006 
and 2015 (Frontex 2016).9 To do this, it arranged the sea into four regions: Central 
Mediterranean, Eastern Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean and Canary Islands and 
Atlantic (European Commission 2006b). This was the immediate origin of the term 
“Central Mediterranean”, as used in this study. Frontex coordinated with local member 
states and cooperative third countries to organise large-scale naval patrols and 
surveillance through regional infrastructures, including command centres, search and 
rescue coordination centres (RCCs) and satellite systems (European Commission 2002a; 
2006a). These activities worked with local operations, like those identified by Carling 
(2007) in Spain and Andrijasevic (2006) in Italy, to produce continuous deterrence over 
extended distances (European Commission 2006a, 6).
I conducted a policy analysis of the EU’s maritime interdiction policies up to 
2006 in Chapter 2. Based on its policy documents, the European Council, European 
Commission and Frontex specifically created and formalised the Central Mediterranean 
as a region of operations due to its:
1. Political commitment to enact and enforce an “external border”, which member 
states increasingly relied upon because of formally reduced internal border 
controls in the Schengen Area;
9  These costs only cover the funds directly allocated by the European Commission to Frontex’s operations at sea. 
They do not include additional costs included in other budget items, such as physical infrastructure (e.g., operations
facilities; lodgings for personnel), operational assets (e.g., patrol vessels; fixed-wing aircraft; helicopters) and 
expenses incurred by member state operations (e.g., Italy’s Mare Nostrum). These costs cannot be reliably 
estimated based on current data, because Frontex and the Commission aggregate them with similar expenses for 
land, air and return operations. 
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2. Conceptualisation of the space between North Africa and Italy as a region of 
“illegal migration” requiring management; and
3. Desire to reduce displacement effects of migration enforcement at sea by 
extending it as far as feasible.
The EU imagined and created the “external border”, a concept which became 
central to the problematisation of “illegal migration”, as early as 1985. As I demonstrated
in Chapter 2, COM and EC deployed this concept to securitise movement at sea.  Despite 
its failure to stop or even noticeably reduce migration by boat (see Chapter 4), 
policymakers remained convinced that escalation of previous efforts would solve 
illegalised movement, culminating in the EPN. Given Frontex’s constrained resources 
and authority, a principal problem of the Network in 2006 was geography.
The European Commission and European Council conceptualised the Central 
Mediterranean as a region requiring migration management by problematising “illegal 
immigration” from North Africa (i.e., Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt) to 
Italy as early as 1994 (European Commission 1994). The Council used bilateral treaties 
through the Barcelona Process to allocate 4.6 billion (2014) Euros in technical aid and 
secure the cooperation of each of these states, except Libya, by 1996 (European 
Commission 1995).10 This occurred despite the fact that 87.6% of maritime arrivals to 
Italy came from the Balkans, not North Africa, in the late-1990s (De Bruycker et al. 
2013, 15). Contemporaneous policymakers identified the region as problematic due to its 
perceived deficit of human rights and democracy, lack of development,  presence of 
10  The Council of the European Union noteably tended to package free-trade agreements with these deals, making 
trade contingent on cooperation with the European Union’s migration policies. For more information, see European
Commission (2001).
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criminal networks and inherent cultural differences “rooted in history” (Committee of 
Regions 1996, 16; European Commission 2000). Corresponding documents stressed the 
importance of controlling the region’s maritime borders as well as “transit migration” 
from Sub-Saharan Africa (Council of the European Union 2000; European Commission 
2002c). EC, COM and, later, Frontex reiterated these policies with a special focus on the 
islands of Lampedusa and Malta in 2003, 2005 and 2006 (European Commission 2003; 
2005; 2006a, 4).
The plan for migration management between North Africa and Italy centred on 
escalating series of policy instruments and spatial tactics, which solidified and enhanced 
the problem of illegal migration there and so increased its perceived importance. These 
included the deployment of liaison officers11 (1999) (Council of the European Union 
1999, 7), third-country surveillance (2000) (European Commission 2000), creation and 
collection of statistics (2001) (European Commission 2001), assignment of border 
projects “to control migration flows” (2002) (European Commission 2002b), technical 
assistance to and training of North African border guards (2004) (European Commission 
2004) and joint interdiction operations (2005) (European Commission 2005). By 2006, 
policymakers said the region was central to the EPN (Frontex 2006), and therefore 
instructed Frontex to carry out continuous interdiction operations (European Commission
2006a, 6). These operations would work with Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Egypt to 
11  Liason officers are border enforcement agents placed by states in countries other than their own for the purposes of
managing migration.
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patrol their territorial waters, thereby preventing or diverting migrant bodies before they 
arrived in the Union (ibid, 33). 
COM argued that their success depended on the Union’s ability to secure the 
Government of Libya’s cooperation on joint search and rescue patrols (European 
Commission 2005, 9). Due to its outcast position, however, the Government of Italy and 
EC had to reintegrate Libya back to the international community in the early-2000s to do 
so. Reintegration meant lifting international embargoes and United Nations sanctions, 
which allowed Italy and the Union to export border control equipment and assistance, in 
addition to formally signing an Action Plan to enable joint search and rescue in 2005 
(European Commission 2003, 17; 2004, 7; 2005, 9). Although not without issue, as 
described in the next section, EC and COM thus conceptualised and implemented the 
Central Mediterranean as an effective region of operations, which Frontex formalised in 
the EPN.
The European Union also created and formalised the Central Mediterranean 
region to reduce expected displacement effects of interdiction operations by extending 
enforcement as far as possible. While policymakers frequently claimed that such 
operations were effective in deterring illegalised movement at sea (see Chapter 2), they 
admitted in contradiction that deterrence may fail: “experience shows that the constant 
pressure of illegal immigration will lead to displacement effects along the external 
borders” (European Commission 2006, 6). This implied a belief that enforcement isolated
in particular regions would ultimately be ineffective, since those moving at sea would 
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bypass patrols. Like a leaking bucket, patching one gap does not stop the leak, but 
increases pressure in the remaining gaps; therefore, the only way to prevent water from 
escaping is to simultaneously patch all gaps – that is, simultaneously operate interdiction 
patrols in all areas of the external border at sea. The Central Mediterranean therefore 
partly served to extend the EPN as far as possible, thereby reducing displacement effects 
caused by enforcement in other regions.
The seas bounded by North Africa, Greece, Italy (including Sardinia and Sicily) 
and, later, Malta, roughly became the EPN’s Central Mediterranean region.12 Contrary to 
EU policy documents claiming that illegalised movement had repeatedly reached 
unprecedented “crisis levels” in the 2000s, Italy regularly experienced migration by boat 
prior to EPN’s establishment (European Commission 2002c, 27; 2005). From 1998 to 
2005, or the period prior to the EPN for which data were available, Italy’s Ministero 
dell’Interno reported no less than 208,701 people illegally arrived at sea (a mean of 
26,088 per year), peaking in 1999 at 49,136 people (De Bruycker et al. 2013, 15). The 
organisation of regularised, large-scale maritime interdiction operations by the EU was 
the noteable change from this earlier period compared to 2006 to 2015. These operations, 
in fact, ultimately failed to noticeably prevent or deter such movement, which 
significantly grew (p < 0.01) to a mean of 52,924 arrivals per year during 2006-2015.13
12  Neither Frontex, the European Commission nor European Council ever formally defined the Central 
Mediterranean region; however, as I will argue later in this Chapter, its space in practise can be inferred by the 
location of its operations. This characteristic was particularly important, because it allowed Frontex to continually 
move its operation as it considered necessary. Frontex and local member state operations frequently violated these 
boundaries.
13  Using quarterly data in freedom of information requests from 2009 to 2015, I found that the European Patrols 
Network as a whole also experienced a statistically significant increase (p < 0.05) in illegalised movement at sea. A 
mean of 7,873 more people per quarter illegally moved at sea towards the European Union.
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3.2 Search and Rescue as an Instrument of Migration Management
Search and rescue became an instrument of migration management by 2006 through the 
European Patrols Network, as demonstrated in Chapter 2. This thesis, however, has not 
yet established the wider basis or use of search and rescue in migration management. In 
this section, I therefore review the origin of institutionalised search and rescue, the 
authority it bestowed upon states, and how they could use it to alter the political 
personhood and legal geographies of bodies moving at sea.
International agreements and state-based enforcement practises institutionalised 
and implemented a search and rescue regime. Though an ancient custom, no international
system existed for search and rescue until the sinking of the RMS Titanic prompted the 
proposal of the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) in 1914 (Kopacz 2001; Li and 
Wonham 2001). Signatory states updated and expanded SOLAS seven times from 1974 
through 1996, turning over its control to the nascent International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and introducing legal responsibilities for masters of ships to help those in distress 
and take the rescued to the nearest place of safety (International Maritime Organization 
2014; Pugh 2004). IMO member states developed an international system to allocate 
these duties to states in the International Convention on Search and Rescue (SAR). SAR, 
along with its 1998 Annex and 2004 amendments, divided the seas of the world into 
search and rescue regions over which states have authority for managing search and 
rescue, especially determining the existence of distress and identifying the nearest place 
of safety (International Maritime Organization 1985). While these regions were neither 
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coincident with nor considered sovereign territory, as governed by the United Nations 
Law of the Sea, they allowed claimant states to extend their power well beyond its limits 
(Coppens 2013; Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea 2014). Because of this, 
many states such as Italy and Malta have fought over control of these regions and filed 
unilateral claims (Figure 3.1).14
Only a patchwork of state-based enforcement guaranteed the operation search and
rescue regions (Carling and Hernandez-Carretero 2011; Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008; 
Miltner 2006). Politics at various scales modulated this operation:
1. International agreements altered the conditions under and the means by which 
states managed maritime traffic and its spaces. The 2000 Palermo Protocol on 
Transnational Organized Crime, for instance, extended the right of state 
authorities to board a ship with suspected irregular migrants to the high seas if 
that ship’s flag state approved or no flag was present (Pugh 2004; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime 2004);
2. Multilateral agreements and organisations created or facilitated joint or extended 
interdiction patrols beyond of the boundaries of single states involved, such as 
that signed between Italy and Libya in 2008 and formation of Frontex (Ronzitti 
2009); and
14  The claims of the Governments of Italy and Malta under SAR were not the most extensive of all member states. 
The United States of America, for instance, claims well over half of the Pacific Ocean and nearly the entire 
Caribbean Sea, and Australia most of the Indian Ocean. This was not a coincidence: these states also made use of 
search and rescue to manage illegalised movement at sea.
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3. National and local politics, including domestic migration law, governed the legal 
statuses and modes of entry by which bodies entered and were in the state, 
thereby altering their personhood (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2008; Mountz 2010). This
also encompassed the determination of who counted as in distress, how states 
“rescued” them, and what happened to them after interception.15 These powers 
intentionally changed the legal geographies of asylum and migration, as discussed
below.
Figure 3.1. Map of Search and Rescue Regions, by State, in the Central
Mediterranean, 2016
Notes: Malta and Italy dispute the boundaries of their search and rescue regions; this map represents them
as recognised in SAR. Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2016).
Because IMO had no effective instruments to ensure signatory compliance with 
SAR and SOLAS, states thus held great power in search and rescue regions with little 
15  I use interception, here, because, as I will demonstrate, most, if not all, “rescues” in the 
Central Mediterranean became interdiction by 2015. Rescue was therefore a misleading 
term, designed to imply political partiality and humanitarian motivations, which obscured 
SAR’s use as an instrument of migration management.
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oversight. This situation promoted the deployment of search and rescue to achieve the 
state’s political objectives, mainly placing a desired spatial order over movement (Barnes
2004).
States more specifically used SAR and SOLAS for migration management. 
Previous literature on legal rights and obligations of migrants, refugee and states at sea 
identified this possibility. Barnes (2004) and Pugh (2004), for example, outlined how the 
intricacies of migration, refugee and maritime law could affect movement, interdiction 
and rescue (Moreno-Lax 2011; Tondini 2012). Though subsequent legal analyses 
sometimes disagreed with the interpretation of these laws, they agreed that their 
ambiguity and dependence on states meant that states could manipulate which legal 
regimes applied to bodies at sea through geography, thereby preventing them from ever 
arriving in their territory (Klepp 2011; Lutterbeck 2006; Mainwaring 2012). A number of
scholars also demonstrated how EU, Italy and Malta particularly deployed maritime law 
to police movement at sea, shifting the political status and location of bodies caught 
within (Frontex 2016). Surprisingly, however, no work empirically explored or mapped 
the use of search and rescue as an instrument of migration management or its 
consequences. I will address these gaps by empirically exploring and mapping the use of 
search and rescue as an instrument of migration management in the Central 
Mediterranean between 2006 and 2015 in this Chapter, and examine its consequences, 
especially with respect to affect of migration trends, in Chapter 4.
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4 An Empirical Description of Joint Interdiction Operations in the Central 
Mediterranean, 2006-2015
Table 3.2. Summary of Joint Interdiction Operations in the Central Mediterranean,
2006-2015
Name Start Date End Date Real Budget
(Millions
Euros)
Days
Active
Interdiction
Incidents
Interceptions
(Persons)
Nautilus 10/05/06 10/15/06 1.9 11 9 650
Nautilus 06/25/07 10/14/07 5.9 112 67 3,090
Nautilus 05/17/08 10/15/08 7.7 152 84 18,419
Hermes 04/16/09 10/16/09 5.6 184 59 1,193
Nautilus 04/20/09 10/15/09 3.9 179 17 1,475
Hermes 06/14/10 10/29/10 3.5 138 . .
Hermes 02/20/11 03/31/12 21.2 406 505 51,205
Aeneas 04/05/11 03/31/12 10.6 362 . .
Hermes 07/02/12 10/30/13 4.2 486 117 5,964
Hermes 05/06/13 04/30/14 9.0 360 540 6,3955
Aeneas 06/03/13 05/31/14 3.6 363 92 4,145
Hermes 05/01/14 10/31/14 4.2 184 757 122,044
Aeneas 06/01/14 9/30/14 2.0 122 34 2,196
Triton 11/01/14 1/31/15 9.3 92 152 19,183
Triton 02/01/15 12/31/15 37.3 334 1000 145,777
Total - - 126.9 3,485 3,433 439,9261
Notes: “.” = no data; dates in mm/dd/yr format. All numbers were minimal estimates based on statistical
reports; true numbers were likely larger.  Sources: COM (2008: 150); Frenzen (2009); Frontex (2014a;
2015a; 2015b; 2016). 1: This number does not add up to the total of 462,813 interdicted migrants in the
region since some operations were missing interdiction statistics.
4.1 Overview
This section identifies and describes the European Union’s maritime interdiction 
operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. Frontex operated at 
least 15 discrete joint maritime interdiction operations, in addition to two operations 
which it cancelled, in the Central Mediterranean region between 2006 and 2015 (Frontex 
2016). These EPN operations incurred 130.2 million (2014) Euros in direct costs and had 
3,485 days of active patrols. Available data indicated that they were associated with no 
less than 3,433 interdiction incidents and the interceptions of 439,926 people (Table 3.2) 
96
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
(European Commission 2008a; Frenzen 2009; Frontex 2014a; 2015a-b).16 I divided these 
operations using Frontex’s five distinct phases, each explored below: Nautilus, Chronos, 
Hermes, Aeneas and Triton. These names reflected Frontex’s active practise of naming 
maritime operations after heroes and gods in Greek mythology.
All operations were assemblages with five major, common components:
1. Personnel who oversaw and directed operations. Frontex typically planned, 
monitored, coordinated and evaluated interdiction operations on multiple 
geographical scales. Italy and Malta used their military and border enforcement 
authorities to work with EPN operations at sea and in coordination centres. 
Frontex relied upon EU member state staff to operate its physical assets prior to 
the mid-2010s. Member states also volunteered intelligence officers, interviewers 
and interpreters. Third countries sent observers, and put their officers aboard 
Italian vessels;
2. Infrastructure that held operational activities and personnel. Frontex located its 
planning and administrative personnel in local, national and regional coordination
centres. It also had support offices at its central facility in Warsaw, Poland. Italy 
and Malta hosted Frontex, other member state and third country personnel, and 
often lent it local facilities. They additionally provided detention centres to detain 
and interview intercepted persons, hospitals to treat the wounded and search and 
rescue coordination centres;
16  As explained in more detail below, this number includes all interceptions in the region which European Patrol 
Network operations assisted. This distinction was important because Frontex did not typically intercept at sea, but 
actively helped Italian and Maltese ships which did.
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3. Physical assets by which Frontex directly conducted its activities. These included 
patrol vessels, fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, satellites and other, ground-based 
surveillance systems, as coordinated in the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR) (European Commission 2008b; 2011). The purpose of these assets 
was to locate persons illegally moving at sea so that Italian or Maltese authorities 
could intercept them;
4. Member state and third country operations which Frontex actively assisted in 
migration management. Italy and Malta continuously held operational activities 
during this time period, working with the Governments of Tunisia, Libya and 
Egypt. Frontex’s work often administratively, legally and spatially revolved 
around these operations; and
5. Policy that practically enabled and politically and legally justified operational 
activities. This involved politics at many scales, as identified in the previous 
section and Chapter 2. Frontex used EU funding to finance its operations, with 
noteable support from Italy, Malta and projects by inter-governmental 
organisations, such as the International Organization for Migration. It followed its
political mandate, to prevent and deter illegalised movement, from COM, EC and 
the Governments of Italy and Malta. Frontex claimed a legal basis for its activities
from international law (e.g., Law of the Sea; SOLAS; SAR; Convention on the 
Status of Refugees; Palermo Protocol), EU law and policy (e.g., 1950 European 
Convention on Human Rights; COM directives) and domestic migration law.
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These components will be the focus of my empirical description of these five 
operational phases. I will explore them in roughly chronological order, using historical, 
content and statistical analyses. Spatial analysis follows in the next section.
4.2 Empirical Description by Operational Class, 2006-2015
Nautilus
Frontex created Joint Operation Nautilus after the failure of the experimental Operation 
Jason in 2005. COM intended Jason to intercept suspected migrants in Libya’s territorial 
waters, which the Government of Libya disallowed (Fink 2012). Nautilus nonetheless 
proceeded without Libyan support on 10 May 2006, and ran in four iterations between 
2006 and 2009 for a total of 450 days of active patrols and a cost of 19.3 million (2014) 
Euros (Frontex 2016). Available reports stated that there were at least 23,634 intercepted 
persons in 177 incidents associated with these operations (Frenzen 2008; Frontex 2007a; 
Times of Malta 28 April 2010). Although Frontex generally refused to publish maps or 
coordinates of any of its operations,17 reports suggested Nautilus’ operational area 
included the territorial and high seas around Malta, Lampedusa, Sicily and, later, Libya 
(Frontex 2008a). Nautilus maintained a complicated relationship with Libya, securing its 
support in 2007 after a Frontex technical mission there, only to have it again withdrawn 
(Diestelmeier 2012; Frontex 2007b). This caused Nautilus’ 2007 iteration to abruptly end
as the Government of Libya refused to take intercepted persons (Fink 2012). Frontex re-
17  In my communications with Frontex, its representatives stated that any publication of spatial information of its 
operations would compromise their future effectiveness, and therefore claimed an exemption to freedom of 
information due to “public security”. This included Nautilus, despite the fact that it occurred nearly a decade before
my requests, and that its areas likely bore little resemblance to later operations, like Triton.
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secured Libyan assistance after the Government of Italy agreed an aid package worth 6 
billion (2014) Euros in 2008 (Ronzitti 2009). While Libyan support continued, Nautilus’ 
ultimate demise occurred due to conflict between the Governments of Italy and Malta 
over its rules of engagement, as well as renewed Italian-Libyan operations, in 2009.
According to Frontex, Nautilus’ purpose, as requested by the Government of 
Malta, was “to strengthen the control of the Central Mediterranean maritime border… 
and also to support Maltese authorities in interviews with the immigrants” (Frontex 
2007a). This happened despite the fact that, during 2006-2009, Malta was not a member 
of the Schengen Area (Martin 2011), and it had rejected important amendments to SAR 
and SOLAS after the MV Tampa incident which formally defined nearest place of safety 
as the nearest port of call (House of Lords 2008). Nautilus was mainly based in Malta, 
which hosted Frontex personnel and a national coordination centre, as well as detention 
facilities at its military bases (Global Detention Project 2014). Even though it was 
originally opposed to Frontex’s intervention in the region, the Government of Italy also 
hosted local coordination centres and physical assets in Lampedusa and Sicily until 2009,
when it ended its support in favour of its own operations with Libya (Ronzitti 2009). 
Nine other EU member states gave physical assets or personnel, an example of which I 
present in Table 3.3. Nautilus included an evaluation of using satellites equipped with 
Synthetic Aperture Radar18 in addition to these assets to spatially detect boats prior to 
arrival in EU territorial seas (Frontex 2009a).
18  Synthetic Aperture Radar was a radar system which simulated an extremely large antenna (or aperture) and 
thereby generated high-resolution remote-sensing imagery over wide areas. For more information, see Wolff, C. 
(2016). Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR). http://www.radartutorial.eu/20.airborne/ab07.en.html. 
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Table 3.3. Physical Assets of Operation Nautilus, 2007
Asset Type Number
Source
Country Asset Type Number Source Country
Patrol vessels 3 Malta
Fixed-wing
aircraft 2 Malta
Patrol vessels 1 Greece
Fixed-wing
aircraft 1 Italy
Patrol vessels 1 Spain
Fixed-wing
aircraft 1 France
Helicopters 2 Germany Experts 20
Germany, France,
Italy, Malta, Portugal,
Romania and United
Kingdom
Sources: COM (2008); House of Lords (2008).
Nautilus made creative use of geography and law to prevent boat arrivals. Patrols 
actively searched Libya’s search and rescue region between 2006 and 2008 and gave 
persons intercepted there to Libyan authorities (Frontex 2008b). Others corroborated 
practises interception beyond EU territory and search and rescue regions, including 
reports of 700 persons turned over to Libya in 2007 (Klepp 2010), at least 602 more to 
Libya and Tunisia in 2009 (Humans Rights Watch 2009; Tondini 2010). Frontex and the 
Governments of Italy and Malta did this with explicit knowledge that, by intercepting 
persons moving at sea beyond EU territorial seas, they would be unable to access human 
rights available in the EU (Government of Italy 2010, 25). The Government of Malta also
made it difficult for those closer to EU territory to arrive through three primary means. 
First, Maltese authorities often chose to not intercept boats in its search and rescue 
region, instead letting them proceed to Italy (House of Lords 2009, 97). Second, they 
101
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
generally refused disembarkation of persons intercepted outside of its search and rescue 
region in clear contravention of the newest SAR and SOLAS amendments. Last, persons 
“rescued” and disembarked in Malta never legally arrived due to being “refused entry” at 
the border, in spite of their physical detainment there (Global Detention Project 2014).
Operation Nautilus came to an end as the Governments of Italy and Malta 
disagreed on the rules of engagement in 2009.  Italy, specifically, wanted to reduce 
arrivals by demanding that those who could not be sent to Libya be disembarked at the 
closest port, which usually happened to be Malta (Times of Malta 14 October 2009). 
Malta opposed this rule, preferring, as noted, to prevent arrivals by forcing them onward 
to Italy. While Frontex originally agreed with Italy and required that Malta, as Nautilus’ 
host country, had to be the operation’s disembarkation point, it later retracted this 
regulation to ensure Maltese support (Global Detention Project 2014). The results of 
these practises was that many boats were left for extended periods without assistance at 
sea, leading to unnecessary loss of life (Human Rights Watch 2009). When the 
Government of Malta refused to change its position in 2009, Italy withdrew its assets and 
ports from Nautilus, thereby effectively ending it (House of Lords 2009). The 
Government of Italy felt new confidence in this move following its 2008 agreement with 
Libya, which enabled joint Italian-Libyan patrols in the Gulf of Sirte, as well as Frontex’s
assistance through Joint Operation Hermes. It argued that, because its activities were 
effectively preventing movement beyond Libya, Nautilus was no longer needed 
(Government of Italy 2010; Tondini 2010).
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Chronos
When Italy withdrew its support of Nautilus, the European Commission and Frontex 
planned to replace it with the larger, wider-reaching Joint Operation Chronos (Times of 
Malta 16 January 2010). The Government of Malta, however, reportedly failed to support
it due to planned changes to Frontex’s governing regulations in 2010 (Times of Malta 26 
April 2010).  These changes would have given Frontex more operational authority to 
disembark intercepted persons in Malta (European Commission 2010).  Although Frontex
left no public record of Chronos’ existence, other sources confirmed that, at about 9.8 
million (2014) Euros, it would have been larger than any iteration of Nautilus. Malta 
again refused to host Chronos after the EU approved Frontex’s changes in 2011, leading 
Frontex to drop the plan in favour in a renewed and enlarged Hermes (Times of Malta 4 
February 2011).
Hermes
Frontex re-activated Joint Operation Hermes in 2009, moving it from the Western 
Mediterranean to temporarily replace Nautilus (Frontex 2016). Frontex again moved 
Hermes to between Algeria, Tunisia and Sardinia in 2010 in anticipation of the 
deployment of Chronos. With Malta’s withdrawal of support and the end of Chronos, 
Frontex repositioned Hermes to replace it while maintaining its Sardinian-based patrols 
(Figure 3.4). Hermes operated in five years between 2009 and 2014 with 1,574 active 
days of patrols at a direct cost of 48.1 million (2014) Euros. Frontex and the Minstero 
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dell’Interno reported that these iterations were associated with the interception of 244,361
persons in 1,978 incidents (De Bruycker et al. 2013, 15; Frontex 2014a; 2015a-b). 
While Frontex refused to report its spatial data, I reconstructed Hermes’ 
operational area using maps from Ministero dell’Interno (Figure 3.4) (Minstero 
dell’Interno 2014, 6). Frontex claimed it bounded Hermes in the Gulf of Sirte by the 
search and rescue regions of Tunisia and Libya. As I will demonstrate, however, in the 
next section, over 75.6% (or 140,622) of intercepted persons in 67.3% (or 873) of 
incidents were outside of these areas during operations 2013-2014, overwhelmingly south
of these lines (Frontex 2015a-b). 
EC and COM dramatically increased resources to Hermes after the Arab Spring 
began in 2011, using it as the principal means to support the Government of Italy in 
diverting and turning over migrants at sea. Despite this increase, COM and Frontex ended
Hermes after Italy unilaterally halted Operation Mare Nostrum, replacing it and Aeneas 
with the larger and more expensive Triton in November 2014.
The purpose of Operation Hermes was to assist the Government of Italy, which 
hosted Hermes, in its ability to divert and intercept migrant boats by increasing its 
surveillance resources (Frontex 2011a, 11). I observed this through the spatial and legal 
relationships of Hermes and Aeneas relative to Italian operations, like Mare Nostrum. 
The Ministero dell’Interno, in particular, reported that Frontex placed its operations 
behind Italy’s in order to detect boats in Libyan waters or the high seas and relay this 
information to the Marina Militare (Italian Navy), which would then intercept them 
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(Ministero dell’Interno 2014). This spatial relationship reflected Frontex’s lack of legal 
authority to regularly enter Libyan territorial seas or search and rescue region, as encoded
in its rules of engagement, as well as Italy’s primacy in determining the ultimate fate of 
boats in its jurisdiction due to SAR (Frontex 2014a, 13). 
Frontex and Italy administered Hermes through facilities associated with its chain 
of command. Frontex oversaw Hermes and provided regular intelligence from its head 
office’s Situation Centre in Warsaw, Poland (Frontex 2012a, 47). Frontex strategically 
coordinated Hermes with other regional operations, like Aeneas, through its Operational 
Office in Piraeus, Greece (Frontex 2011b, 16). These offices worked in the Central 
Mediterranean through its National and International Coordination Centres, as stationed 
at the Guardia di Finanza’s (Financial Guard’s) premises at Air-Naval Command in 
Practica di Mare Air Base, Rome, Italy (ibid, 11). Centres actively planned, coordinated 
and evaluated Hermes in close cooperation with Italian authorities, whom the Guardia di 
Finanza represented. They issued operational instructions to Local Coordination Centres, 
especially the centre located at the Guardia di Finanza’s building in the port of 
Lampedusa, Italy, which organised and assisted operational assets and personnel (ibid, 
17). These resources and instructions acted directly through patrol vessels, which became
mobile “border control points” for Frontex. Italy also housed Frontex personnel in Rome 
and Lampedusa, provided detention centres and allowed use of air bases at Lampedusa, 
Pantelleria, Sigonella and Catania for aircraft deployment (ibid, 8).
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Personnel for Hermes came from Frontex, 22 member states and 6 third countries.
A summary of personnel can be found in Table 3.5 (Frontex 2009b, 11-15; Frontex 
2016). Frontex personnel planned, implemented and monitored the operation, gathered 
intelligence and produced risk assessments in close coordination with and direction from 
the Government of Italy. Personnel from Italian border guard agencies, including 
Ministero dell’Interno, Polizia di Stato (State Police), Guardia di Finanza, Guardia 
Costiera (Coast Guard) and Marina Militare, directed daily operations, commanded all 
physical assets and determined what to do with intercepted persons. Other EU member 
states and third countries provided interviewers, specialised advisers, observers and guest
officers to oversee the operation of their assets. All participating member states, each 
Italian border guard agency, and Frontex all had members on the Joint Coordination 
Board, which made daily decisions for operational activities.
Operation Hermes also actively functioned in moving interdicted migrants to 
detention centres for the Government of Italy. Locations of detention centres included 
Caltanisetta, Trapani, Caligari, Bari, Mineo, Crotone, Lampedusa, Pozzallo, August and 
Ragusa (Frontex 2009b; 2011b, 4; 2013). European Union authorities used detention as 
an opportunity to gather intelligence from detained migrants on their routes, reasons for 
migrating and sources of funds and boats (Frontex 2012b, 30).19 While Frontex redacted 
19  Migrant interviews in detention during operations had two functions: (1) intelligence-gathering and (2) 
constructing migrant ontology. “Debriefing teams” would collect data detailing the identity, route and means by 
which migrants journeyed to the EU. They would record and store the texts and maps produced during interviews, 
later giving them a grade based on how useful they were. Frontex’s personnel, however, would purposely not give 
any questions related to regarding expression of fear or desire for protection. Authorities did not explicitly explain 
rights to protection, this system’s design evaded the identification of asylum seekers. Thanks in part to this 
exclusionary process, only about 5% of interdicted persons from 2006 and 2015 became recognised refugees.
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the total number of migrant interviews, 2,229 occurred over 51,205 interdicted migrants 
in 2011 – a ratio of about one interview for every 23 migrants (Frontex 2011c, 5). If this 
ratio was representative of Hermes overall, then at least approximately 7,853 interviews 
would have occurred between 2009 and 2014. Examples of questions used and data 
collected during migrant interviews can be found in Frontex (2012b, 33-35).
Figure 3.4. Operational Areas of Hermes and Aeneas, 2011-2014
Notes: Map re-projected using linear transform from Minstero dell’Interno data. Source: Minstero
dell’Interno (2014).
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Table 3.5. Personnel of Operation Hermes, 2011 
Personnel Type Source Function
Coordinator Frontex Monitoring and cooperation and coordination with Italy,
member states and third countries
Analyst Support
Officers
Frontex Information collection and production of risk
assessments
International
Liaison Officers
Frontex Additional officers to coordinate with Italian authorities
Project Team Frontex Overall monitoring, planning and evaluation of
operation
Personnel for
Physical Assets
Italian border
guard agencies
Operation of all physical assets administered by Frontex
Commanding
Officers
Italian border
guard agencies
Command aerial, maritime and land assets and
personnel
Liaison Officers Italian border
guard agencies
Coordinate and transmit information from various
Italian border guard agencies
Intelligence Officer Polizia di Stato Gathers local information during operation and
transmits to International Coordination Centre
International
Coordinator
Guardia di
Finanza
Directs daily operations and tasks of the International
Coordination Centre
Interpreters Italian border
guard agencies
Provide translation for interviews
Guest Officers Member states Coordinate use of physical assets by Italian authorities
National Officials Member states Responsible for coordination and monitoring of
deployed member state assets
Experts Member states Conduct interviews with intercepted persons
Special Advisers Member states
and third
countries20
Assist local staff with specialist knowledge
Observers Third countries Provide advice and exchange experience
Joint Coordination
Board
Frontex and
member states
Leads daily operational activities
Sources: Frontex (2009b, 11-15; 2016).
By 2015, Hermes was associated with a total of 1,978 interdicted boats, 244,361 
interdicted migrants and 1,758 days (the equivalent of 4.8 years) of activity. All this came
at a cost to Frontex of about 45.6 million 2014 Euros or 24,791.25 2014 Euros per day of 
20  Examples of participating third countries included Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, 
Albania, Turkey and Egypt.
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activity (Frontex 2016). The Government of Italy implicitly, heavily subsidised Hermes 
through its corresponding maritime interdiction operations (e.g., Mare Nostrum). Frontex 
eventually phased out Hermes by combining it with Triton in 2015.
Aeneas
Operation Aeneas overlapped with but was not part of Frontex’s command or operations 
in the Central Mediterranean Sea. Frontex primarily intended the Operation to support 
Poseidon in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Nevertheless, Operation Hermes 
conducted joint patrols with Aeneas in their joint patrol area (Figure 3.4). Frontex 
operated Aeneas in the years 2011, 2013 and 2014 with up to 16 (13 EU member and 3 
non-member) states participating (Frontex 2016). Aeneas was ultimately not repeated in 
2015, with its assets being combined with Hermes and then Triton. With the advent of 
Operation Triton in late 2014, Frontex finalised this almagamation and substantially 
shifted Aeneas’ former patrol areas around Malta and Brindisi.
While Aeneas’s details are beyond the scope of this chapter due to its geography, 
I present some key statistics in order to note their contribution to the Central 
Mediterranean region’s operations as a whole. Operation Aeneas operated for a total of 
847 days at a cost of about 16.29 million 2014 Euros, or about 19,229.67 2014 Euros per 
day of activity. During this time, Operation Aeneas was associated with at least 63 
incidents interdicting 6,431 migrants. Overall, Aeneas’ rate of interdiction (e.g., by 
incidents or migrants interdicted per day) over time was significantly less (p<0.01) than 
that of Hermes or Triton.
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Triton
Operation Triton was Frontex’s last, amalgamated operation in the Central Mediterranean
between 2006 and 2015 (Frontex 2014c). According to Frontex’s unredacted operational 
concept,21 Frontex recommended an extension and replacement of Hermes after its end in
October 2014 due to the “high number of search-and-rescue cases” (ibid, 7). The end of 
the Government of Italy’s Operation Mare Nostrum, which previously coordinated with 
Hermes and Aeneas, also encouraged  Frontex to create a newer, larger interdiction 
operation. Frontex’s stated objectives with Triton were to combine border surveillance 
and gathering of information through debriefing and screening in order to “control 
irregular migration flows towards the territory of the European Union and tackle cross 
border crime” (ibid, 10).
As with Hermes, Frontex designed Triton to interdict migrant boats en route from 
Northern Africa and Greece to Italy and Malta (ibid, 3). Frontex established a large, 
combined operational area (Figure 3.6)  which was broken into three sub-areas: (1) M1 
(Mike 1), covering the Pelagic Islands and Sicily, (2) M2 (Mike 2), covering the area 
south of Sardinia and (3) common patrol area (CPA), covering east of Sicily.
21  Frontex only gave me a redacted version of its operational concept via freedom of information requests; however, a
secondary source release an unredacted version, which I use here.
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Figure 3.6. Operational Area of Operation Triton, 2015
Notes: Map re-projected using linear transform from Minstero dell’Interno data. Source: Minstero
dell’Interno (2014).
Triton made use of similar assets to Hermes. It used two fixed-wing aircraft and a 
helicopter to surveil maritime areas within and outside its stated operational area in order 
to gain early detection of migrant boats (ibid, 7; 11). Frontex deployed three coastal 
patrol vessels for interdiction within the operational area, and two offshore patrol vessels 
beyond it. Seven debriefing (interview) teams deployed in Mineo, Ragusa and Syracuse 
for the purposes of gathering intelligence on migrant journeys from migrants in detention 
(ibid, 8). Personnel and reporting structures mirrored those found in Hermes. Frontex 
established its operational headquarters at Lampedusa and Roma, as in Hermes. At its 
onset, Operation Triton had an estimated operational cost of 2.83 million 2014 Euros per 
month.
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Triton was the first operation in the Central Mediterranean to be fully integrated in
EUROSUR, or the European Union’s maritime surveillance network (European 
Commission 2011; Frontex 2014c, 12). Specific services integrated included traffic 
information systems in combination with vessel detection capabilities using radar-based 
earth observation technology to detect boats far beyond the operational area. Frontex 
incorporated these data into a system which measured vessel risk and gave alerts as to its 
personnel and the Government of Italy as the risk of migration increased. It also included 
other geographic models (e.g., weather) in order to provide regular forecasts of expected 
migration.
Frontex outlined Triton’s tactics in its operational annexes (Frontex 2014a). Here 
it legally justified its interdiction of migrants via previously mentioned conventions, in 
addition to the European Convention and updates to the Schengen Borders Code (ibid, 9).
It designated a shift in the use of offshore patrol vessels, which no longer disembarked 
migrants, but transferred them to coast patrol vessels for disembarkation (ibid, 12). 
Frontex also redesginated coastal patrol vessels to allow redirection of interdicted 
migrants in the territorial sea to outside of it, with the Government of Italy retaining 
ultimate jurisdiction on where boats would go (ibid, 13). It provided intentionally vague, 
bureaucratic and expanded definitions of “distress” and “vulnerable person” in order to 
allow interdiction of more boats (ibid, 16; 20). Finally, Frontex stated new rules which 
explicitly forbid handing over any “rescued persons” to third countries, though which 
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countries counted as “third” or whether the rule was implemented remained unclear (ibid,
20).
In the end, Triton began an unbroken operation from October 2014 to December 
2015. Based on available data, this included 426 operational days active at a cost of 46.58
million 2014 Euros, or a cost of about 109,341.4 2014 Euros per day (Frontex 2015a-b). 
This daily cost was overly four to five times more expensive than Aeneas or Hermes. 
Operation Triton was associated with 1,152 interdiction incidents and 164,960 interdicted
migrants.
5 Operational Deployment of Search and Rescue as an Instrument of Migration 
Management
In this section, I test the empirical relationship between use of search and rescue, space 
and migrant interdiction using complete interdiction data from Frontex for each day 
between May 2013 and December 2015.22 I specifically model these relationships using 
three types of models, with sinusoidal regression being the least biased and most 
accurate. I reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the use of 
search and rescue with geography, time or migrants interdicted. Instead, the use of search
of rescue increased over time, and was correlated with increases in migrants interdicted 
and externalisation of geography – even beyond those stated in Frontex’s operational 
documents. I know interdiction occurred beyond the boundaries sttaed in Frontex’s 
documentation because my data explicitly measure such incidents. These findings 
22  I use this time frame due to data constraints. Frontex only provided detailed interdiction data from its JORA 
database between 2013 and 2015; however, this database’s data go back to at least 2011.
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demonstrate the increasing deployment of search and rescue as a means to alter 
geography and enhance interdiction over time.
Methodology
I conducted a statistical analysis of Frontex’s detailed maritime interdiction data from its 
JORA database, as outlined in its operational documents (Frontex 2014d). I acquired 
these data, including their relevant variables, via multiple freedom of information 
requests to Frontex (Frontex 2015a-b). After aggregating separate requests, I received all 
available data for a large selection of variables between 1 May 2013 and 31 December 
2015. These periods represent the beginning of Hermes in 2013 to the end of Triton in 
2015, thereby encompassing two years-worth of complete interdiction data. In the end, 
the completed interdiction data I used for the following analysis included 375,300 
interdicted migrants over 2,575 separate incidents and 954 days of operations – or the 
majority of interdictions and incidents in this study.
I used the following variables in my analysis: time (days since 1 May 2013), 
interdiction incidents, interdicted migrants, migrant deaths, incidents outside the 
operational area and incidents initiated using search and rescue. To help better model 
trends in the data, I intentionally reduced the extreme variance observed from day-to-day 
operations by smoothing data over 30 days for three variables: migrants interdicted, 
incidents outside the operational area and incidents initiated using search and rescue. 
These smoothed trends more accurately represented the overall trend of these variables 
over time while only reducing the number of observations to 925.
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To test the empirical relationship between the use of search and rescue, space and 
migrant interdiction, I modelled three relationships: (1) incidents initiated using search 
and rescue over time, (2) incidents occurring outside the operations area over incidents 
initiated using search and rescue and (3) migrant interdiction over time. I tested these 
relationships on the basis that they proxy for three specific characteristics about the 
hypothesis of search and rescue as an instrument of maritime interdiction: (1) its intensity
of use over time, (2) its intensity of use and geography of interdiction and (3) its intensity
of use and total interdiction. If Frontex in fact used search and rescue as an instrument of 
interdiction, then we should observed significant, positive relationships in all three cases. 
This would be in conference with existing theories and histories of maritime interdiction.
I modelled the relationships of interest using three model types: naive treatment 
effect estimation, linear ordinary least squares estimation and sinusoidal ordinary least 
squares estimation. The purpose of these three types was to contrast relationship results 
between models types and thereby check for the robustness of findings. I deployed 
sinusoidal regressions to control for observed wave-like effects observed over time. As 
noted in the Discussion subsection, these were likely caused by changes in seasons and 
Frontex’s response to them. All ordinary least squares models used the following 
independent variables: time (days since 1 May 2013), month, total migrants interdicted, 
total incidents and total migrant deaths. Sinusoidal regression models replace the month 
control with two controls according to their trigonometric identity:
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sin( 2π12monthi )+cos( 2π12monthi ) (1)
where “month” is the number of months since 1 May 2013 for observation i. I multiply 
month by 12 since this represents the number of months in a year. Since 2 over 12 is 1 
over 6, this form allows there to be at least two distinct cyclical periods per year.
All models used Huber-White, or robust, standard errors. I conducted my analysis 
in R version 3.4.2. All figures were also produced in R. Statistical significance was 
assumed to occur beyond a 95% confidence interval.
Findings
I modelled three relationships over 925 days-worth of data:
1. Density of incidents using search and rescue to initiate interdiction and time;
2. Density of incidents occurring outside the stated operational area and density of 
incidents using search and rescue to initiate interdiction; and
3. Migrants interdicted and time.
For each of these relationships, I set the null hypothesis to be that there was no 
relationship between the variables in question. Using sinusoidal regression with Huber-
White standard errors, I found there to be a statistically significant relationship (p<0.001) 
in all three cases. Results for final models can be found in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7. Sinusoidal Regression Model Results (n=925)
Dependent Variable
Independent
Variable of Interest Coefficient
Standard
Error
Adjusted
R-Squared
Migrants Interdicted Time (Day) 0.1118*** 0.02159 0.7379
Incidents Occurring Outside
Operational Area
Incidents using
Search and Rescue 0.5042*** 0.03961 0.847
Incidents using Search and Rescue Time (Day) 0.0001241*** 8.808E-06 0.6444
Notes : Statistical significance at  p< - *: 0.1; **: 0.05; and ***: 0.01. Uses Huber-White
standard errors.
The density of incidents Frontex initiated using search and rescue was significantly 
associated with time (Figure 3.8). Each additional day in the final model was associated 
with about a 0.012% increase in the use of search and rescue, which, over 925 days, was 
associated with about a 11.5% average increase in the use of search and rescue. This 
significant increase remained, despite controlling for other time-based effects (e.g., 
seasons). This final sinusoidal regression model had an adjusted R-squared of over 0.64, 
which meant it was also relatively good at explaining the observed variance of use of 
search and rescue over time. Given its statistical and substantive significance, I rejected 
the null hypothesis that there was no relationship between these two variables.
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Figure 3.8. Distribution and Fitted Sinusoidal Model of 
Incidents using Search and Rescue over Time (n=925)
Notes: Blue line – fitted sinusoidal model values.
The density, or proportion, of incidents which occurred outside of Frontex’s stated
operational areas was significantly associated with the density of incidents initiated using 
search and rescue (Figure 3.9). A 1% increase in the use of search and rescue was 
associated with a 0.5% increase in incidents occurring outside operational areas. Given an
increase of use of search and rescue by about 28.57% between May 2013 and December 
2015, incidents occurring outside stated operational areas increased by over 14.4%. 
Density of use of search and rescue was the strongest predictor of the location of an 
incident, explaining the majority of its observed variance (Pearson’s r = 0.81). A 
sinusoidal regression model achieved an adjusted R-squared of about 0.85 – an extremely
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high result for a finding in the social sciences. Based on its significance, I thus rejected 
the null hypothesis that there was no relationship between the density of incidents which 
occurred outside stated operational areas and density of incidents initiated using search 
and rescue.
I conducted regressional diagnostics to validate ordinary least squares 
assumptions of this critical model. Breusch-Pagan tests failed to reject that its residuals 
were homoskedastic. A Durbian-Watson test failed to reject error independence. A 
Bonferroni outlier test rejected that there were no statistical outliers in the data. Based on 
these results, and given the model’s strong adjusted R-squared, I concluded that most, if 
not all, ordinary least squares assumptions were true and that the model was therefore 
valid.
I further tested this finding by conducting time series modelling of 1464 incidents 
from Operation Triton between 2014 and 2017 which had spatial data available for 
interdiction latitude and longitude (Frontex 2017). After including the previous 
mentioned controls as well as one new one, the interdicted boat’s country of departure, I 
found that search and rescue was significantly (p<0.001) associated with the latitude but 
not longitude of interdiction. Specifically, the use of search and rescue pushed the 
average interdiction incident 0.45 degrees south – or closer to North Africa. This was 
strong evidence that the use of search and rescue was associated with border 
externalisation.
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Figure 3.9. Distribution and Fitted Sinusoidal Model of 
Incidents Outside Operational Area over Incidents using Search and Rescue (n=925)
Notes: Blue line – fitted sinusoidal model values.
The number of migrants interdicted through Frontex’s operations significant grew 
between May 2013 and December 2015 (Figure 3.10). Each day was specifically 
associated with an average 0.11 more migrants interdicted than the previous day; this 
meant, by the end of the period, Frontex interdicted an average of 103.42 more migrants 
per day. Given this statistical and substantive significance, I rejected the null hypothesis 
that there was no relationship between migrant interdiction and time. A sinusoidal 
regression model using the previously-mentioned control variables featured an adjusted R-
squared of approximately 0.74, and was therefore relatively good at predicting migrant 
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interdiction during this time period. The sinusoidal model specifically captured the impact
of seasonal effects on interdiction.
Figure 3.10. Distribution and Fitted Sinusoidal Model of Migrant Interdiction over
Time (n=925)
Notes: Blue line – fitted sinusoidal model values.
Discussion
Ziegler (1995), Guilfoyle (2009) and Mountz & Loyd (2018) argued that modern 
maritime interdiction operates primarily via the use of search and rescue. These practises 
diffused to and became ingrained within the European Union's bordering practises, as 
explored in Chapter 2. Cuttitta (2018) and Guilyfoyle (2009) identified that Italy 
experimented with modern the configuration of the modern maritime interdiction 
operation via search and rescue in what Frontex would later label as the Central 
Mediterranean Sea. The search and rescue hypothesis, however, had yet to be empirically
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tested in the region. This was the purpose of conducting a detailed statistical analysis on 
data from 2013 to 2015.
If search and rescue was instrumental in allowing or even enhancing maritime 
interdiction, then I argued we would expect to observe three trends: increases in (1) the 
use of search and rescue over time, (2) outward spread of interdiction geographies via use
of search and rescue and (3) more migrants interdicted as a consequence of these shifts. I 
formalised these trends using three relationships which served to proxy them. I then 
tested these relationships to estimate their direction, strength and significance.
I found all three relationships to be statistically significant and positive. Each 
model explained the majority of observed variance in its dependent variable and passed 
checks for violations of ordinary least squares assumptions. This supported the search 
and rescue hypothesis via three avenues. First, my results showed that the use of search 
and rescue increased over time. Second, they demonstrated that increases in search and 
rescue directly corresponded with increased externalisation of enforcement. Third, my 
results revealed that increases in search and rescue were also associated with increases in 
migrant interdiction. Given that I observed all three expected trends, I therefore 
concluded that search and rescue was instrumental in maritime interdiction of migrants in
the Central Mediterranean between 2013 and 2015.
These conclusions strongly support previous theories tying search and rescue to 
maritime interdiction, as noted above. Further research, moreover, will be required to test
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and extend its findings to additional geographies and time periods. I discuss such 
additional research in Chapter  5.
6 Conclusion
This Chapter revealed that search and rescue became instrumental in maritime 
interdiction in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. I also gave the first
detailed description of maritime interdiction operations in the European Patrols Network. 
The EU via Frontex operated a maritime interdiction network in this region which 
involved 15 discrete operations, interdicted 439,926 migrants and cost 126.9 million 2014
Euros. I demonstrated that search and rescue was empirically instrumental in maritime 
interdiction via three subhypotheses: increases in (1) increases in the use of search and 
rescue over time, (2) outward spread of interdiction geographies via use of search and 
rescue and (3) more migrants interdicted as a consequence of these shifts. I found all 
three relationships to be statistically significant and postive, therefore supporting an 
undeniable connexion between search and rescue and maritime interdiction.
I showed that search and rescue was theoretically instrumental in maritime 
interdiction via three additional analyses. First, I conducted a theoretical and literature 
review, which concluded that we would expect modern maritime interdiction of 
migration to use search and rescue. Second, I overviewed the creation and 
implementation of maritime interdiction operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea 
between 2006 and 2015, which established the central role of search and rescue. Third, I 
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identified and described these operations in detail to show how search and rescue was 
integrated within them.
My findings were important in three ways. First, my findings give the first, if 
brief, genealogy of maritime interdiction, a topic left untouched within migration and 
border studies. The history and deployment of maritime interdiction operations reveal 
them as a form of blockade; however, modern border enforcement authorities purposely 
avoid such a designation in order to not violate international maritime law. Such 
operations nonetheless have a history which is clear, experimental and traceable. Second, 
I completed the first empirical account of a series of related maritime interdiction 
operations over time. Most existing studies of MIOs analyse them on a general level 
using qualitative methodologies; I closed this gap by giving a detailed, quantitative 
account to supplement my qualitative analyses. Last, I conducted the first statistical 
analysis of search and rescue and its relationships to maritime interdiction. Contemporary
studies were unable to gather data or proxy for use of search and rescue, which restricted 
their ability to empirically infer its relevance. I have shown that measuring search and 
rescue is possible and crucial to understanding MIOs.
Given the importance of search and rescue in maritime interdiction, one key 
question remains unanswered: Was maritime interdiction via search and rescue effective 
in detering migrants from making journeys to the EU? I will address this question in 
Chapters 4. It suffices to say that statistical analysis shows that even despite their 
124
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
increasing resources and efforts, maritime interdiction operations in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea were ultimately not effective in deterring current or future migration.
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4 Testing the Effectiveness of Maritime Interdiction Operations at Deterring
Migration in the Central Mediterranean Sea, 2009 to 2015
Abstract: In this chapter, I demonstrate that there was no statistical relationship between 
maritime interdiction operational (MIO) intensity and current or future migration in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. I find this result using a time series 
analysis of complete interdiction data from two data sets acquired through freedom of 
information requests with Frontex. My statistical analysis achieves a fine-grained, literally 
day-by-day analysis of 3,256 boat interdiction incidents involving 462,813 interdicted 
migrants over 3,241 operational days in 12 MIOs. My results provide important evidence 
against previous theories which argued that MIOs had a clear deterrent effect that made 
them valuable tools of migration management (e.g., Carling 2007; Miltner 2006; Tondini 
2010). Contrastingly, they support scholars who argued that this general ineffectiveness 
reflected the political functions of MIOs (e.g., Pugh 2004; Tazzioli 2016). Though my 
data and analysis experience important limitations, my findings are compelling and show 
that an independent, quantitative analysis of the relationship between MIOs and migration
is possible.
1 Introduction
There has yet to be a detailed statistical analysis of the effectiveness of maritime 
interdiction operations (MIOs) using search and rescue. This absence of detailed 
statistical analysis happened despite the existence and importance of a system of regular 
maritime interdiction in the European Union beginning in 2006. Chapter 2 explored this 
system’s intentional creation and use of search and rescue in interdiction. Chapter 3 
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empirically demonstrated the deployment and effects of search and rescue as interdiction 
in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015. While many policymakers and 
scholars alike have assumed the (lack of) effectiveness of MIOs to deter migration for 
their own political or theoretical ends, none have statistically demonstrated either side of 
the debate. In this chapter, I do so by testing one core hypothesis using two new, detailed 
data sets: increases in maritime interdiction operational activity decrease migration. I 
disaggregate this hypothesis into two subhypotheses, which test the effectiveness of MIOs 
on current and future migration in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 
2015. Using three types of statistical models, I find that enhanced MIO activity was not 
generally associated with decreased migration in either the present or the future. My 
findings therefore fail to support the core hypothesis that maritime interdiction operational
intensity was associated with less migration.
I conduct a time series analysis of complete interdiction data from two data sets: 
the Crossings data and JORA data, the European Border and Cost Guard Agency’s 
(Frontex’s) statistical database. I supplement these data on interdicted migrants and 
interdiction incidents with data on all operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea. These 
data sets represent a nearly complete record of all migrant detection and interdiction in the
region between 2009 and 2015, and use many previously unavailable variables to enhance
my statistical analysis.
My findings provide evidence against previous theories which posited that the 
deterrent effect of maritime interdiction operations served to make them valuable tools of 
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migration management. At the same time, they support scholars who argued their general 
ineffectiveness reflected their function as political tools. The empirical reality was that 
MIOs strengthened in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015, despite the 
fact that they failed to stop or prevent migration. This implies that other motivations or 
functions of such operations trump their questionable role in migration management.
This chapter contributes to the previous literature through a new and expanded 
analysis of maritime interdiction operations and migration as well as methodologies. I 
make use of more advanced data than ever used before on this subject. I explicitly analyse 
data on migration with data on MIOs using statistical analysis. I do this by providing a 
greatly expanded representation and measurement of operational intensity. My statistical 
analysis is the first ever to explicitly incorporate search and rescue as a spatial tactic. I 
achieve a fine-grained, literally day-by-day analysis of all interdiction in a third of the 
Mediterranean Sea, including at least 3,256 boat interdiction incidents involving 462,813 
interdicted migrants over 3,241 operational days in 12 MIOs. The scale and scope of my 
analysis are therefore unprecedented in this field.
While my findings represent the most advanced analysis on the most detailed 
interdiction and migration data to date, they have a number of important limitations. 
These include generalisability, weak proxies, specification error, selection bias, 
measurement error, baseline bias and differentiated treatment bias. I also discuss a 
number of limitations in each of the two data sets used. In spite of their limitations, I 
137
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
argue my findings are compelling given their advanced methods and detailed data. Future 
research, moreover, will be needed to improve, verify and expand them.
2 Literature Review
2.1 The Effectiveness of Maritime Interdiction Operations Using Search and Rescue
Public policymakers in the EU and academics alike made assessments of the effectiveness
of maritime interdiction operations using search and rescue in deterring migration. 
Frontex has repeatedly reviewed and evaluated the performance and outcomes of its own 
joint operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea. In general, Frontex’s classified and 
public documents argued or even assumed that its operations “provided an effective 
border control at [the] external border of the EU. [They have] also enhanced the detection 
and prevention of cross border crime” (Frontex 2014, 4). Frontex authors also claimed 
that “the number of arrivals in [the] European Union [who went] undetected was very 
small” (ibid, 5). In these documents, however, Frontex provided little to no clear criteria 
by which to determine whether its MIOs in fact had met their own stated aims.
Frontex made its judgements on maritime interdiction operation effectiveness first 
and foremostly on their statistical impacts on migration. Each annual report evaluating 
Joint Operation Hermes, for instance, begins its assessment of outcomes by listing how 
many interdiction incidents occurred and how many migrants they interdicted (e.g., 
Frontex 2010, 1; 2011, 5). Frontex began to include additional statistics over time, such as
the deployment of search and rescue, geography of incidents and quantity of migrant 
interviews (Frontex 2012a, 5-6; 2012b, 7). 
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While no specific determination of success or failure occurred, Frontex authors 
frequently used such statistics to justify operational expansion, thereby implying 
operational effectiveness. Frontex (2012b, 7), for instance, argued that the increase of 
incidents around Sicily justified the expansion of operational intensity and geography to 
cope. They also maintained that detection and interdiction of boats, no matter their 
numbers, all were clear indicators of well-planned and -executed operations (e.g., Frontex 
2012a, 5; 2013, 7). Other EU policymakers agreed with this assessment, adding that boat 
interdiction was an effective tactic for deterring ‘irregular’ entry (COM 2004, 11). 
Ultimately, though, Frontex made no rigorous, empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of
its own operations in its own documents. This represents a major gap in understanding 
and explaining the use of search and rescue in maritime interdiction operations.
Academics reached limited, mixed conclusions about the effectiveness of maritime
interdiction operations using search and rescue at sea. They also questioned whether state 
authorities judged their success based on effectiveness of interdiction at all. With respect 
to operations specifically using search and rescue, Miltner (2006, 84) stated but failed to 
argue that “interception has proven to be a highly effective tool for controlling migrant 
flows.” Italian Navy officer and scholar Tondini (2010, 6) concurred with assessment, 
writing that “[patrols] have been rather effective in curbing the [migration] phenomenon.” 
While pointing out operational limitations, Carling (2007, 333) agreed with these 
conclusions, quantitatively showing that, at the very least, MIOs using search and rescue 
reduce migrant mortality rates, if not migration generally.
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A number of scholars, by contrast, claimed or showed that maritime interdiction 
operations using search and rescue had either no effect on migration or even increased 
migration or losses at sea. Pugh (2004, 62) proposed that operations, while not effective 
as a deterrent, satisfied “political expediency”. Marin (2011, 478) challenged previous 
evaluations of operational effectiveness by Frontex, questioning whether independent 
assessment was even possible. Tazzioli (2016, 6) furthered these arguments by 
understanding search and rescue-based interdiction of a form of humanitarian 
governmentality, one which required its ultimate ineffectiveness as a deterrent in order to 
justify its political existence. Williams and Mountz (2018) completed the first statistical 
analysis of operational effectiveness with respect to migration, finding no relationship 
between the two, and that increases in enforcement were associated with increased 
migration in alternate times and places. These two groups of scholars therefore reached 
mixed conclusions about the effectiveness of MIOs using search and rescue. The overall 
lack of statistical analysis on the deterrent effect of such operations and data limitations 
therein warrant additional and more sophisticated analysis.
Despite their disagreement over effectiveness, most authors agreed that maritime 
interdiction operations had motivations beyond stopping or preventing migration. In 
Chapter 2, I demonstated how interdiction itself became a core part of EU policymakers’ 
political project as part of a wider project of border security. In this case, ‘securing’ the 
border was necessary to preserve the political integrity of the Union itself. Other scholars 
also concluded that the effectiveness of interdiction was less about migration itself and 
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more about political expediency, xenophobia and governmentality (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2008; Pugh 2004; Tazzioli 2016). 
For those who maintained that MIOs were intended for  migration management, 
effectiveness of surveillance was more important than deterrence (Carling 2007, 336; 
Miltner 2006, 85). All of these proposals aligned with border studies literature which saw 
border control at sea as a form of political spectacle where the state tried to preserve its 
sovereign functions and legitimacy (Carrera 2007; Ceriani et al. 2009; Van Selm and 
Cooper 2005). In this way, Collyer (2007) and de Haas (2007) showed that the EU had 
little interest in stopping migration from North Africa – or even actively increased it. This 
explained why MIOs persisted and intensified even as they tended to enhance crisis, not 
stop it (Loyd and Mountz 2014; Lutterbeck 2006). These perspectives, while insightful, 
failed to demonstrate a critical part of their causal hypotheses: that MIOs using search and
rescue did not decrease migration. Failing to find this would represent a substantial 
problem for these theories, as they support themselves by consistently alluding to the 
ultimate inefficacy of MIOs. This limitation warranted more data and analysis.
2.2 Existing Work on Data in Maritime Interdiction Opertions and Migration
There exists little work tracking the relationship between maritime interdiction operations
and migration at sea. Most of these efforts stemmed from descriptions and analyses of 
migrant losses at sea. Williams and Mountz (2018) and Davies et al. (2017) pointed out 
that this analytical gap shows the oft-obsfucated nature of MIOs as well as the 
dehumanisation of migrant lives and their loss at sea. There have, moreover, been 
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important efforts to identify and describe this relationship on both land and sea in a 
nmber of regional geographies. These included Mexican journeys to the United States 
(Burridge 2009; Delano and Nienass 2014), losses at sea among people trying to reach 
Australia (Hodge 2015; Weber and Pickering 2011), and losses in the Mediterranean Sea 
among those headed for the EU (IOM 2017; Spijkerboer et al. 2015; Williams and 
Mountz 2018). Overall, however, the state of the literature on data related to maritime 
interdiction operations and migration were extremely limited and dramatically constrained
the ability to conduct any statistical analysis of their relationship.
There were substantial examples of recording border migration data. Beyond 
administrative data (e.g., Frontex), scholars and NGOs began efforts in various regions to 
better understand migration at land and sea borders. Memorialisation efforts recorded 
important information of migration at the US-Mexico border (Brigden 2016; Burridge 
2009). Weber and Pickering (2011) conducted a parallel survey of ‘border deaths’ over a 
decade at the maritime boundaries of Australia, and continue this work via the Border 
Cross Observatory (Border Crossing Observatory 2013). SIEV X was a similar effort in 
Australia, which specifically focused on interdicted migrant boats en route to Australia 
(Hutton 2015). In the EU, Spijkerboer et al. (2015) and UNITED for Intercultural Action 
(2014) created and updated lists of documented migrant deaths throughout the Union over
time using different methodologies. Williams and Mountz (2018) extended these projects 
to a global scale, but only incorporated migration which involved losses of life at sea. We 
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were also the first authors to statistically examine, albeit in a limited way, the links 
between MIOs and migration.
Despite the relative absence on work statistically linking maritime interdiction 
operations with migration, a number of authors theoretically mapped relationships 
between them in specific contexts. Skop (2001), Stevens (2002) and Kosic and 
Triandafyllidou (2004) described and documented migration by boat and its connexion to 
MIOs in the United States, Australia and Italy in the 1990s and early 2000s. Guilfoyle 
(2009) and Loyd and Mountz (2018) expanded this literature by providing deeper legal, 
historical and social context. While all intricate, none of these analyses empirically 
associated structured data on MIOs with migration. Arango and Martin (2005) and 
Carling (2007), in contrast, explicitly made the first papers on this association but 
exclusively in the Spanish-Moroccan context and with limited data. These works 
additionally failed to consider how new spatial tactics, like search and rescue, affected 
mobility in a statistical way. Williams and Mountz (2018) also suffered from data with 
many limitations in their initial analysis of the statistical relationships between MIOs and 
migration in the Mediterranean Sea.
Previous work on data linking maritime interdiction operations and migration did 
not consider this relationship on a larger scale in order to measure the intensity of 
enforcement. So, for example, it was not possible to examine the treatment effect of 
exposing migrants to more intense maritime interdiction using search and rescue – either 
on those presently making their journeys or who might do so in the future. Assessments 
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so far have therefore relied solely on either the intensity of enforcement (e.g., in terms of 
numbers of interdictions) or intensity of migration and losses. This disconnect moreover 
represented a virulent selection bias, since policymakers and researchers tended to select 
their preferred data in order to conclude whether MIOs were effective. 
Frontex, for example, conditioned its own conclusions on operational effectiveness
by only looking at enforcement, not migration itself; contrastingly, academics tended to 
only examine data on migration or migrant outcomes as indicators of operational success 
or failure. The former is problematic because it assumes, rather than tests, the relationship
between the treatment (exposure to MIOs) and the outcome (decisions to migrate). 
Frontex specifically assumes that there is a negative correlation between the two, meaning 
that higher measures of enforcement always lead to more deterrence. The latter is 
problematic because it selects on the outcome variable. Only looking at migrants who die 
or boats which sink, for instance, becomes an issue when we make inferences about 
migrants who do not die or boats which do not sink. So, for example, only examining 
cases where migrants die may lead to the faulty inference that maritime interdiction 
always results in death. I address these analytical gaps by combining information of 
maritime interdiction and migration into a centralised, nearly complete data set for the 
Central Mediterranean Sea from 2009 to 2015. This was possible due to new statistical 
recording and databasing by EU authorities over time.
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3 Methodology
I conducted a time series analysis of complete interdiction data from two data sets: the 
Crossings data and JORA, Frontex’s statistical database (Frontex 2015a-c; 2016a). I 
supplemented these data on interdicted migrants and interdiction incidents with data on 
operations in the Central Mediterranean and weather data from the Weather Company 
(Frontex 2017; Weather Company 2017). These generated interdiction data over time, 
with different units of time for two discrete time periods. First, I used quarterly data 
between 2009 and 2015. Second, I used daily data between 2013 and 2015. I expanded 
the geography of the first analysis by explicitly modelling the relationship between 
interdiction and migration in the Central Mediterranean with the Eastern and Western 
Mediterranean.
This analysis explicitly modelled the relationship between migration in the present
with current and past enforcement. As discussed, EU policymakers and some academics 
argued that enhanced maritime interdiction operations deter migration by increasing the 
costs and decreasing the odds of successful entry to the EU (e.g., Carling 2007; Miltner 
2006; Tondini 2010). If this were true, then we would expect that increased operational 
activity would be associated with decreases in migration either in the present or future. 
One difficulty in conducting a statistical analysis of this relationship was finding 
appropriate data. I managed to locate such data using freedom of information requests 
with the EU.
Here I describe the data used in my analysis. The Joint Operations Reporting 
Application (JORA) was a relational database implemented by Frontex as early as 2011 in
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its operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea (Frontex 2012, 16). JORA functioned as a
database to collate reporting on MIOs. Designated Frontex personnel were to report all 
interdiction incidents in the region during operations, which the Governments of Italy and
Malta provided during times with no Frontex MIOs (Frontex 2013, 45). Frontex provided 
the attributes (variables) of JORA’s relational database in a freedom of information 
request (Table 4.1). JORA included data verification and quality control, as well as 
connexions to other data sources (Frontex 2014b, 56). Given Frontex had nearly complete 
detection of migration by 2013 via EUROSUR, JORA represented an effectively complete
sampling of migration in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2013 and 2015. I 
therefore made a freedom of information request and received most of these attributes for 
all MIOs in the region from Frontex during this time period (Frontex 2015a-b). The 
JORA data set ultimately contained full details on 2,575 boat interdiction incidents 
involving 357,300 interdicted migrants over 954 operational days in 5 MIOs between May
2013 and December 2015. It thereby represented the most detailed maritime interdiction 
and migration data available to date.
The Number of Illegal Border Crossings (Crossings) data were a detailed, 
quarterly data set of migrant detection throughout the Mediterranean between 2009 and 
2015. Frontex released these data in response to my freedom of information request in 
2015 for the years 2009 to 2014, which they later added 2015 during a new request in 
2016 (Frontex 2015c; 2016). Crossings formed a comprehensive record of migrant 
detections as opposed to interdictions, which was more accurate from 2009 to 2013. This 
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was possible because, in the past, it was far more likely that migrants might be detected 
via surveillance but not interdicted due to material, legal or geographical constraints, thus 
making detections a more accurate proxy of migration than interdictions. The Crossings 
data set ultimately included at least 3,256 boat interdiction incidents involving 462,813 
interdicted migrants over 3,241 operational days in 12 MIOs between January 2009 to 
December 2015. These data therefore represented a similar but more advanced version of 
migrant interdiction data used by Williams and Mountz (2018).
I used proxies to model the relationship between maritime interdiction operational 
intensity and migration. I proxied migration using total migrants detected between 2009 
and 2015, and total migrants interdicted between 2013 and 2015. I proxied operational 
intensity using three measures for both data: operational days active, operational spending
and operational spending per day. I posit that these represent good and valid measures for 
operational intensity. For both data sets, I generated days active and spending during the 
current time period using Frontex’s operational data (Frontex 2017). If an operation began
on 1 May and ended on 31 October, for instance, then it would have had 61 days in the 
second quarter, 92 in the third quarter and 31 in the fourth quarter. 
I also divided operational spending in this way, justified by the fact that 
expenditures were nearly constant in operations due to consistent use of operational 
resources during operations over time (see Chapter 3). I then generated spending per day 
by dividing total operational spending by the number of operational days active for each 
time period. Given the relatively consistent expenditure of operational resources by 
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Frontex, this resulted in, for example, six discrete levels of operational intensity between 
2013 and 2015. I was able to use this variance in operational intensity to measure 
correlations between intensity and migration in the present and future. I proxied 
externalisation of geography using a variable which measured whether or not an 
interdiction incident occurred outside the operational area. I assumed that the more 
incidents which occur outside the operational area, then the more externalised that 
operation was.
Table 4.1. List of Attributes in JORA
General Information Persons Information Additional Information
1. Incident Number 17. Country of Departure 33. Number of Transport Means
2. Reporting Unit 18. Place of Departure 34. Transport Type
3. Operational Area 19. Time of Departure 35. Transport Hiding Place
4. Incident Type 20. Date of Arrival 36. Boat Destroyed by
5. Date of Reporting 21. Country of Destination 37. Comments
6. Detection Date 22. Disembarkation 38. Modus Operandi
7. Detected by 23. Migrants Deterred 39. Additional Vessel Information
8. Latitude Detection 24. Victims of Trafficking 40. Heading
9. Longitude Detection 25. Death Cases. 41. Vessel Type
10. Interception Date 26. Nationality Information 42. Departure Point Relief
11. Intercepted by 27. Migrants Information 43. Vessel Length
12. Interception Place 28. Documents Alerts Information 44. Vessel Width
13. Place of Interception
Comments 29. Asylum Requests Information 45. Number of Engines
14. Latitude Interception 30. Smuggling Activities
15. Longitude
Interception 31. Smuggling of Number
16. Reference to Op. Area 32. Market Value
Source: Frontex (2013, 51).
The Crossings data recorded the number of migrants detected en route to the 
European Union by quarter between 2006 and 2015 – a total of 28 quarters. It included 
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the following variables (Table 3.1): quarter, detected migrants (Central, Eastern and 
Western Mediterranean), operational spending (total and density of EU-wide maritime 
interdiction spending), operational days active (total and density of EU-wide maritime 
interdiction days active) and average windspeed near Lampedusa. The latter variable was 
a proxy for general weather conditions at sea, which were expected to reduce migration as
they speed increased and weather became worse.
The JORA data recorded many more variables than the Crossings data. Frontex 
generated the original data using interdiction incidents as the unit of analysis. I converted 
the unit analysis to time (day) by adding a measurement of time using incident dates and 
then tabulating data for each variable on each day. I then generated all zeros (i.e., missing 
days) and filled in their missing values (i.e., zero). This method created a total of 954 
observed operational days between May 2013 and December 2015, or the entirety of 
Hermes 2013 to the end of Triton in 2015. This was appropriate because, in this case, 
zeros occurred due to the absence of incidents, not of recording. Variables used included 
month, operations active, operational spending per day (current time period and multiple 
past time periods), interdiction incidents, migrant deaths, interdicted migrants, density of 
interdictions involving search and rescue, density of interdictions outside of operational 
areas and density of interdictions by operational area (Calabria, Pelagic Islands, Puglia, 
Sardinia or Sicily) (Table 4.3). Variables for the Crossings data included time (quarter), 
operational days active, operational spending (total), migrants detected and average wind 
speed (weather) (Table 4.2).
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I constructed three classes of models: naive treatment effect estimators, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimators and OLS estimators using lagged independent variables. I 
deployed these three types to provide a contrast between different types of modelling and 
to check robustness of results. I also used two classes of time series compensations: 
incorporation of time as an independent variable and use of lagged independent variables.
In the first case, I included quarter as an independent variable between 2009 and 2015, 
and used a sinusoidal version of month between 2019 and 2015. I justified the latter by 
improved fit of sinusoidal compared to linear regression for these data (see Chapter 3). In 
the second case, from the residuals of each final OLS model, I estimated optimal time 
lags using time auto-correlation functions. I algorithmically identified which time lags 
were significantly autocorrelated with the present, and then included these lags as 
independent variables. I found a total of one optimal lag in the 2009 to 2015 data and nine
optimal lags in the 2013 to 2015 data. The three models therefore had the following 
specifications respectively:
(1) y t=β0+β1 x t+ϵt (Naive treatment effects),
(2) y t=β0+β1 x t+β2 z1 ,t+...+βi+1 zi ,t+t t+ϵt (OLS) and
(3) y t=β0+β1 x t+ ...+βi xt− j+βi+1 z1 , t+...+βi+ j+ 1 z i , t+t t+ϵt (OLS with time series),
where x is operational intensity, z1 through zi are control variables, t is time, j is a time lag 
in the set of time lags, and i and t are elements of the set of natural numbers.
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Table 4.2. Variables Included in Crossings Data Set
Variable n Missing Mean
Standard
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Imputed
Time (Quarter) 28 0 14.5 8.23 0 -1.33 No
Operational Days Active
(Total) 28 0 115.75 74.65 0.02 -1.04 No
Operational Days Active
(Density of EU Total) 28 0 0.48 0.28 0.07 -0.76 Yes
Operational Spending (Total) 28 0 4016590 33892131 0.47 -1.24 No
Operational Spending
(Density of EU Total) 28 0 0.47 0.29 0.04 -0.76 Yes
Migrants Detected (Total) 28 0 16600.4 21249.39 1.44 0.86 No
Average Wind Speed
(Weather) 28 0 18.57 2.87 0.21 -0.87 No
Due to the data’s structures, I was able to not reduce the number of observations 
by using lagged independent variables. This was because I had access to measures of 
operational intensity from 2006 to 2015 (Frontex 2017). This meant that I could provide 
measures of operational intensity in periods prior to 2009 and 2015 for both data sets. I 
therefore ran my time series analysis using these earlier measures of operational intensity.
All models used Huber-White, or robust, standard errors. I conducted my analysis 
in R version 3.4.2. I assumed statistical significance to occur beyond a 95% confidence 
interval.
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Table 4.3. Variables Included in JORA Data Set
Variable n Missing Mean
Standard
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Imputed
Time (Day) 954 0 477.50 275.54 0.00 -1.20 No
Month 954 0 16.35 9.07 0.00 -1.20 No
Operations Active 954 0 1.51 0.50 -0.03 -2.00 No
Operational Spending per
Day 954 0 66837.50 37161.66 0.27 -1.87 No
Interdiction Incidents 954 0 2.70 3.76 2.21 5.94
Yes;
Smoothed
Migrants Deceased 954 0 0.93 12.33 27.04 786.59
Yes;
Smoothed
Migrants Interdicted 952 2 373.98 636.49 2.78 9.16
Yes;
Smoothed
Migrants Interdicted
(Smoothed) 925* 29 381.02 269.12 0.49 -1.12
Yes;
Smoothed
Use of Search and Rescue in
Interdictions (Density) 925* 29 0.93 0.09 -1.96 2.76 No
Outside of Operational Area
in Interdictions (Density) 925* 29 0.77 0.21 -1.28 0.55 No
Operational Area: Calabria
Interdictions (Density) 925* 29 0.04 0.04 2.46 10.69 No
Operational Area: Pelagic
Islands Interdictions
(Density) 925* 29 0.68 0.21 -0.41 -0.85 No
Operational Area: Puglia
Interdictions (Density) 925* 29 0.01 0.03 4.68 22.90 No
Operational Area: Sardinia
Interdictions (Density) 925* 29 0.00 0.00 3.53 13.37 No
Operational Area: Sicily
Interdictions (Density) 925* 29 0.27 0.19 0.35 -0.96 No
Notes: * - 29 observations removed due to use of smoothed migrants interdicted variable.
4 Findings
I tested one core hypothesis: increases in maritime interdiction operational activity 
decrease migration. I formed two subhypotheses based on this core hypothesis: (1) 
increases in past maritime interdiction operational activity decrease current migration, 
and (2) increases in current maritime interdiction operational activity decrease current 
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migration. I tested these subhypotheses in the Crossings and JORA datsets using three 
model types, as noted above. I rejected both subhypotheses in both data sets. Increased 
operational activity in the past or present had no significant relationship with migration in 
the present. These findings failed to support the core hypothesis.
I modelled the relationship between operational intensity and migration in the 
2013 to 2015 JORA data set, summary results of which can be found in Tables 4.4 and 
4.6. I measured operational intensity by total spending per day and migration as the total 
number of migrants interdicted by Frontex-related maritime interdiction operations. The 
statistical and substantive significance of current operational intensity’s association with 
migration was mixed. In the simplest model (naive treatment effects), increased 
operational spending per day was associated with significantly more migrant interdiction, 
where each additional 1,000 2014 Euros spent per day was associated with about 0.7 
more migrant interdictions. Contrastingly, the OLS model found that increased 
operational intensity was associated with significantly less migrant interdiction, with 1000
Euros associating with one less migrant interdiction. Finally, OLS with time series, the 
most robust of all models, found no significant relationship between the two. The 
ambiguity of significance and direction of effect strongly suggested that there was no 
effect between operational intensity and migration.
Although operational intensity in the past had more significant effects than the 
present on migration, these effects were also equally ambiguous. This meant that while 
some time lags appeared to have significant impacts on migration, there were an equal 
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amount of time lags with significant impacts in the opposite direction of effect. There was
therefore no clear pattern in past enforcement’s impact on the present. An autocorrelation 
function identified the following lengths of days as optimal time lags: 101, 141, 160, 189, 
233, 284, 418, 484 and 516. I found eight of these nine lags to have statistical 
significance; however, four of them featured positive coefficients while four featured 
negative. Most negative coefficients occurred closer to the present while positive occurred 
further in the past. These findings suggested two things. First, the ambiguity of of effects 
suggested that there was likely no clear, unidirectional effect over time. Second, and more 
weakly supported, was that maritime interdiction operational intensity may be associated 
with less migration in the short-run, but may be associated with more migration in the 
medium- or long-run.
The two OLS-based models also tested a number of control and time variables. 
Increased use of search and rescue and externalisation of geography were associated with 
more migration. Search and rescue, in particular, had a strong substantive effect: each 1% 
increase in the use of search and rescue to initiate interdiction was associated with about 
15 more people migrating. Likewise, increasing operational intensity in areas closer to 
major migration routes  (i.e., the Pelagic Islands, Puglia and Sicily) was also associated 
with significantly more migration. I observed this despite incorporating the effects of past 
operations on present migration. These findings suggested  that while the deployment of 
search and rescue may be strongly associated with more interdiction, that interdiction in 
the present did not deter future migration.
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Table 4.5. Summary of Model Results from JORA Data Set
Model Type
Naive Treatment
Effects OLS OLS with Time Series
Variable Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error
Intercept 334.65*** 19.06 -806.09*** 146.83 -1621.06*** 129.78
Operational Spending per
Dayx1000 0.68** 0.24 -0.99*** 0.17 -0.62 0.44
sin(Month) 360.55*** 6.74 324.94*** 8.64
cos(Month) -118.06*** 8.20 -29.56** 9.11
Use of Search and Rescue in
Interdictions (Density) 1331.78*** 78.83 1502.44*** 85.35
Outside of Operational Area
in Interdictions (Density) 402.88*** 39.30 151.21*** 45.36
Operational Area: Pelagic
Islands Interdictions (Density) -324.96 172.38 401.60*** 152.70
Operational Area: Puglia
Interdictions (Density) 856.67*** 255.28 770.12*** 205.00
Operational Area: Sardinia
Interdictions (Density) -8195.73*** 1749.39 -3825.38 2094.25
Operational Area: Sicily
Interdictions (Density) -438.43* 180.14 535.77*** 158.02
Operational Spending per Day
(101-day Lag)x1000 -1.66*** 0.25
Operational Spending per Day
(141-day Lag)x1000 -1.40*** 0.25
Operational Spending per Day
(160-day Lag)x1000 3.45*** 0.26
Operational Spending per Day
(189-day Lag)x1000 -1.91*** 0.27
Operational Spending per Day
(233-day Lag)x1000 0.63** 0.23
Operational Spending per Day
(284-day Lag)x1000 -0.18 0.18
Operational Spending per Day
(418-day Lag)x1000 6.31*** 0.64
Operational Spending per Day
(484-day Lag)x1000 5.31*** 0.75
Operational Spending per Day
(516-day Lag)x1000 -5.78*** 1.01
Notes: Statistical significance beyond - *: 5%; **: 1%; ***: 0.1%. Uses Huber-White standard errors.
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Table 4.5. Summary of Model Results from Crossings Data Set
Model Type Naive Treatment Effects OLS OLS with Time Series
Variable Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error Coefficient
Standard
Error
Intercept 5845 5799 42454 21558 45994* 21245
Operational Spending
(Total)x1000 2.68* 1.11 0.31 1.13 0.02 1.13
Operational Spending
(Density of Total EU
Spending) 8649 14462 15486 14951
Average Wind Speed
(Weather) -2891.60 1218.20* -3360.50* 1237.10
Quarter 1556.00 465.68** 1640.70** 459.64
Operational Spending
(Total; 1-Quarter
Lag)x1000 32.82 23.13
Notes: Statistical significance beyond - *: 5%; **: 1%; ***: 0.1%. Uses Huber-White standard errors.
Table 4.6. Summary of Relationship of all Models to Core Hypothesis
Data Set Time Period Model Type n
Adjusted
R-Squared
Relationship to
Core Hypothesis
Crossings 2009 to 2015 Naive Treatment Effects 28 0.15 Fails to support
Crossings 2009 to 2015 OLS 28 0.46 Fails to support
Crossings 2009 to 2015 OLS with Time Series 28 0.48 Fails to support
JORA 2013 to 2015 Naive Treatment Effects 954 0.01 Fails to support
JORA 2013 to 2015 OLS 929 0.80 Supports
JORA 2013 to 2015 OLS with Time Series 929 0.86 Fails to support
I modelled the relationship between operational intensity and migration in the 
2009 to 2015 Crossings data set, summary results of which can be found in Tables 4.5 and
4.6. I measured operational intensity using total operational expenditure during the time 
period (quarter) and migration by total migrants detected by Frontex-led maritime 
interdiction operations. There was generally no statistical or substantive significance 
between migration and operational intensity. Specifically, all models either found that 
increased operational intensity was associated with more migration or not at all. The naive
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treatment effects model found that an increase of 1,000 2014 Euros was associated with 
about 2.7 more migrant detections, while the OLS and OLS with time series models 
found no significant relationship between the two. These results strongly suggested that, at
best, maritime interdiction operational intensity had no association with migration.
Operational intensity in the past also had no significant relationship with current 
migration. An autocorrelation function estimated only one optimal time lag: one quarter; 
however, operational intensity lagged by one quarter had no significant association with 
current migration. These findings suggested that past operational intensity had no 
association with current migration.
The two OLS-based models also tested a number of control and time variables. Of
these variables, only two were significantly associated with migration: weather and time 
(quarter). In particular, as average wind speeds increased and therefore weather worsened,
lower migration was observed; each increase in 1km/h was associated with about 2,892 
fewer migrants. As time passed, migration itself grew, with each quarter being associated 
with nearly 1,645 more migrants than the previous quarter – this despite the increasing 
intensity of maritime interdiction in the region. The latter finding specifically suggested 
that operational intensity was not deterring migration over time.
5 Discussion of Findings
My findings demonstrated that search and rescue as interdiction was not effective at 
stopping current or future migration. They also relate the importance of that finding with 
respect to existing theories of the purposes and uses of border enforcement in migration 
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and border studies literatures. My findings additionally bring the final answer to the three 
research questions I posed at the beginning of this thesis. Specifically, they indicated that 
the EU’s system of maritime interdiction using search and rescue failed to achieve its 
intended ends.
The summary of observed results relative to the core hypothesis was that enhanced
maritime interdiction operations were generally not tied to decreased migration in the 
present or future. Models featured relatively high measurements of fit to the data for social
science, with the OLS with time series model on the JORA data, for instance, having an 
adjusted R-squared of 0.86 (Table 4.6). Most of the strength of fit, however, was 
attributeable to the effect of search and rescue in interdiction (see Chapter 3), whereas 
operational intensity was only weakly correlated with migration in the present or future. 
These findings held despite passing multiple checks to model validity, such as Durbin-
Watson, Breusch-Pagan, Bonferroni, among other, tests. These facts fail to support the 
core hypothesis that maritime interdiction operational intensity was associated with less 
migration, neither for statistical nor substantive significance. This occurred despite the 
relative strength of the final models involved, meaning that, while room for bias exists, it 
may be too small for operational intensity to have a consistent effect on migration either 
in the present or the future.
My findings provided evidence by which to partly evaluate previous theories of the
effectiveness of maritime interdiction operations using search and rescue. First, 
operational intensity had no discernible or even a positive effect on migration in nearly all
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cases. This meant that MIOs were not an effective deterrent of current or future migration.
This conclusion fails to support EU policymakers in Frontex and beyond, as well as 
academics such as Miltner (2006), Carling (2007) and Tondini (2010). Contrastingly, 
MIOs’ lack of effective supported border studies literature which argued that they were 
not effective, such as Williams and Mountz (2018). This meant that my findings fail to 
support theories of maritime interdiction which explicitly require its effectiveness at 
deterrence.
Second, the ineffectiveness of maritime interdiction operations served to test 
theories which depended on its presence to support their causal hypotheses. My results 
failed to support those who argued that MIOs functioned primarily as parts of migration 
management in controlling or stop movement (e.g., Carling 2007; Miltner 2006). This was
because their observed ineffectiveness substantially reduced their ability to serve as tools 
to control or stop migrant mobility – at least prior to interdiction. Theories that used the 
ineffectiveness of MIOs to support their causal hypotheses, however, had more evidence 
to support their positions. So, for instance, ineffectiveness supported scholars such as 
Pugh (2004) and Tazzioli (2016) who argued that it reflected that MIOs served more as 
political tools than migration management. It also supported my arguments in Chapter 2, 
where I identified and explored how the creation of a unified maritime patrols network 
was ultimately a political production. It additionally aligned with my arguments on how 
such operations persisted despite their general ineffectiveness.
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The inclusion of these findings brings the final answer to my dissertation’s three 
research questions. Chapter 2 showed how it was possible that the European Patrols 
Network came into existence in the EU by 2006. It also identified how and why the EU, 
and later Frontex, intentionally designed this system of interdiction as well as the 
importance of search and rescue within it. These two properties formed the analytical 
focus of Chapter 3. Here I explored and mapped the functions of each maritime 
interdiction operation in the Central Mediterranean Sea during the first ten years of the 
EPN.  I empirically demonstrated that search and rescue was the main mechanisms by 
which these MIOs interdicted migrants at sea. These findings culminated in this chapter, 
where I made the first empirical assessment of whether search and rescue as interdiction 
was effective at stopping current or future migration. In sum, my dissertation has now 
explored and mapped (1) how and why a system of regular maritime interdiction arose in 
the Central Mediterranean Sea, (2) how that system functioned to achieve its ends, and (3)
whether or not it achieved those ends. My conclusion based on my findings above was that
the EU’s system of maritime interdiction failed to achieve its ends – at least with respect 
to migrant deterrence.
6 Discussion of Limitations
While my findings represented the most advanced analysis on the most detailed 
interdiction and migration data to date, they had a number of important limitations. I 
begin by exploring methodological limitations and then conclude with data limitations. 
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One limitation was the generalisability of findings. While it was clear that time 
series analysis failed to support that MIOs were effective in deterring current or future 
migration by boat, this inference was limited to the Central Mediterranean Sea between 
2009 and 2015. In the Appendix, I expand this analysis to August 2017 and find similar 
results; however, analysing other regions lays beyond this dissertation’s scope. It was 
ultimately possible therefore that these findings were a statistical outlier: either a special 
case modulated by unique circumstances or simply a statistical fluke. Given the data’s 
extensive coverage and the parallel use of MIO tactics throughout the EU, I would expect 
similar findings for MIOs in this region between 2009 and 2017. This implication was 
strongly supported by Williams and Mountz (2018), who found such a pattern for the 
entire Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. I make no assertions for maritime 
interdiction operations using search and rescue globally based on my observed results, 
though my educated guess would be to expect similar results to those found here.
Assuming that the Central Mediterranean between 2009 and 2017 was not an 
outlier, I suspect a limited number of errors or biases accounted for the lack of 
relationship between maritime interdiction operational intensity and migration. One major
possibility was that the dependent variables were poor proxies for migration. Perhaps we 
would have expected the increased use of search and rescue to have increased migration 
because migrants wanted to be interdicted by EU-based authorities. Frontex (2014a, 4) 
first made this argument during its operational planning for JO Triton. This explanation 
161
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
was ruled out by the OLS and time series models, however, since I explicitly controlled 
for the density of use of search and rescue, and the lack of effect persisted. 
Another explanation along the lines of specification error was that use of migrants 
detected or interdicted suffered from significant selection bias, which thereby made them 
poor proxies for migration as a whole. As noted, however, by 2013 “the number of arrival 
in [the] European Union undetected [sic] was very small. Aerial assets delivered early 
detections that allowed an effective intervention by maritime units” (Frontex 2014, 5). 
While a counter-argument could be made that Frontex misevaluated its ability to detect 
migration, evidence for enhanced detection via both the implematation of EUROSUR and
enhanced MIOs failed to support this position. A further potential problem with the 
dependent variables was measurement error, in that Frontex’s reporting could have been 
inaccurate. Due to the comprehensiveness of data used, a more effective counter-argument
could be that Frontex misreported migrant detection or interdiction numbers. I was unable
to rule out this possibility during my analysis due to the lack of third party verification of 
data used. It remained possible thus that Frontex could have biased my results through 
misreporting.
One potential source of important bias involved baseline bias in the dependent 
variable. Perhaps some groups of migrants at different places or times were more prone to
make journeys by boat to the EU. If this were the case and the variance was substantial 
enough, then we would have expected to observe spikes or ebbs in migration in the 
Central Mediterranean which were unrelated to MIOs. If these spikes happened to 
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coincide with increased enforcement, then I might have falsely concluded that increased 
operational intensity was positively associated with migration when, in fact, there was 
actually a negative relationship. This position failed to be supported, however, when I 
explicitly modelled at least one significant factor modulating probability of migration 
from 2009 to 2015: weather conditions. Other factors which modulated propensity to 
migrate, moreover, were not controlled for, and therefore could explicitly have biased my 
models. Ultimately, making strong empirical conclusions on this issue would require data 
on those who chose not to migrate by boat in addition to those who did, which are 
unavailable at this time. Existing evidence from other regions failed to support this 
position, though, since numerous reports documented migrant willingness to take 
journeys by boat regardless of external circumstances (e.g., Bialasiewicz 2012; Carling 
2007; Hamood 2006).
A final potential methodological limitation as considered here was differential 
treatment bias, in which migrants exposed to the treatment (i.e., maritime interdiction) 
had an objectively different effect than those who remained unobserved. If those who 
went unobserved were more likely to change their decision to migrate based on the 
presence or intensity of MIOs, then my model results would have overestimated their 
effect on migration. Although I could not directly observe this difference due to lack of 
data, it was likely not an issue for the JORA data set due to comprehensiveness of 
coverage. For Crossings, moreover, a study design with stronger controls over assignment 
of treatment groups would eliminate the possibility of differential treatment bias.
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Despite the novelty and detail of the JORA and Crossings data sets, they both 
experienced substantial limitations. These limitations were larger for Crossings, which 
was absent of JORA’s incredible amount of information. Specifically, Crossings featured 
time as a unit of analysis by quarter, which would be expected to normalise a great deal of
variance observed in operational intensity and migration by, say, day. Crossings also 
lacked particular spatial information about migration, such as spatial coordinates or 
subregion of interdiction, which limited the inclusion of known, relevant spatial factors 
affecting interdiction as demonstrated in Chapter 3. As I pointed out earlier, Crossings had
a much higher chance of experiencing bias in the dependent variable due to the higher 
odds of undetected migration. Finally, Crossings lacked many of JORA’s variable due to 
the non-existence of JORA prior to 2013 in the Central Mediterranean Sea.
JORA additionally held limitations in its data. Because it used incident as its unit 
of analysis, I had to convert JORA data to use time as the unit of analysis, which further 
required filling its zeroes (i.e., days that had no interdiction incidents). Another limitation 
my was use of data smoothing, which I used to better represent variance over long periods
that would otherwise by heavily biased by zeroes. Smoothing data over a 30-day period 
led to reduced variance in a number of variables due to normalisation, as well as the loss 
of 29 days-worth of data. I note, however, that higher variance would have likely increased
the observed standard errors in my models; this meant that the relationship between 
operational intensity and migration would be less significant due to higher covariance. I 
additionally normalised the variance of operational intensity by assuming constant 
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spending, though Frontex documentation supported this assumption. Last, my JORA data 
excluded a number of variables available in Frontex’s version due to Frontex’s redactions 
in their response to my freedom of information requests. One important example was 
detailed spatial information (e.g., coordinates) of interdiction.23 Some variables (e.g., boat 
type) that I received, moreover, missed large numbers of observations, which excluded 
their use in my analysis.
7 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated that there was no statistical relationship between maritime 
interdiction operational intensity and current or future migration in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. I found this result using a time series analysis
of complete interdiction data from two new data sets: the Crossings data and JORA data, 
which I supplemented with data on all operations in the Central Mediterranean during 
this time period. My statistical analysis achieved a fine-grained, literally day-by-day 
analysis of all interdiction data in a third of the Mediterranean Sea, including at least 
3,256 boat interdiction incidents involving 462,813 interdicted migrants over 3,241 
operational days in 12 MIOs. The scale and scope of my analysis were thereby 
unprecedented in either the migration studies or border studies literatures.
My results gave important evidence against previous theories which argued that 
maritime interdiction operations had a clear deterrent effect that made them valuable tools
23 I later received these data for JO Triton, 2014 to 2017, due to another freedom of
information request. I subsequently added a brief analysis of their distribution in 
Chapter 3.
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of migration management. It was an empirical fact that despite the increasing strength of 
MIOs in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015, they failed to stop or 
prevent migration. If there was a causal relationship between the two, then we would also 
expect a correlation - but none was present. Given their continued use, this finding 
implied that other motivations or functions of such operations trumped their questionable 
role in migration management.
Contrastingly, my results supported scholars who argued that the general 
ineffective of maritime interdiction operations reflected their political functions. If MIOs 
had no deterrent effect, and so there were other reasons for their implemenation and 
persistence, then it was possible that it would be for the theoretical reasons presented by 
scholars such as Pugh (2004) or Tazzioli (2016). While my analysis was unable to make 
any direct conclusions about political theories of MIOs, it tested a key element of my 
proposals regarding the use of search and rescue in interdiction. Specifically, I found that 
search and rescue was significantly associated with interdiction, meaning that it was 
increasingly used to justify and practise interdiction at sea. This supported my 
conclusions about the creation and deployment of a maritime interdiction network using 
search and rescue in the Central Mediterranean Sea, as explored in Chapters 2 and 3.
This chapter contributed to previous literature through a new and expanded 
analysis of maritime interdiction operations and migration as well as new methodologies. 
I particularly used the first detailed data on MIOs and their relation to migration for 
analysing their empirical association. In doing so, I expanded on foundational steps in this
166
Doctoral Dissertation:  Arriving Somewhere, Not Here                                     Kira Williams  
direction by Carling (2007) and Williams and Mountz (2018). Beyond these papers, 
moreover, I provided a greatly expanded statistical representation and measurement of 
operational intensity. My analysis was also the first to ever include search and rescue as a 
spatial tactic for statistical analysis, which allowed important conclusions about its 
effectiveness. Another important feature of my analysis was its large-scale analysis of the 
relationship between MIOs and migration, incorporating an entire third of the 
Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. I even achieved as fine-grained of an analysis 
as to analysis this relationship day-by-day – something very uncommon in either the 
border studies or migration studies literatures.
In spite of their limitations, my findings were compelling given their advanced 
analysis and detailed data. More work will need to be done, moreover, to improve, verify 
and expand them. My findings could be improved by using new methodologies and data. 
Potential avenues for additional statistical methods include expanded time series analysis 
(e.g., ARIMA) or matching methods, which, if not more robust than my approach, would 
provide further results for comparison. Researchers could use more data, specifically by 
extending JORA into the past (2012), future (2016 to 2017) and other regions in the EU 
(e.g., Eastern Mediterranean). Another data possibility would be to contrast findings from 
my data with third party data for reliability and accuracy. Future work could verify my 
results by confirming existing results using my data and methods as well as testing them 
using the improved models, as proposed above. Finally, findings could be greatly 
expanded by using similar statistical methods in new geographies, new times and 
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triangulating them with other methodologies (e.g., ethnography; spatial analysis). I would 
recommend to begin doing so by acquiring JORA data for all other EU regions in the 
European Patrols Network and reusing my approach.
Though my data and analysis experienced important limitations, my findings were 
compelling. This chapter's secondary but perhaps ultimately more long-term importance 
was its ability to give an independent, quantitative analysis of the relationship between 
maritime interdiction operations and migration. Some authors, like Marin (2011), have 
argued that such an analysis would be impossible, and therefore questioned if research 
was feasible at all. If nothing else, this chapter confirmed that such an analysis was indeed
possible, and might even be so on geographical and temporal scales unheard of in the 
fields of migration studies and border studies. In doing so, I intended to continue an 
empirical foundation for research on the phenomenon on maritime interdiction operations
using search and rescue begun by Carling (2007) and Williams and Mountz (2018). It will
remain for future research to determine whether the statistical ineffectiveness of MIOs 
found here will also be discovered in other places and times.
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5 Conclusion
1 Summary of Analytical Conclusions
As the vignette with which I began my dissertation showed, CNN reporter Christian 
Amanpour received a rare chance to shipride with a maritime interdiction operation 
(MIO) in the Central Mediterranean Sea on 21 May 2015 (CNN 2015). She believed she 
had joined a rescue mission designed to free migrants. Amanpour parsed her personal 
experiences of her journey with the Italian Navy through this lens. But as this dissertation
demonstrated, what she participated in and saw was interdiction, or the practise of 
blockading the sea to halt and control the movement of contraband – human contraband. 
Interdiction that the EU, through Frontex, practised using militarised border enforcement 
operations. The European Patrols Network (EPN) used search and rescue to interdict 
migrants before they could arrive to the EU. Despite being within the EU’s jurisdiction, 
then, migrants remained precariously lodged outside of its territory, dramatically altering 
their physical, legal and political geographies. MIOs using search and rescue therefore 
made it possible to arrive somewhere yet simultaneously not be there.
Where did migrants arrive, if not the EU? Migrants arrived in a nominally 
stateless but de facto state legal jurisdiction, which operated using Elden's (2013) imperio.
Recall from Chapter 3 that territorial seas did not bound search and rescue regions. 
Chapter 3 also empirically established that interdiction occurred far beyond sovereign 
territory using search and rescue. Naval warfare allowed use of enforcement instruments 
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up to and including capture and destruction. International maritime law thereby enabled 
states to control and management movement of migrant boats far beyond territory. 
The question now becomes one of jurisdiction: what legal regime the interdicted 
fall under. Migrants and boats without a valid flag state were nominally in stateless zones, 
since states had few legal rights to implement domestic or regional law beyond their 
territorial seas. The Government of Italy and EU, moreover, exploited interdiction via 
search and rescue to selectively apply their laws. The Government of Italy, for example, 
repeatedly claimed that domestic and regional laws did not apply to the interdicted 
(Government of Italy 2010). Yet, at the same time, they implemented laws on migration 
and border control to halt, detain and move migrant bodies and boats. Like Mountz's 
(2010) long tunnel thesis, enforcement authorities, such as Frontex, argued that 
interdicted migrants had not crossed the threshold of the border, and therefore were 
neither in Italy nor the EU. They therefore could not benefit from domestic or regional 
human rights law or asylum law. States thereby internalised interdicted migrants into their
de facto legal jurisdiction.
Search and rescue regions were spaces of imperio, not territory. In Maillet et al. 
(2018), we showed how the Central Mediterranean Sea's search and rescue regions 
internalised migrants. Imperio specifically involved a form of rule that was fundamentally
boundless, limitless and administrative. Imperio was boundless in that it had no final 
spatial boundary and was therefore not contained like territory. It was limitless, 
bureaucratic and administrative in that there were only internal checks to its power. 
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Finally, the object this imperio's rule was not space itself, but migrants and their boats. 
While interdicted migrants who arrived to the EU via search and rescue were nominally 
stateless, the Government of Italy and EU entangled law and geography to produce de 
facto jurisdiction.
The EU implemented a maritime interdiction network using search and rescue, the
EPN, which interdicted at least 462,813 “illegal migrants” in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea between 2006 and 2015. This involved 15 discrete, militarised and semi-secret MIOs 
at a cost of 126.9 million 2014 Euros. My dissertation explored and mapped these 
operations and their geographies between 2006 and 2015.
I examined three core research questions. First, I examined how the European 
Patols Network came into being in the first place. This served to show that the EU 
purposely created regular MIOs using search and rescue to interdict migrants by 2006. It 
also justified my subsequent analyses of their histories, functions and outcomes, each of 
these depended on the network having two specific properties: intentionality and 
internalisation.
More specifically, Chapter 2 identified and explained the creation of the European 
Patrols Network in the EU between 1985 and 2006. To explain its rise, I initially gave a 
structural narrative of the evolution of interdiction at sea through the concept of the 
external border. I then supported this narrative with a structural theory of internalisation. 
My central argument was that EU authorities, as led by Frontex, used search and rescue to
internalise the external objects of security via legal inclusion in order to exclude them at 
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key moments over time. The Network's creation was a deliberate policy developed by EU 
policymakers at key moments over time. It fit into a wider system of border security 
whose goal was to manage illegalised movement in "all stages and places".
Second, and based on the EPN’s properites, I examined and explored its 
operations in the Central Mediterranean Sea in order to describe them for the first time. I 
showed the existence of these operations, their inner workings and their basic empirical 
outcomes. I then proceeded to statistically reveal that search and rescue was empirically 
critical to their interdiction practises over time. I subsequently demonstrated that search 
and rescue was also vital to spatial externalisation. These analyses led me to conclude that
search and rescue was indeed the primary spatial and legal tool of maritime interdiction in
the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015.
Chapter 3 theoretically and empirically revealed that search and rescue was 
instrumental in Frontex’s maritime interdiction operations in the Central Mediterranean 
Sea between 2006 and 2015. I showed this via four analyses. I conducted a theoretical and
literature review of the key links between search and rescue and modern maritime 
interdiction. I then described the evolution of both in my study region and time. I 
proceeded to give the first detailed account of these operations to show how they worked 
to interdict migrants. Last, I statistically showed that search and rescue was empirically 
instrumental in maritime interdiction via three subhypotheses: increases in (1) the use of 
search and rescue over time, (2) outward spread of interdiction geographies via use of 
search and rescue and (3) more migrants interdicted as a consequence of these shifts. I 
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found all three relationships to be statistically significant and postive, therefore supporting
an undeniable connexion between search and rescue and maritime interdiction.
Finally, and from my empirical demonstration of the relevance of search and 
rescue, I put these maritime interdiction operations to unprecendented statistical testing to
determine whether they were effective at stopping current or future migration. This 
analysis functioned to understand whether social theories assuming or arguing for the 
(lack of) effectiveness of such operations had empirical support. Given that such 
operations were statistically ineffective, and that they had a functionalist structure, it then 
followed that there must be other appropriate explanations for their continual use and 
enhancement.
In Chapter 4, I uncovered that there existed no statistical relationship between 
maritime interdiction operational intensity and current or future migration in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. I found this result using a time series analysis
of complete interdiction data from two data sets acquired through freedom of information 
requests with Frontex. My statistical analysis achieved a fine-grained, literally day-by-day 
analysis of 3,256 boat interdiction incidents involving 462,813 interdicted migrants over 
3,241 operational days in 12 MIOs. My results gave important evidence against previous 
theories which argued that MIOs had a clear deterrent effect that made them valuable 
tools of migration management. Contrastingly, they supported scholars who argued that 
this general ineffectiveness reflected the political functions of MIOs.
Finally, in this Conclusion, I bring together and review the conclusions of Chapters
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2 to 4. I make further, speculative inferences on the nature of maritime interdiction via 
search and rescue as a means of border enforcement at sea. I review and contrast my 
findings with previous literature related to maritime interdiction and migration in the 
border studies and migration literatures. I then suggest future lines of enquiry for research 
and conclude the chapter.
2 Wider Lessons from Arriving Somewhere, Not Here
2.1 Maritime Borders
A body of scholarship addressed the location, description and function of maritime 
borders. With respect to migration and mobility, my findings support recent work that 
suggested that the border is hugely dispersed and moves with the body (Carrera 2007). I 
further this analysis by adding that this is because border enforcement authorities imbue 
and embody the border with meaning by making it the object over which they exercise 
power, as described in Chapter 2. It was therefore no accident that migration could be 
properly understood as a security threat to the EU (Boswell 2003; Ceriani et al. 2009), 
since internalisation was precisely the process through which states included migrant 
bodies and boats as security threats in order to exclude them. My dissertation additionally 
showed just how continuous and powerful the constructed political risk to the EU’s very 
political integrity had become by 2006.
My conclusions supported claims that the border’s function for the state were 
heavily political. I agree with scholars who argued that the border was located where the 
state tried to preserve its power and thereby legitimacy (Balibar 2003; Ceriani et al. 2009; 
Van Selm and Cooper 2006); however, I disagree that these states designed this place to 
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preserve sovereignty. This was because, as I demonstrated, MIOs using search and rescue 
intentionally went beyond established practises and notions of sovereignty and territory. 
These spaces instead functioned as sites of imperio via governmentality (Maillet et al. 
2018). The general ineffectiveness of MIOs moreover supported these spaces’ use as a 
form of political spectacle: a wall standing against wider social forces (Brown 2017; 
Carrera 2007; de Genova 2013).
Scholars claimed that states achieved the securitsation of migration via narration 
and construction of crisis. Hyndman’s (2015) and Campesi’s (2011) observation that 
securitisation operated by moving “regular politics” to security using a discusive rhetoric 
of emergency, threat and danger to justify extraordinary measures clearly applied to MIOs
in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. As I argued, however, those 
exposed to the process of internalisation were never part of regular politics to begin with; 
they were not pushed out from the inside, but rather pushed out after being brought in to 
the state’s politics via security. This internalisation thus represented the opposite of 
Agamben’s (1998) camp. My findings bolstered those who showed that efforts to manage 
migration tended to intensify crisis, thereby justifying its own perpetuation (de Haas 
2007; Loyd and Mountz 2014). The strength, enhancement and continuity of MIOs using 
search and rescue, despite their ineffectiveness at deterrence, uncovered their reality as a 
product of fast policy (Peck and Theodore 2015). It was apparent that these operations 
were born of rapid policy diffusion from states such as the United States and Australia 
(Guilfoyle 2009; Mountz 2010). 
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My dissertation found that - on some level - borders as colloquially understood 
simply do not exist at sea (Goodwin-Gill 2011). Maritime borders did not adhere to 
notions of the border applied on land, especially that of the topology of fixed containers 
of sovereign power (Elden 2013; Steinberg 2001). Klepp (2011) did partial justice to this 
space’s distinctions through her description of maritime borders as a “multi-sited area of 
negotiation”, where international norms were modified and adapted by various actors 
pursuing their own agendas through informal or even illegal practises. Other scholars also 
identified that the explicit deployment of MIOs as border spaces were an effort to enforce 
migration authority without remedy to international legal obligations (Fischer-Lescano et 
al. 2009; Gil-Bazo 2006) and as political spaces where states performed crisis (Huysman 
2006; Mountz 2010). Search and rescue specifically fulfilled both of these roles through 
rhetoric and practises of humanitarian emergency and international law.
Some claims about maritime borders were not supported from my conclusions. I 
particularly disagree with Carrera’s (2007) and Coppens’ (2013) assertion that the 
extension of border control into third countries required a legal basis in bilateral 
agreements, since EU states repeatedly operated in Libyan maritime spaces even without 
formalised agreement. Search and rescue was the legal foundation of these practises, 
which, owing to its partial absence of spatial limits, justified application of imperio to 
interdiction practises. I also find no evidence for the implementation of securitisation via 
internalisation as a precautionary principle to migration: the EU designed the EPN to stop
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its own clearly defined threat rather than an unknown, potential one (Aradau and Van 
Munster 2008). 
Further, and as demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4, MIOs using search and rescue 
as a border policy were not aimed at controlling who entered space, but rather how they 
did so (Gil-Bazo 2006). As Maillet et al. (2018) showed, changing the geography of entry 
using border enforcement correspondingly changed the legal and political regimes which 
applied to migrants and boats. More conclusions added more nuance to Mountz and 
Loyd’s (2013) thesis that regional analysis overlooks daily life and politics surrounding 
migrant movement. From a philosophical perspective, a sufficient explanation of 
structural social forces, including politics, must be able to describe how macro-level 
forces affect micro-level interactions, which therein contribute to structure (Little 1991). 
While I concur that we must therefore unstand contextual relations and everyday 
practises, a regional analysis facilitates the connexion of those forces to larger social 
forces which constrain the everyday. Both should be understood in conjunction with one-
another, and my dissertation forms the structural side of deeper, contextual analysis 
produced by previous scholarship.
2.2 Maritime Interdiction Operations
Previous work identified, described and explained the origin and deployment of maritime 
interdiction in the modern era. The case of maritime interdiction in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea gave insight into its modern evolution and structure with respect to 
migration. Military and legal scholars understood interdiction as the "use of naval force to
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prevent import by sea of specified contraband items" (Olson 1993). While MIOs in the 
Central Mediterranean were not intended to achieve "military objectives" or act as a siege 
tactic (Jones 1983), EU border enforcement agencies used militarised assets and spatial 
strategies in order to achieve wider political goals (Bialasiewicz 2012; Tazzioli 2016). 
Obstinately cloaked in the practise and rhetoric of rescue, MIOs nonetheless confronted 
nominal free movement at sea with restrictions via interdiction (Ziegler 1995). Morabito 
(1991) made an astute observation in that, given the lack of directly applicable maritime 
law, the EU and its member states created or borrowed international practises for MIOs, 
such as search and rescue.
Scholars argued that the evolution of maritime interdiction pushed from territorial 
ports and seas to the high seas to enhance efficiency (Jones 1983). Though the general 
logic of this conclusion applied in my findings, its inferences did not. Maritime 
interdiction pushed far beyond the high seas using search and rescue, and did so despite 
its demonstrable ineffectiveness at deterring migration.
Maritime interdiction operations in my dissertation made heavy use of but 
modified historical interdiction practises. MIOs, for instance, gave notice to interdicted 
ships and allowed neutral ships to continue unabated; however, they substantially deviated
in not specifically targetting other states, and failing to completely, impartially interdict all
ships in their patrol areas (Jones 1983; London Naval Conference 1909). Despite violating
these classic rules, MIOs frequently practised all available, acceptable enforcement 
measures, up to and including vessel diversion, capture and destruction (Hazen et al. 
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2003; Ziegler 1995). They also made use of military assets, techniques and scientific 
methods, such as detention, interrogation, risk modelling and statistical analysis (Dawley 
2003; Ziegler 1995). Guilfoyle's (2009) description of maritime interdiction using search 
and rescue remained accurate for the 12 MIOs in my dissertation.
My findings confirmed that operations remained centred around the implicit 
notion of "contraband". Frontex made hidden use of laws of naval warfare which 
specifically tasked enforcement with identifying and controlling the movement of 
contraband, which was destined for to carry out political violence (Jones 1983; Paris 
Declaration 1856). MIOs using search and rescue to interdict migrants mirrored alternate, 
modern versions of pacific blockade, such as embargo or naval quarantine (Olson 1993; 
Ziegler 1995). Participants in these MIOs obstinately insisted the legality of operations by
using different terms and thereby obsfucating their function as a blockade of human 
beings (Dawley 2003; Jones 1983; Morabito 1991). The United States, where deploying 
these practises against migrants originated, specifically used these terms and spatial 
tactics to human migration, which the EU and Italy later borrowed (Dawley 2003; 
Guilfoyle 2009). My findings thus confirmed Guilfoyle's (2009) claim that these practises 
had been transferred in their entirety to the EU context. Ultimately, then, MIOs in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2015 were blockades in all but name and 
deployed their most powerful spatial and legal tactics while evading many of their 
associated international obligations.
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2.3 Migration by Boat
Academics and policymakers debated the relationship between migration by boat and 
maritime interdiction operations. My findings were in a position to contribute to this 
debate. In terms of narration, scholars posited that the dominant discourses of migration 
by boat were those of transnational threat and, secondarily, protection of human security 
(Lutterbeck 2006; Pugh 2004). My findings demonstrated that these were true in the case 
of MIOs in the Central Mediterranean Sea between 2009 and 2015. EU policymakers 
further entwined these narratives in order to use humanitarianism as a necessary means to
handle the protrayed health, cultural, social, economic and security risks migrants 
allegedly posed (Hamood 2006). Given that humanitarianism in interdiction was a tool of 
governmentality (Tazzioli 2016), the use of the search and rescue regime was far less 
controversial than that of border control (Tondini 2012). It was for this reason that my 
research confirmed border enforcement agencies called their activities "search and rescue 
operations" in spite of obvious practises of interdiction (Tondini 2010).
Goodwin-Gill (2011) claimed that freedom of movement at sea had become 
effectively illusory for migrants due to state responses to migration by boat. My 
dissertation supported this claim, adding to it by demonstrating Moreno-Lax's (2011) 
argument that the EU achieved minimum compliance to international law by using a 
fragmentary reading of its norms. While the fact was that by using search and rescue, EU 
member states justified their actions based on the protection principle and accessed that 
regime's resources, the term remained intentionally legally ambiguous (Matthew 2003; 
Miltner 2006; Tondini 2012). As my study showed, interdiction had different 
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characteristics than search and rescue (Moreno-Lax 2011). To thus launch operations 
premised on interdiction at all clearly violated international norms of search and rescue, 
thereby imperiling that regime's functioning.
Migration by boat uncovered gaps in the topology of state power between 
sovereignty and jurisdiction (Goodwin-Gill 2011). Contrary to Mailla (2011), I found that
the militarisation and externalisation of the Mediterranean Sea's border spaces explicitly 
made use of alleged risks to one member state to justify EU-level action (Lutterbeck 
2006). My results extended Mainwaring's (2008) central conclusion: MIOs in the Central 
Mediterranean Sea revealed an EU policy focus on internalisation as well as 
externalisation of migration by boat.
Practises of search and rescue in interdiction of migration by boat reflected the 
EU’s deployed legalities and politics. The broad limits on restricting freedom of 
movement in international maritime law necessitated the use of another instrument for 
interdiction: search and rescue (Klepp 2011; Miltner 2006). 
My dissertation revealed that Frontex empirically conflated interdiction with 
search and rescue in its operations, and that this conflation only increased over time, until 
interdiction was effectively the same as search and rescue (Moreno-Lax 2011). This 
growth contributed to a "ratchet effect" by which militarisation drove migrants into even 
more extreme risks, which, in turn, enhanced calls for crisis management (Andreas 2000).
I showed that the instruments of interdiction even went beyond migrants boats, such as 
visa requirements, carrier sanctions, immigration liasons, which fostered imperio.
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Previous work identified wider-ranging consequences on migration by boat due to 
the operation of maritime interdiction. Although I did not explicitly analyse it, the 
continual, complete interdiction, detention and deportation of migrants would be expected
to produce a situation akin to Matthew's (2003) "refugees in orbit". Work by Hamood 
(2006), among others, uncovered that many of those who arrived in Libya, for example, 
repeated the journey. This was despite previous failure and the fact that the overwhelming 
majority of migrants were aware of the risks before they travelled (ibid). The "region" as a
spatial solution concept to this movement in my research explicitly required the broader 
blurring of the internal/external (Mountz and Loyd 2013; Wolff 2008). But in as much as 
Frontex initially developed the Central Mediterranean as a spatial solution, it continually 
broke sovereignty and territory through its focused application to migrant bodies and 
boats regardless of physical, legal or political location. States blurring the internal and 
external, then, meant to confound the positionality of migration by boat. Blurring entailed
inclusion of interdicted migrants in the margins so exclusion could occur.
To blur the internal and external in my findings then meant to confound the 
positionality of migration by boat: to include it in the margins; to make room for 
exclusion to occur. 
3 Future Lines of Enquiry
My research presents an abundance of future lines for enquiry. Here I explore five 
particular projects which I propose to undertake. First, to explore and map what happened
to interdicted migrants in my research. Second, to construct a better-defined, explicit 
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theory of internalisation for reuse in other research. Third, to conduct a deeper, 
genealogical analysis of the modern history of maritime interdiction operations in 
migration. Fourth, to extend my analysis of search and rescue’s relationship interdiction to
additional geographies and times, beginning with the EU. Last, to enhance my 
dissertation’s existing analysis using new and improved data. All five lines of enquiry will 
distinctly enhance my findings.
One of the most interesting related questions in my research has been: What 
happened to interdicted migrants? Where did they go? While, by now, I have established 
the existence and functioning of MIOs in the Central Mediterranean Sea, their 
effectiveness was but one of their outcomes. A second, and arguably as important, 
outcome was the fate of the interdicted. I therefore propose an analysis to empirically 
track the fate of interdicted migrants using process mapping. This would further serve to 
establish the human costs of MIOs as well as re-emphasise migrants’s basic humanity. It 
would also give insight into controversial practises of deportation and detention 
conducted by the Government of Italy and EU over time.
I forward two social theory-based lines of enquiry. Although I presented, 
explained and briefly applied internalisation in my thesis, its complexity and importance 
require further research. In this work, I submit to more fully develop the theory of 
internalisation via a closer engagement with social theory. I will also make use of 
multiple case studies to provide context and evidence for my theoretical positions, 
especially with respect to Agamben’s camp.
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Migration and border studies have yet to analyse the origin of maritime 
interdiction operations in migration management. This lack of analysis represents a major 
analytical gap, especially given how much work exists on migration by boat. My 
dissertation briefly uncovered an interesting, highly relevant genealogy to MIOs. Based on
this preliminary work, I propose we construct a wider genealogical analysis of MIOs in 
migration. Part of this work must entail a larger encounter with social theory to 
understand and explain why and how it was possible MIOs came to be as they are today.
Finally, I outline two further lines of enquiry based on extending my dissertation’s 
empirical findings. First, I advance to repeat and extend my methodological approach to 
new regions and times. This extension will function to verify and generalise findings on 
the relationship between search and rescue, interdiction and geography. Immediate 
opportunities will be available in other EU regions, which have the same data and 
availbility as the Central Mediterranean did for my study. Research could therefore, for 
example, be quickly taken up in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean.
Last, I submit to extend my thesis research by recompleting my empirical analyses 
with improved data. As of 2017, for instance, Frontex began releasing specific spatial data
for boat identification and interdiction in the Central Mediterranean Sea. Conducting a 
spatial analysis of these data will allow a detailed description of the routes border 
enforcement authorities use, as well as their spaces. A statistical analysis of these data 
will enable me to estimate externalisation over time in specific directions, meaning that it 
will be possible to map where the border expands to. A longer range but highly relevant 
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data improvement will be to gather data on all migrant journeys, not only those 
interdicted. My analysis currently experiences baseline and differential treatment biases 
due to the lack of control group for analysing interdiction. While this does not invalidate 
my findings, we will gain much more statistical information and accurate measurements 
of the effects of MIOs using data including all migrants.
4 Arriving Somewhere, Not Here
I chose the my dissertation’s title, “Arriving Somewhere, Not Here”, based on its 
connotations for the migrants interdicted by the EU’s maritime operations as well as my 
own life. The title is also a track by artist Porcupine Tree; its lyrics describe a personal 
transformation which brings one to a place where they never expected to be. One can only
reach this unknown, uncharted space by confronting their deepest-held beliefs and 
watching them crumble apart. Though it may seem as if all is lost, there hides a chance 
for something different – if one can only see and embody the potential of growth.
There appears a cosmic paradox living in a world where life is born, lives and dies.
To have to witness the daily loss of everyone we have or could know only to become 
cosmic fertiliser. To bear the secondary trauma of the struggle of hundreds of thousands 
of migrants to go somewhere new; to be something different. To hear how they toss the 
bodies of people they love dearly into the ocean while I get to sit comfortably at an office 
desk, reporting on it all. And I laugh at this because it is how I have learned to cope in 
having to do this over and over again. Can we be something different?
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6 Appendix: A Brief Analytical Update for 2016 and 2017
Maritime interdiction operations continued in the Central Mediterranean Sea after I 
finished collecting data for my dissertation at the end of 2015. I extended my data to 
incorporate Frontex-related MIOs from the beginning of 2016 to the end of 2017.
Since 2015 there were two additional iterations of Operation Triton. As noted in 
Chapter 3, Triton continued its function in combining and taking over from Operations 
Hermes and Aeneas. These two additional MIOs cost a total of 76.67 million 2014 Euros 
over 629 operational days active, and were associated with 286,559 interdicted migrants in
2,770 incidents (Frontex 2017a-b). This brought total statistics related to MIOs in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea between 2006 and 2017 to 14 MIOs at a total cost of 203.7 
million 2014 Euros over 4,114 operational days active with 749,372 migrants interdicted 
in 6,255 incidents.
The general structure, tactics and spaces of Triton remained similar to the end of 
2015. Search and rescue remained the primary means by which authorities initiated 
interdiction, reaching its peak in Spring 2016 (Figure 6.1). One noteable change has been 
the slightly decreased use of search and rescue towards the end of 2017 due to the 
increased presence and function of the European External Action Service’s EUNAVFOR 
Med (or Operation Sophia), a coordinated, formal EU military operation in the region 
designed to interdict and destroy migrant boats near the Libyan Coast (EEAS 2018).
The overall frequency of interdiction and its spatial location also remained 
relatively constant. MIOs interdictions corresponded with biannual, seasonal cycles, 
which experienced roughly similar peaks each throughout 2014 to 2017 (Figure 6.2) 
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(Frontex 2017a). This consistency occurred in spite of persistent increases in Triton’s 
budget from year-to-year and the presence of additional operations, like Sophia or Italy’s 
Mare Sicuro. Based on available spatial data, the average interdiction incident occurred 
near 33.6 degress north and 13.2 degrees east, which was about 40km north of Tripoli and
150km southeast of Lampedusa (Figure 6.3). This spatial mean featured a standard 
deviation of about 0.85 degrees north-south and 1.74 degrees east-west. Even taking this 
variance into account, the spatial location of interdiction using search and rescue was far 
beyond even the EU’s search and rescue regions, which terminated at 34.4 degrees north. 
Figure 6.1. Distribution and Fitted Sinusoidal Model of 
Incidents using Search and Rescue over Time (n=1620)
Notes: Blue line – fitted sinusoidal model values.
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Maritime interdiction operations were still generally ineffective at deterring 
migration (Table 6.4). Because of the presence of Operation Sophia, moreover, by the end
of 2017 search and rescue lost its significant association with interdiction in the Central 
Mediterranean. Time and geography remained significant factors associated with 
interdiction. Overall, these findings maintained a failure to support the core hypothesis of 
Chapter 4 that maritime interdiction was associated with decreased current or future 
migration.
Figure 6.2. Distribution and Fitted Sinusoidal Model of Migrant Interdiction over
Time (n=1620)
Notes: Blue line – fitted sinusoidal model values.
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The analytical conclusion of my dissertation’s update was that maritime 
interdiction operations using search and rescue continue to be stronger than ever in the 
Central Mediterranean Sea. Given long-standing EU policy and current politics, there will
be no apparent end in sight for such EPN operations in the region in the forseeable future. 
Search and rescue will therefore continue to be used by Frontex and the wider EU as an 
instrument of interdiction, affecting the fate of the lives of hundreds of thousands of 
migrants each year.
Figure 6.3 Spatial Coordinates of Interdiction Incidents between 2016 and 2017
(n=1464)
Notes: Black circles – interdiction incidents; Purple square – spatial mean; 
Purple ellipses – first and second stanard deviational ellipses.
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Table 6.4. Model Results from Analysis of JORA Data Set, 2016 to 2017 (n = 600)
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Intercept -8118.45*** 605.40
Operational Spending per Dayx1000 -5.06 3.84
sin(Month) 130.63*** 17.98
cos(Month) 188.13*** 11.36
Day 0.54*** 0.16
Use of Search and Rescue in Interdictions
(Density) 120.93 349.28
Outside Operational Area in Interdictions
(Density) -105.98 93.09
Operational Area: Calabria Interidctions (Density) 7853.09*** 1002.41
Operational Area: Pelagic Islands Interidctions
(Density) 8554.83*** 748.96
Operational Area: Puglia Interidctions (Density) 1975.51* 774.45
Operational Area: Sicily Interidctions (Density) 8564.54*** 767.86
Notes: Statistical significance beyond - *: 5%; **: 1%; ***: 0.1%. Uses Huber-White standard errors.
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